deps(deps): update actions/checkout action to v6

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Type	Update	Change
actions/checkout	action	major	v4.2.2 → v6.0.2

---

Release Notes

actions/checkout (actions/checkout)

v6.0.2

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• Fix tag handling: preserve annotations and explicit fetch-tags by @​ericsciple in #​2356

v6.0.1

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v6.0.0

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v5.0.1

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What's Changed

• Port v6 cleanup to v5 by @​ericsciple in #​2301

Full Changelog: actions/checkout@v5...v5.0.1

v5.0.0

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What's Changed

• Update actions checkout to use node 24 by @​salmanmkc in #​2226
• Prepare v5.0.0 release by @​salmanmkc in #​2238

⚠️ Minimum Compatible Runner Version

v2.327.1
Release Notes

Make sure your runner is updated to this version or newer to use this release.

Full Changelog: actions/checkout@v4...v5.0.0

v4.3.1

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What's Changed

• Port v6 cleanup to v4 by @​ericsciple in #​2305

Full Changelog: actions/checkout@v4...v4.3.1

v4.3.0

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What's Changed

• docs: update README.md by @​motss in #​1971
• Add internal repos for checking out multiple repositories by @​mouismail in #​1977
• Documentation update - add recommended permissions to Readme by @​benwells in #​2043
• Adjust positioning of user email note and permissions heading by @​joshmgross in #​2044
• Update README.md by @​nebuk89 in #​2194
• Update CODEOWNERS for actions by @​TingluoHuang in #​2224
• Update package dependencies by @​salmanmkc in #​2236
• Prepare release v4.3.0 by @​salmanmkc in #​2237

New Contributors

• @​motss made their first contribution in #​1971
• @​mouismail made their first contribution in #​1977
• @​benwells made their first contribution in #​2043
• @​nebuk89 made their first contribution in #​2194
• @​salmanmkc made their first contribution in #​2236

Full Changelog: actions/checkout@v4...v4.3.0

---

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🔍 Vulnerabilities of moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

📦 Image Reference moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

digest	sha256:fe0990fb85c4586aaa94e599905b75a2676664f065f29bea67ebcd5b2fe88acb
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	111 MB
packages	251

📦 Base Image alpine:3

also known as	3.22 3.22.2 af829cb99e2e0ed9843029ba4b20af63bf652e3f57b9aaa049744a8b64d7c608 latest
digest	sha256:85f2b723e106c34644cd5851d7e81ee87da98ac54672b29947c052a45d31dc2f
vulnerabilities

stdlib 1.25.0 (golang) pkg:golang/stdlib@1.25.0 Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.075% EPSS Percentile 19th percentile Description The ParseAddress function constructeds domain-literal address components through repeated string concatenation. When parsing large domain-literal components, this can cause excessive CPU consumption. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.075% EPSS Percentile 19th percentile Description The processing time for parsing some invalid inputs scales non-linearly with respect to the size of the input. This affects programs which parse untrusted PEM inputs. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.033% EPSS Percentile 5th percentile Description Validating certificate chains which contain DSA public keys can cause programs to panic, due to a interface cast that assumes they implement the Equal method. This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.3 Fixed version 1.25.3 EPSS Score 0.033% EPSS Percentile 5th percentile Description Due to the design of the name constraint checking algorithm, the processing time of some inputs scals non-linearly with respect to the size of the certificate. This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains.

golang.org/x/crypto 0.42.0 (golang) pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@0.42.0 Affected range <0.43.0 Fixed version 0.43.0 EPSS Score 0.055% EPSS Percentile 13th percentile Description SSH clients receiving SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS when expecting a typed response will panic and cause early termination of the client process.

