fix: use direct path value in envoy instead of query params

[steveiliop56]

Summary by CodeRabbit

• Bug Fixes
  • Corrected how proxy requests interpret paths containing query-like characters, preventing them from incorrectly matching an allowed path.
  • Preserved percent-encoded path and query delimiters in Envoy redirect targets.

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📚 Code guidelines (1)

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ℹ️ Recent review info

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Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 20290ee and aa2053f.

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• internal/controller/proxy_controller_test.go

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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The ext-authz handler now extracts the path from the raw request URI instead of the decoded path query parameter. Tests check percent-encoded redirect targets and verify that a repeated path parameter does not allow a request to match an allowed path.

Changes

Ext-authz path parsing

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Extract and validate the ext-authz path internal/controller/proxy_controller.go, internal/controller/proxy_controller_test.go	getExtAuthzContext strips the Envoy endpoint prefix from the raw request URI. Tests check encoded redirect targets and expect 401 Unauthorized when a later path parameter names an allowed path.

Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes

Change: Bug fix

Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to aa205

Envoy configurations that place another query parameter before path can cause path-based access rules to evaluate the authorization endpoint instead of the requested route. Confirm or account for that integration risk before merging.

Security Architecture Review

Security architecture risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to aa205

Authorization can evaluate the authorization endpoint’s path instead of the protected resource’s path when request parameters appear in an unexpected order. This can weaken path-based authentication requirements. Production reachability depends on proxy configuration that was not available.

Retained concerns

• Medium · security · inferred: The new extraction assumes an exact raw endpoint prefix without enforcing it. A reordered request such as /api/auth/envoy?other=1&path=/admin is accepted but evaluated against /api/auth/envoy. Unlike the base, this can skip authentication for a protected path under a path-block policy if such authorization requests can reach the integration. Deployed producer guarantees and attacker influence over that construction are unresolved.

Security review details

Security Blast Radius

• inferred — Potential exposure is to resources using the affected Envoy integration and path-dependent authentication policies. A shaped authorization URI could receive an unauthenticated success when the substituted endpoint path falls outside the protected pattern. Resource access requires the upstream proxy to issue and honor that request; deployment reachability is not established. No broader tenant, credential, or infrastructure authority expansion is evidenced.

Security Findings and Attack Paths

• inferred — The conditional attack path is a reordered authorization URI, failed literal-prefix removal, normalization to the authorization endpoint path, and a path-dependent decision for the wrong resource. The base retained the named /admin value regardless of parameter order. This regression is separate from the repeated-parameter ambiguity addressed by the new test.

Trust Boundaries and Controls

• observed — Existing controls require a forwarded protocol and nonblank host, reject conflicting auth-module identifiers, and reject URL paths with a host or without a leading slash. These controls remain, but none checks successful removal of the expected raw prefix. The added path-first test expects unauthorized access despite a later allowed path parameter.

Hardening Proposals

• proposed — Make the producer-to-consumer URI contract explicit and reject requests that do not satisfy it before ACL evaluation, while preserving the raw protected URI rather than reintroducing decoded-query ambiguity.

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name	Status	Explanation	Resolution
Docstring Coverage	⚠️ Warning	Docstring coverage is 0.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 1 functions across 2 files.	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

✅ Passed checks (4 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Description Check	✅ Passed	Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly describes the main change: extracting the Envoy path directly from the raw request URI instead of using the decoded query parameter.
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

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Actionable comments posted: 1

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🤖 Prompt to fix review comments

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Inline comments:
Review comments at @internal/controller/proxy_controller.go:
- Around line 465-472: Decode the captured path value before parsing it in the
proxy context path extraction flow, so encoded characters such as %3F are
visible to the admin block-rule check. Update the path handling near the
TrimPrefix call to use query unescaping and return an error for invalid
encoding.

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ℹ️ Review info

⚙️ Run configuration

• Configuration used: Repository: tinyauthapp/tinyauth/.coderabbit.yaml
• Review profile: CHILL
• Plan: Advanced
• Run ID: c82427ec-9cf9-4b6d-ab9f-23734adfb924

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between d513702 and 20290ee.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)

• internal/controller/proxy_controller.go
• internal/controller/proxy_controller_test.go

Included review availability: This review used your included allowance. Your plan provides up to 8 included reviews per hour; 7 remain after this review.

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✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.

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