This repository ships markdown skills and local install scripts. There is no networked service and no runtime sandbox.
Do not curl | bash unsigned HEAD. Do not treat npx skills add owner/repo without a tag as a pin — that follows whatever the default
branch is today.
Verified path:
git clone --branch vX.Y.Z --depth 1 \
https://github.com/protocol/perun.git
cd perun
# optional: sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
./install.sh /path/to/your/projectReplace vX.Y.Z with a published release tag (see GitHub Releases). The
AGENTS.md stamp records Installed: **x.y.z** (@ sha) after copy.
SHA256SUMS covers the three skill trees under .claude/skills/.
Regenerate with bash scripts/write-checksums.sh. Lane PRs do not commit it;
the land commit (the one that bumps VERSION) does, and CI checks the file
against the tree there. This is a content hash, not OpenSSF Model Signing —
do not claim a signed skill.
Optional marketplace path, still pinned:
npx skills add protocol/perun#vX.Y.Z --skill deep-code-reviewPrefer --copy over a symlink that auto-updates. npx skills update
without a re-review is AST07. Default-on auto-update runs remote code from release tags: that high risk is MITIGATED by the
auto_update_delay_h cooldown (default 72h), not closed; it closes only once tags are signed and a release-signers file ships.
Signed releases: if .claude/skills/agentic-delivery/release-signers (ssh allowed_signers) exists, land-release.sh and release.yml refuse any release tag that does not verify against it; absent file = unchanged. The signers file is read from the base branch, not the tagged tree. The release.yml step only catches accidental unsigned tags: a tag-push workflow runs from the tagged commit, so a hostile tagger can edit it away. The real control is consumer-side perun_auto_update running verify-tag against the installed release-signers; also restrict v* tag creation to admins with a tag ruleset. The first release-signers file reaches an install through an update that could not yet be verified (trust on first use); installs made after it ships verify every later tag.
Open a private GitHub security advisory on this repository, or an issue if the finding is already public. Do not file a proof-of-concept exploit against systems you do not own.
install.shis localcp -R. It does not sign the payload.- Required-review branch protection is off so a same-owner merge is not
trapped. Status check
gatesis required. - Secret-scanning validity checks and non-provider patterns are GitHub
product settings; they may need GitHub Secret Protection. Do not claim
they are on unless the live
security_and_analysispayload says so.