github.com/opencontainers/selinux 1.12.0 (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/opencontainers/selinux@1.12.0 Race Condition Enabling Link Following Affected range <=1.12.0 Fixed version 1.13.0 CVSS Score 7.3 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H EPSS Score 0.018% EPSS Percentile 2nd percentile Description Impact This attack is primarily a more sophisticated version of CVE-2019-19921, which was a flaw which allowed an attacker to trick runc into writing the LSM process labels for a container process into a dummy tmpfs file and thus not apply the correct LSM labels to the container process. The mitigation runc applied for CVE-2019-19921 was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when runc writes LSM labels that those labels are actual procfs files. Rather than using a fake tmpfs file for /proc/self/attr/<label>, an attacker could instead (through various means) make /proc/self/attr/<label> reference a real procfs file, but one that would still be a no-op (such as /proc/self/sched). This would have the same effect but would clear the "is a procfs file" check. Runc is aware that this kind of attack would be possible (even going so far as to discuss this publicly as "future work" at conferences), and runc is working on a far more comprehensive mitigation of this attack, but this security issue was disclosed before runc could complete this work. In all known versions of runc, an attacker can trick runc into misdirecting writes to /proc to other procfs files through the use of a racing container with shared mounts (runc has also verified this attack is possible to exploit using a standard Dockerfile with docker buildx build as that also permits triggering parallel execution of containers with custom shared mounts configured). This redirect could be through symbolic links in a tmpfs or theoretically other methods such as regular bind-mounts. Note that while /proc/self/attr/<label> was the example used above (which is LSM-specific), this issue affect all writes to /proc in runc and thus also affects sysctls (written to /proc/sys/...) and some other APIs. Additional Impacts While investigating this issue, runc discovered that another risk with these redirected writes is that they could be redirected to dangerous files such as /proc/sysrq-trigger rather than just no-op files like /proc/self/sched. For instance, the default AppArmor profile name in Docker is docker-default, which when written to /proc/sysrq-trigger would cause the host system to crash. When this was discovered, runc conducted an audit of other write operations within runc and found several possible areas where runc could be used as a semi-arbitrary write gadget when combined with the above race attacks. The most concerning attack scenario was the configuration of sysctls. Because the contents of the sysctl are free-form text, an attacker could use a misdirected write to write to /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern and break out of the container (as described in CVE-2025-31133, kernel upcalls are not namespaced and so coredump helpers will run with complete root privileges on the host). Even if the attacker cannot configure custom sysctls, a valid sysctl string (when redirected to /proc/sysrq-trigger) can easily cause the machine to hang. Note that the fact that this attack allows you to disable LSM labels makes it a very useful attack to combine with CVE-2025-31133 (as one of the only mitigations available to most users for that issue is AppArmor, and this attack would let you bypass that). However, the misdirected write issue above means that you could also achieve most of the same goals without needing to chain together attacks. Patches This advisory is being published as part of a set of three advisories: CVE-2025-31133 CVE-2025-52881 CVE-2025-52565 The patches fixing this issue have accordingly been combined into a single patchset. The following patches from that patchset resolve the issues in this advisory: db19bbed5348 ("internal/sys: add VerifyInode helper") 6fc191449109 ("internal: move utils.MkdirAllInRoot to internal/pathrs") ff94f9991bd3 ("*: switch to safer securejoin.Reopen") 44a0fcf685db ("go.mod: update to github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin@v0.5.0") 77889b56db93 ("internal: add wrappers for securejoin.Proc*") fdcc9d3cad2f ("apparmor: use safe procfs API for labels") ff6fe1324663 ("utils: use safe procfs for /proc/self/fd loop code") b3dd1bc562ed ("utils: remove unneeded EnsureProcHandle") 77d217c7c377 ("init: write sysctls using safe procfs API") 435cc81be6b7 ("init: use securejoin for /proc/self/setgroups") d61fd29d854b ("libct/system: use securejoin for /proc/$pid/stat") 4b37cd93f86e ("libct: align param type for mountCgroupV1/V2 functions") d40b3439a961 ("rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets") ed6b1693b8b3 ("selinux: use safe procfs API for labels") Please note that this patch includes a private patch for github.com/opencontainers/selinux that could not be made public through a public pull request (as it would necessarily disclose this embargoed security issue). The patch includes a complete copy of the forked code and a replace directive (as well as go mod vendor applied), which should still work with downstream build systems. If you cannot apply this patch, you can safely drop it -- some of the other patches in this series should block these kinds of racing mount attacks entirely. See selinux: migrate to pathrs-lite procfs API opencontainers/selinux#237 for the upstream patch. 3f925525b44d ("rootfs: re-allow dangling symlinks in mount targets") a41366e74080 ("openat2: improve resilience on busy systems") runc 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3 have been released and all contain fixes for these issues. As per runc's new release model, runc 1.1.x and earlier are no longer supported and thus have not been patched. Mitigations Do not run untrusted container images from unknown or unverified sources. For the basic no-op attack, this attack allows a container process to run with the same LSM labels as runc. For most AppArmor deployments this means it will be unconfined, and for SELinux it will likely be container_runtime_t. Runc has not conducted in-depth testing of the impact on SELinux -- it is possible that it provides some reasonable protection but it seems likely that an attacker could cause harm to systems even with such an SELinux setup. For the more involved redirect and write gadget attacks, unfortunately most LSM profiles (including the standard container-selinux profiles) provide the container runtime access to sysctl files (including /proc/sysrq-trigger) and so LSMs likely do not provide much protection against these attacks. Using rootless containers provides some protection against these kinds of bugs (privileged writes in runc being redirected) -- by having runc itself be an unprivileged process, in general you would expect the impact scope of a runc bug to be less severe as it would only have the privileges afforded to the host user which spawned runc. For this particular bug, the privilege escalation caused by the inadvertent write issue is entirely mitigated with rootless containers because the unprivileged user that the runc process is executing as cannot write to the aforementioned procfs files (even intentionally). Other Runtimes As this vulnerability boils down to a fairly easy-to-make logic bug, runc has provided information to other OCI (crun, youki) and non-OCI (LXC) container runtimes about this vulnerability. Based on discussions with other runtimes, it seems that crun and youki may have similar security issues and will release a co-ordinated security release along with runc. LXC appears to use the host's /proc for all procfs operations, and so is likely not vulnerable to this issue (this is a trade-off -- runc uses the container's procfs to avoid CVE-2016-9962-style attacks). Credits Thanks to Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) and Tõnis Tiigi (@tonistiigi from Docker) for both independently discovering this vulnerability, as well as Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) for the original research into this class of security issues and solutions. Additional thanks go to Tõnis Tiigi for finding some very useful exploit templates for these kinds of race attacks using docker buildx build.

[github-actions]

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Recommended fixes for image moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

Base image is alpine:3

Name	3.22.2
Digest	sha256:85f2b723e106c34644cd5851d7e81ee87da98ac54672b29947c052a45d31dc2f
Vulnerabilities
Pushed	1 month ago
Size	3.8 MB
Packages	20
OS	3.22.2

The base image is also available under the supported tag(s): 3.22, 3.22.2, latest

Refresh base image

Rebuild the image using a newer base image version. Updating this may result in breaking changes.

✅ This image version is up to date.

Change base image

Tag	Details	Pushed	Vulnerabilities
3.21 Tag is preferred tag Also known as: 3.21.5	Benefits: Image is smaller by 156 KB Minor OS version update Image contains 1 fewer package Tag is preferred tag Tag was pushed more recently Image has same number of vulnerabilities Image details: Size: 3.6 MB OS: 3.21.5	1 month ago

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Outdated

🔍 Vulnerabilities of moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

📦 Image Reference moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

digest	sha256:fe0990fb85c4586aaa94e599905b75a2676664f065f29bea67ebcd5b2fe88acb
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	111 MB
packages	251

📦 Base Image alpine:3

also known as	3.22 3.22.2 af829cb99e2e0ed9843029ba4b20af63bf652e3f57b9aaa049744a8b64d7c608 latest
digest	sha256:85f2b723e106c34644cd5851d7e81ee87da98ac54672b29947c052a45d31dc2f
vulnerabilities

stdlib 1.25.0 (golang) pkg:golang/stdlib@1.25.0 Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.075% EPSS Percentile 19th percentile Description The ParseAddress function constructeds domain-literal address components through repeated string concatenation. When parsing large domain-literal components, this can cause excessive CPU consumption. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.075% EPSS Percentile 19th percentile Description The processing time for parsing some invalid inputs scales non-linearly with respect to the size of the input. This affects programs which parse untrusted PEM inputs. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.033% EPSS Percentile 5th percentile Description Validating certificate chains which contain DSA public keys can cause programs to panic, due to a interface cast that assumes they implement the Equal method. This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.3 Fixed version 1.25.3 EPSS Score 0.033% EPSS Percentile 5th percentile Description Due to the design of the name constraint checking algorithm, the processing time of some inputs scals non-linearly with respect to the size of the certificate. This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains.

github.com/opencontainers/selinux 1.12.0 (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/opencontainers/selinux@1.12.0 Race Condition Enabling Link Following Affected range <=1.12.0 Fixed version 1.13.0 CVSS Score 7.3 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H EPSS Score 0.018% EPSS Percentile 2nd percentile Description Impact This attack is primarily a more sophisticated version of CVE-2019-19921, which was a flaw which allowed an attacker to trick runc into writing the LSM process labels for a container process into a dummy tmpfs file and thus not apply the correct LSM labels to the container process. The mitigation runc applied for CVE-2019-19921 was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when runc writes LSM labels that those labels are actual procfs files. Rather than using a fake tmpfs file for /proc/self/attr/<label>, an attacker could instead (through various means) make /proc/self/attr/<label> reference a real procfs file, but one that would still be a no-op (such as /proc/self/sched). This would have the same effect but would clear the "is a procfs file" check. Runc is aware that this kind of attack would be possible (even going so far as to discuss this publicly as "future work" at conferences), and runc is working on a far more comprehensive mitigation of this attack, but this security issue was disclosed before runc could complete this work. In all known versions of runc, an attacker can trick runc into misdirecting writes to /proc to other procfs files through the use of a racing container with shared mounts (runc has also verified this attack is possible to exploit using a standard Dockerfile with docker buildx build as that also permits triggering parallel execution of containers with custom shared mounts configured). This redirect could be through symbolic links in a tmpfs or theoretically other methods such as regular bind-mounts. Note that while /proc/self/attr/<label> was the example used above (which is LSM-specific), this issue affect all writes to /proc in runc and thus also affects sysctls (written to /proc/sys/...) and some other APIs. Additional Impacts While investigating this issue, runc discovered that another risk with these redirected writes is that they could be redirected to dangerous files such as /proc/sysrq-trigger rather than just no-op files like /proc/self/sched. For instance, the default AppArmor profile name in Docker is docker-default, which when written to /proc/sysrq-trigger would cause the host system to crash. When this was discovered, runc conducted an audit of other write operations within runc and found several possible areas where runc could be used as a semi-arbitrary write gadget when combined with the above race attacks. The most concerning attack scenario was the configuration of sysctls. Because the contents of the sysctl are free-form text, an attacker could use a misdirected write to write to /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern and break out of the container (as described in CVE-2025-31133, kernel upcalls are not namespaced and so coredump helpers will run with complete root privileges on the host). Even if the attacker cannot configure custom sysctls, a valid sysctl string (when redirected to /proc/sysrq-trigger) can easily cause the machine to hang. Note that the fact that this attack allows you to disable LSM labels makes it a very useful attack to combine with CVE-2025-31133 (as one of the only mitigations available to most users for that issue is AppArmor, and this attack would let you bypass that). However, the misdirected write issue above means that you could also achieve most of the same goals without needing to chain together attacks. Patches This advisory is being published as part of a set of three advisories: CVE-2025-31133 CVE-2025-52881 CVE-2025-52565 The patches fixing this issue have accordingly been combined into a single patchset. The following patches from that patchset resolve the issues in this advisory: db19bbed5348 ("internal/sys: add VerifyInode helper") 6fc191449109 ("internal: move utils.MkdirAllInRoot to internal/pathrs") ff94f9991bd3 ("*: switch to safer securejoin.Reopen") 44a0fcf685db ("go.mod: update to github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin@v0.5.0") 77889b56db93 ("internal: add wrappers for securejoin.Proc*") fdcc9d3cad2f ("apparmor: use safe procfs API for labels") ff6fe1324663 ("utils: use safe procfs for /proc/self/fd loop code") b3dd1bc562ed ("utils: remove unneeded EnsureProcHandle") 77d217c7c377 ("init: write sysctls using safe procfs API") 435cc81be6b7 ("init: use securejoin for /proc/self/setgroups") d61fd29d854b ("libct/system: use securejoin for /proc/$pid/stat") 4b37cd93f86e ("libct: align param type for mountCgroupV1/V2 functions") d40b3439a961 ("rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets") ed6b1693b8b3 ("selinux: use safe procfs API for labels") Please note that this patch includes a private patch for github.com/opencontainers/selinux that could not be made public through a public pull request (as it would necessarily disclose this embargoed security issue). The patch includes a complete copy of the forked code and a replace directive (as well as go mod vendor applied), which should still work with downstream build systems. If you cannot apply this patch, you can safely drop it -- some of the other patches in this series should block these kinds of racing mount attacks entirely. See selinux: migrate to pathrs-lite procfs API opencontainers/selinux#237 for the upstream patch. 3f925525b44d ("rootfs: re-allow dangling symlinks in mount targets") a41366e74080 ("openat2: improve resilience on busy systems") runc 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3 have been released and all contain fixes for these issues. As per runc's new release model, runc 1.1.x and earlier are no longer supported and thus have not been patched. Mitigations Do not run untrusted container images from unknown or unverified sources. For the basic no-op attack, this attack allows a container process to run with the same LSM labels as runc. For most AppArmor deployments this means it will be unconfined, and for SELinux it will likely be container_runtime_t. Runc has not conducted in-depth testing of the impact on SELinux -- it is possible that it provides some reasonable protection but it seems likely that an attacker could cause harm to systems even with such an SELinux setup. For the more involved redirect and write gadget attacks, unfortunately most LSM profiles (including the standard container-selinux profiles) provide the container runtime access to sysctl files (including /proc/sysrq-trigger) and so LSMs likely do not provide much protection against these attacks. Using rootless containers provides some protection against these kinds of bugs (privileged writes in runc being redirected) -- by having runc itself be an unprivileged process, in general you would expect the impact scope of a runc bug to be less severe as it would only have the privileges afforded to the host user which spawned runc. For this particular bug, the privilege escalation caused by the inadvertent write issue is entirely mitigated with rootless containers because the unprivileged user that the runc process is executing as cannot write to the aforementioned procfs files (even intentionally). Other Runtimes As this vulnerability boils down to a fairly easy-to-make logic bug, runc has provided information to other OCI (crun, youki) and non-OCI (LXC) container runtimes about this vulnerability. Based on discussions with other runtimes, it seems that crun and youki may have similar security issues and will release a co-ordinated security release along with runc. LXC appears to use the host's /proc for all procfs operations, and so is likely not vulnerable to this issue (this is a trade-off -- runc uses the container's procfs to avoid CVE-2016-9962-style attacks). Credits Thanks to Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) and Tõnis Tiigi (@tonistiigi from Docker) for both independently discovering this vulnerability, as well as Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) for the original research into this class of security issues and solutions. Additional thanks go to Tõnis Tiigi for finding some very useful exploit templates for these kinds of race attacks using docker buildx build.

golang.org/x/crypto 0.42.0 (golang) pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@0.42.0 Affected range <0.43.0 Fixed version 0.43.0 EPSS Score 0.055% EPSS Percentile 13th percentile Description SSH clients receiving SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS when expecting a typed response will panic and cause early termination of the client process.

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Outdated

Recommended fixes for image moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

Base image is alpine:3

Name	3.22.2
Digest	sha256:85f2b723e106c34644cd5851d7e81ee87da98ac54672b29947c052a45d31dc2f
Vulnerabilities
Pushed	1 month ago
Size	3.8 MB
Packages	20
OS	3.22.2

The base image is also available under the supported tag(s): 3.22, 3.22.2, latest

Refresh base image

Rebuild the image using a newer base image version. Updating this may result in breaking changes.

✅ This image version is up to date.

Change base image

Tag	Details	Pushed	Vulnerabilities
3.21 Tag is preferred tag Also known as: 3.21.5	Benefits: Image is smaller by 156 KB Minor OS version update Image contains 1 fewer package Tag is preferred tag Tag was pushed more recently Image has same number of vulnerabilities Image details: Size: 3.6 MB OS: 3.21.5	1 month ago

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Outdated

🔍 Vulnerabilities of moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

📦 Image Reference moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

digest	sha256:fe0990fb85c4586aaa94e599905b75a2676664f065f29bea67ebcd5b2fe88acb
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	111 MB
packages	251

📦 Base Image alpine:3

also known as	3.22 3.22.2 af829cb99e2e0ed9843029ba4b20af63bf652e3f57b9aaa049744a8b64d7c608 latest
digest	sha256:85f2b723e106c34644cd5851d7e81ee87da98ac54672b29947c052a45d31dc2f
vulnerabilities

stdlib 1.25.0 (golang) pkg:golang/stdlib@1.25.0 Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.026% EPSS Percentile 6th percentile Description The ParseAddress function constructeds domain-literal address components through repeated string concatenation. When parsing large domain-literal components, this can cause excessive CPU consumption. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.026% EPSS Percentile 6th percentile Description The processing time for parsing some invalid inputs scales non-linearly with respect to the size of the input. This affects programs which parse untrusted PEM inputs. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.014% EPSS Percentile 2nd percentile Description Validating certificate chains which contain DSA public keys can cause programs to panic, due to a interface cast that assumes they implement the Equal method. This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.3 Fixed version 1.25.3 EPSS Score 0.014% EPSS Percentile 2nd percentile Description Due to the design of the name constraint checking algorithm, the processing time of some inputs scale non-linearly with respect to the size of the certificate. This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains.

github.com/opencontainers/selinux 1.12.0 (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/opencontainers/selinux@1.12.0 Race Condition Enabling Link Following Affected range <=1.12.0 Fixed version 1.13.0 CVSS Score 7.3 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H EPSS Score 0.022% EPSS Percentile 5th percentile Description Impact This attack is primarily a more sophisticated version of CVE-2019-19921, which was a flaw which allowed an attacker to trick runc into writing the LSM process labels for a container process into a dummy tmpfs file and thus not apply the correct LSM labels to the container process. The mitigation runc applied for CVE-2019-19921 was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when runc writes LSM labels that those labels are actual procfs files. Rather than using a fake tmpfs file for /proc/self/attr/<label>, an attacker could instead (through various means) make /proc/self/attr/<label> reference a real procfs file, but one that would still be a no-op (such as /proc/self/sched). This would have the same effect but would clear the "is a procfs file" check. Runc is aware that this kind of attack would be possible (even going so far as to discuss this publicly as "future work" at conferences), and runc is working on a far more comprehensive mitigation of this attack, but this security issue was disclosed before runc could complete this work. In all known versions of runc, an attacker can trick runc into misdirecting writes to /proc to other procfs files through the use of a racing container with shared mounts (runc has also verified this attack is possible to exploit using a standard Dockerfile with docker buildx build as that also permits triggering parallel execution of containers with custom shared mounts configured). This redirect could be through symbolic links in a tmpfs or theoretically other methods such as regular bind-mounts. Note that while /proc/self/attr/<label> was the example used above (which is LSM-specific), this issue affect all writes to /proc in runc and thus also affects sysctls (written to /proc/sys/...) and some other APIs. Additional Impacts While investigating this issue, runc discovered that another risk with these redirected writes is that they could be redirected to dangerous files such as /proc/sysrq-trigger rather than just no-op files like /proc/self/sched. For instance, the default AppArmor profile name in Docker is docker-default, which when written to /proc/sysrq-trigger would cause the host system to crash. When this was discovered, runc conducted an audit of other write operations within runc and found several possible areas where runc could be used as a semi-arbitrary write gadget when combined with the above race attacks. The most concerning attack scenario was the configuration of sysctls. Because the contents of the sysctl are free-form text, an attacker could use a misdirected write to write to /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern and break out of the container (as described in CVE-2025-31133, kernel upcalls are not namespaced and so coredump helpers will run with complete root privileges on the host). Even if the attacker cannot configure custom sysctls, a valid sysctl string (when redirected to /proc/sysrq-trigger) can easily cause the machine to hang. Note that the fact that this attack allows you to disable LSM labels makes it a very useful attack to combine with CVE-2025-31133 (as one of the only mitigations available to most users for that issue is AppArmor, and this attack would let you bypass that). However, the misdirected write issue above means that you could also achieve most of the same goals without needing to chain together attacks. Patches This advisory is being published as part of a set of three advisories: CVE-2025-31133 CVE-2025-52881 CVE-2025-52565 The patches fixing this issue have accordingly been combined into a single patchset. The following patches from that patchset resolve the issues in this advisory: db19bbed5348 ("internal/sys: add VerifyInode helper") 6fc191449109 ("internal: move utils.MkdirAllInRoot to internal/pathrs") ff94f9991bd3 ("*: switch to safer securejoin.Reopen") 44a0fcf685db ("go.mod: update to github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin@v0.5.0") 77889b56db93 ("internal: add wrappers for securejoin.Proc*") fdcc9d3cad2f ("apparmor: use safe procfs API for labels") ff6fe1324663 ("utils: use safe procfs for /proc/self/fd loop code") b3dd1bc562ed ("utils: remove unneeded EnsureProcHandle") 77d217c7c377 ("init: write sysctls using safe procfs API") 435cc81be6b7 ("init: use securejoin for /proc/self/setgroups") d61fd29d854b ("libct/system: use securejoin for /proc/$pid/stat") 4b37cd93f86e ("libct: align param type for mountCgroupV1/V2 functions") d40b3439a961 ("rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets") ed6b1693b8b3 ("selinux: use safe procfs API for labels") Please note that this patch includes a private patch for github.com/opencontainers/selinux that could not be made public through a public pull request (as it would necessarily disclose this embargoed security issue). The patch includes a complete copy of the forked code and a replace directive (as well as go mod vendor applied), which should still work with downstream build systems. If you cannot apply this patch, you can safely drop it -- some of the other patches in this series should block these kinds of racing mount attacks entirely. See selinux: migrate to pathrs-lite procfs API opencontainers/selinux#237 for the upstream patch. 3f925525b44d ("rootfs: re-allow dangling symlinks in mount targets") a41366e74080 ("openat2: improve resilience on busy systems") runc 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3 have been released and all contain fixes for these issues. As per runc's new release model, runc 1.1.x and earlier are no longer supported and thus have not been patched. Mitigations Do not run untrusted container images from unknown or unverified sources. For the basic no-op attack, this attack allows a container process to run with the same LSM labels as runc. For most AppArmor deployments this means it will be unconfined, and for SELinux it will likely be container_runtime_t. Runc has not conducted in-depth testing of the impact on SELinux -- it is possible that it provides some reasonable protection but it seems likely that an attacker could cause harm to systems even with such an SELinux setup. For the more involved redirect and write gadget attacks, unfortunately most LSM profiles (including the standard container-selinux profiles) provide the container runtime access to sysctl files (including /proc/sysrq-trigger) and so LSMs likely do not provide much protection against these attacks. Using rootless containers provides some protection against these kinds of bugs (privileged writes in runc being redirected) -- by having runc itself be an unprivileged process, in general you would expect the impact scope of a runc bug to be less severe as it would only have the privileges afforded to the host user which spawned runc. For this particular bug, the privilege escalation caused by the inadvertent write issue is entirely mitigated with rootless containers because the unprivileged user that the runc process is executing as cannot write to the aforementioned procfs files (even intentionally). Other Runtimes As this vulnerability boils down to a fairly easy-to-make logic bug, runc has provided information to other OCI (crun, youki) and non-OCI (LXC) container runtimes about this vulnerability. Based on discussions with other runtimes, it seems that crun and youki may have similar security issues and will release a co-ordinated security release along with runc. LXC appears to use the host's /proc for all procfs operations, and so is likely not vulnerable to this issue (this is a trade-off -- runc uses the container's procfs to avoid CVE-2016-9962-style attacks). Credits Thanks to Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) and Tõnis Tiigi (@tonistiigi from Docker) for both independently discovering this vulnerability, as well as Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) for the original research into this class of security issues and solutions. Additional thanks go to Tõnis Tiigi for finding some very useful exploit templates for these kinds of race attacks using docker buildx build.

golang.org/x/crypto 0.42.0 (golang) pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@0.42.0 Affected range <0.43.0 Fixed version 0.43.0 EPSS Score 0.018% EPSS Percentile 3rd percentile Description SSH clients receiving SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS when expecting a typed response will panic and cause early termination of the client process.

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Recommended fixes for image moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

Base image is alpine:3

Name	3.22.2
Digest	sha256:85f2b723e106c34644cd5851d7e81ee87da98ac54672b29947c052a45d31dc2f
Vulnerabilities
Pushed	1 month ago
Size	3.8 MB
Packages	20
OS	3.22.2

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Tag	Details	Pushed	Vulnerabilities
3.21 Tag is preferred tag Also known as: 3.21.5	Benefits: Image is smaller by 156 KB Minor OS version update Image contains 1 fewer package Tag is preferred tag Tag was pushed more recently Image has same number of vulnerabilities Image details: Size: 3.6 MB OS: 3.21.5	1 month ago

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🔍 Vulnerabilities of moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

📦 Image Reference moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

digest	sha256:fe0990fb85c4586aaa94e599905b75a2676664f065f29bea67ebcd5b2fe88acb
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	111 MB
packages	251

📦 Base Image alpine:3

also known as	3.22 3.22.2 af829cb99e2e0ed9843029ba4b20af63bf652e3f57b9aaa049744a8b64d7c608 latest
digest	sha256:85f2b723e106c34644cd5851d7e81ee87da98ac54672b29947c052a45d31dc2f
vulnerabilities

stdlib 1.25.0 (golang) pkg:golang/stdlib@1.25.0 Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.026% EPSS Percentile 6th percentile Description The ParseAddress function constructeds domain-literal address components through repeated string concatenation. When parsing large domain-literal components, this can cause excessive CPU consumption. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.026% EPSS Percentile 6th percentile Description The processing time for parsing some invalid inputs scales non-linearly with respect to the size of the input. This affects programs which parse untrusted PEM inputs. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.2 Fixed version 1.25.2 EPSS Score 0.014% EPSS Percentile 2nd percentile Description Validating certificate chains which contain DSA public keys can cause programs to panic, due to a interface cast that assumes they implement the Equal method. This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains. Affected range >=1.25.0 <1.25.3 Fixed version 1.25.3 EPSS Score 0.014% EPSS Percentile 2nd percentile Description Due to the design of the name constraint checking algorithm, the processing time of some inputs scale non-linearly with respect to the size of the certificate. This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains.

github.com/opencontainers/selinux 1.12.0 (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/opencontainers/selinux@1.12.0 Race Condition Enabling Link Following Affected range <=1.12.0 Fixed version 1.13.0 CVSS Score 7.3 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H EPSS Score 0.022% EPSS Percentile 5th percentile Description Impact This attack is primarily a more sophisticated version of CVE-2019-19921, which was a flaw which allowed an attacker to trick runc into writing the LSM process labels for a container process into a dummy tmpfs file and thus not apply the correct LSM labels to the container process. The mitigation runc applied for CVE-2019-19921 was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when runc writes LSM labels that those labels are actual procfs files. Rather than using a fake tmpfs file for /proc/self/attr/<label>, an attacker could instead (through various means) make /proc/self/attr/<label> reference a real procfs file, but one that would still be a no-op (such as /proc/self/sched). This would have the same effect but would clear the "is a procfs file" check. Runc is aware that this kind of attack would be possible (even going so far as to discuss this publicly as "future work" at conferences), and runc is working on a far more comprehensive mitigation of this attack, but this security issue was disclosed before runc could complete this work. In all known versions of runc, an attacker can trick runc into misdirecting writes to /proc to other procfs files through the use of a racing container with shared mounts (runc has also verified this attack is possible to exploit using a standard Dockerfile with docker buildx build as that also permits triggering parallel execution of containers with custom shared mounts configured). This redirect could be through symbolic links in a tmpfs or theoretically other methods such as regular bind-mounts. Note that while /proc/self/attr/<label> was the example used above (which is LSM-specific), this issue affect all writes to /proc in runc and thus also affects sysctls (written to /proc/sys/...) and some other APIs. Additional Impacts While investigating this issue, runc discovered that another risk with these redirected writes is that they could be redirected to dangerous files such as /proc/sysrq-trigger rather than just no-op files like /proc/self/sched. For instance, the default AppArmor profile name in Docker is docker-default, which when written to /proc/sysrq-trigger would cause the host system to crash. When this was discovered, runc conducted an audit of other write operations within runc and found several possible areas where runc could be used as a semi-arbitrary write gadget when combined with the above race attacks. The most concerning attack scenario was the configuration of sysctls. Because the contents of the sysctl are free-form text, an attacker could use a misdirected write to write to /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern and break out of the container (as described in CVE-2025-31133, kernel upcalls are not namespaced and so coredump helpers will run with complete root privileges on the host). Even if the attacker cannot configure custom sysctls, a valid sysctl string (when redirected to /proc/sysrq-trigger) can easily cause the machine to hang. Note that the fact that this attack allows you to disable LSM labels makes it a very useful attack to combine with CVE-2025-31133 (as one of the only mitigations available to most users for that issue is AppArmor, and this attack would let you bypass that). However, the misdirected write issue above means that you could also achieve most of the same goals without needing to chain together attacks. Patches This advisory is being published as part of a set of three advisories: CVE-2025-31133 CVE-2025-52881 CVE-2025-52565 The patches fixing this issue have accordingly been combined into a single patchset. The following patches from that patchset resolve the issues in this advisory: db19bbed5348 ("internal/sys: add VerifyInode helper") 6fc191449109 ("internal: move utils.MkdirAllInRoot to internal/pathrs") ff94f9991bd3 ("*: switch to safer securejoin.Reopen") 44a0fcf685db ("go.mod: update to github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin@v0.5.0") 77889b56db93 ("internal: add wrappers for securejoin.Proc*") fdcc9d3cad2f ("apparmor: use safe procfs API for labels") ff6fe1324663 ("utils: use safe procfs for /proc/self/fd loop code") b3dd1bc562ed ("utils: remove unneeded EnsureProcHandle") 77d217c7c377 ("init: write sysctls using safe procfs API") 435cc81be6b7 ("init: use securejoin for /proc/self/setgroups") d61fd29d854b ("libct/system: use securejoin for /proc/$pid/stat") 4b37cd93f86e ("libct: align param type for mountCgroupV1/V2 functions") d40b3439a961 ("rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets") ed6b1693b8b3 ("selinux: use safe procfs API for labels") Please note that this patch includes a private patch for github.com/opencontainers/selinux that could not be made public through a public pull request (as it would necessarily disclose this embargoed security issue). The patch includes a complete copy of the forked code and a replace directive (as well as go mod vendor applied), which should still work with downstream build systems. If you cannot apply this patch, you can safely drop it -- some of the other patches in this series should block these kinds of racing mount attacks entirely. See selinux: migrate to pathrs-lite procfs API opencontainers/selinux#237 for the upstream patch. 3f925525b44d ("rootfs: re-allow dangling symlinks in mount targets") a41366e74080 ("openat2: improve resilience on busy systems") runc 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3 have been released and all contain fixes for these issues. As per runc's new release model, runc 1.1.x and earlier are no longer supported and thus have not been patched. Mitigations Do not run untrusted container images from unknown or unverified sources. For the basic no-op attack, this attack allows a container process to run with the same LSM labels as runc. For most AppArmor deployments this means it will be unconfined, and for SELinux it will likely be container_runtime_t. Runc has not conducted in-depth testing of the impact on SELinux -- it is possible that it provides some reasonable protection but it seems likely that an attacker could cause harm to systems even with such an SELinux setup. For the more involved redirect and write gadget attacks, unfortunately most LSM profiles (including the standard container-selinux profiles) provide the container runtime access to sysctl files (including /proc/sysrq-trigger) and so LSMs likely do not provide much protection against these attacks. Using rootless containers provides some protection against these kinds of bugs (privileged writes in runc being redirected) -- by having runc itself be an unprivileged process, in general you would expect the impact scope of a runc bug to be less severe as it would only have the privileges afforded to the host user which spawned runc. For this particular bug, the privilege escalation caused by the inadvertent write issue is entirely mitigated with rootless containers because the unprivileged user that the runc process is executing as cannot write to the aforementioned procfs files (even intentionally). Other Runtimes As this vulnerability boils down to a fairly easy-to-make logic bug, runc has provided information to other OCI (crun, youki) and non-OCI (LXC) container runtimes about this vulnerability. Based on discussions with other runtimes, it seems that crun and youki may have similar security issues and will release a co-ordinated security release along with runc. LXC appears to use the host's /proc for all procfs operations, and so is likely not vulnerable to this issue (this is a trade-off -- runc uses the container's procfs to avoid CVE-2016-9962-style attacks). Credits Thanks to Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) and Tõnis Tiigi (@tonistiigi from Docker) for both independently discovering this vulnerability, as well as Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) for the original research into this class of security issues and solutions. Additional thanks go to Tõnis Tiigi for finding some very useful exploit templates for these kinds of race attacks using docker buildx build.

golang.org/x/crypto 0.42.0 (golang) pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@0.42.0 Affected range <0.43.0 Fixed version 0.43.0 EPSS Score 0.018% EPSS Percentile 3rd percentile Description SSH clients receiving SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS when expecting a typed response will panic and cause early termination of the client process.

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Recommended fixes for image moby/buildkit:buildx-stable-1

Base image is alpine:3

Name	3.22.2
Digest	sha256:85f2b723e106c34644cd5851d7e81ee87da98ac54672b29947c052a45d31dc2f
Vulnerabilities
Pushed	1 month ago
Size	3.8 MB
Packages	20
OS	3.22.2

The base image is also available under the supported tag(s): 3.22, 3.22.2, latest

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Tag	Details	Pushed	Vulnerabilities
3.21 Tag is preferred tag Also known as: 3.21.5	Benefits: Image is smaller by 156 KB Minor OS version update Image contains 1 fewer package Tag is preferred tag Tag was pushed more recently Image has same number of vulnerabilities Image details: Size: 3.6 MB OS: 3.21.5	1 month ago

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🔍 Vulnerabilities of wayofdev/nginx:latest

📦 Image Reference wayofdev/nginx:latest

digest	sha256:f9906bbd502cadcef096547eb29e7668bc2799a618c6ad8edb66a4e44e357860
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	32 MB
packages	88

📦 Base Image nginx:1-alpine

also known as	1-alpine3.23 1.29-alpine 1.29-alpine3.23 1.29.4-alpine 1.29.4-alpine3.23 29a30e3c0dd4df5c388b40cff9d145fa8040f440bb993c5eb1a02ef109a87193 alpine alpine3.23 mainline-alpine mainline-alpine3.23
digest	sha256:e7e5b7fa7a0b1ab2f59d6066092a6d35984864cc8baf2cff7c088ee409657e57
vulnerabilities

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Recommended fixes for image wayofdev/nginx:latest

Base image is nginx:1-alpine

Name	1.29.4-alpine
Digest	sha256:e7e5b7fa7a0b1ab2f59d6066092a6d35984864cc8baf2cff7c088ee409657e57
Vulnerabilities
Pushed	1 week ago
Size	26 MB
Packages	88
Flavor	alpine
Runtime	1.29.4

The base image is also available under the supported tag(s): 1-alpine3.23, 1.29-alpine, 1.29-alpine3.23, 1.29.4-alpine, 1.29.4-alpine3.23, alpine, alpine3.23, mainline-alpine, mainline-alpine3.23

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Tag	Details	Pushed	Vulnerabilities
1-alpine-slim Minor runtime version update Also known as: 1.29.4-alpine-slim 1.29-alpine-slim alpine-slim alpine3.23-slim 1-alpine3.23-slim 1.29-alpine3.23-slim mainline-alpine-slim 1.29.4-alpine3.23-slim mainline-alpine3.23-slim	Benefits: Same OS detected Minor runtime version update Image is smaller by 19 MB Image contains 62 fewer packages Image introduces no new vulnerability but removes 7 Tag is using slim variant 1-alpine-slim was pulled 215K times last month Image details: Size: 5.7 MB Flavor: alpine Runtime: 1.29.4	1 month ago

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🔍 Vulnerabilities of wayofdev/nginx:latest

📦 Image Reference wayofdev/nginx:latest

digest	sha256:5b0304958633cc8e19409a7ae4373099266cad5fadb211c388ce877807d8f1d4
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	32 MB
packages	88

📦 Base Image nginx:1-alpine

also known as	1-alpine3.23 1.29-alpine 1.29-alpine3.23 1.29.4-alpine 1.29.4-alpine3.23 29a30e3c0dd4df5c388b40cff9d145fa8040f440bb993c5eb1a02ef109a87193 alpine alpine3.23 mainline-alpine mainline-alpine3.23
digest	sha256:e7e5b7fa7a0b1ab2f59d6066092a6d35984864cc8baf2cff7c088ee409657e57
vulnerabilities

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Recommended fixes for image wayofdev/nginx:latest

Base image is nginx:1-alpine

Name	1.29.4-alpine
Digest	sha256:e7e5b7fa7a0b1ab2f59d6066092a6d35984864cc8baf2cff7c088ee409657e57
Vulnerabilities
Pushed	1 week ago
Size	26 MB
Packages	88
Flavor	alpine
Runtime	1.29.4

The base image is also available under the supported tag(s): 1-alpine3.23, 1.29-alpine, 1.29-alpine3.23, 1.29.4-alpine, 1.29.4-alpine3.23, alpine, alpine3.23, mainline-alpine, mainline-alpine3.23

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Tag	Details	Pushed	Vulnerabilities
1-alpine-slim Minor runtime version update Also known as: 1.29.4-alpine-slim 1.29-alpine-slim alpine-slim alpine3.23-slim 1-alpine3.23-slim 1.29-alpine3.23-slim mainline-alpine-slim 1.29.4-alpine3.23-slim mainline-alpine3.23-slim	Benefits: Same OS detected Minor runtime version update Image is smaller by 19 MB Image contains 62 fewer packages Image introduces no new vulnerability but removes 7 Tag is using slim variant 1-alpine-slim was pulled 215K times last month Image details: Size: 5.7 MB Flavor: alpine Runtime: 1.29.4	1 month ago