[ralyodio]

Turns c0mpute dm from a local keygen stub into working peer-to-peer, end-to-end encrypted one-to-one messaging. No coordinator is involved.

How it works

• Addresses are public keys. An address is a hash of all four public keys (X25519, ML-KEM-768, Ed25519, ML-DSA-65). The fingerprint is its first 8 bytes. A lookup is checked against the address, so a node cannot substitute a different key.
• Sealed outer layer. Mailboxes see a rotating recipient tag, the size, and the peer that handed the message over. They never see the sender, the recipient address, or the content.
• Delivery order:
  1. If the recipient's home node is online, the message goes straight into that node's spool. The home node is announced by a signed HomeRecord that it gossips together with its dial addresses.
  2. Otherwise it is stored on the 3 mailbox nodes that rank highest for the tag (rendezvous hashing, so every node picks the same 3). They keep it for up to 30 days, within size, count and per-sender rate caps.
• Pull and ack. The recipient polls its tags, opens and verifies each message, and acks it. The ack reveals a secret only the recipient could decrypt, and every copy is deleted.
• Local state. Contacts, blocklist, inbox and replay guard are stored in chat-state.enc, encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a key derived from the chat seed.

Changes

• c0mpute-secure-chat: new modules identity, sealed, mailbox, placement and state.
• c0mpute-net: a new /c0mpute/rpc/1.0.0 request/response protocol for named services (RpcHandler, register_rpc, rpc, connected_peers). Bodies are capped at 1 MiB per request and 8 MiB per response.
• c0mpute-core::dm: the network service, plus a new Role::Mailbox. The role is on by default, gateways serve it too, and the supervisor starts it.
• CLI: c0mpute dm send|pull|inbox|lookup|contacts add/ls/rm|block|unblock. The old c0mpute chat <cmd> forms still work. C0MPUTE_DM_PASSWORD is read for scripts.
• plugins/secure-chat/module.toml updated to match.

Tests

• Unit tests: secure-chat (18), plus a two-node RPC round trip in c0mpute-net.
• tests/dm_e2e.rs runs on loopback with 4 mailbox nodes. It covers:
  • offline store on exactly the 3 ranked nodes
  • pull, then ack deletes all 3 copies
  • a blocked sender's message is dropped and still deleted
  • a replayed message is rejected
  • lookup by fingerprint
  • direct delivery to the home node with no mailbox involved
• cargo test --workspace --locked passes locally, except for one failure in hosting_market_e2e (Paid hosting marketplace: d1sks-picked preferred hosts, proof of storage, settlement (off by default) #163, just merged). That test does not touch this code. It saw 4 challenge receipts instead of 3 under full-workspace load, and passed 2 of 2 when run alone, so it looks timing-sensitive.

Not in this PR

Group chats, attachments, web/TUI surfaces, CoinPay DID binding, and Double Ratchet forward secrecy.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

[github-actions]

ThreatCrush Security Scan

12 finding(s)

HIGH/CRITICAL: 1 | MEDIUM: 8 | LOW: 3

Severity	Rule	Location
HIGH	js-ssrf-outbound-request	apps/web/public/sw.js:24
MEDIUM	js-unescaped-html-sink	apps/web/src/app/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:53
MEDIUM	js-unescaped-html-sink	apps/web/src/app/layout.tsx:80
MEDIUM	sh-remote-script-execution	scripts/dev-setup.sh:25
MEDIUM	sh-eval-expansion	scripts/dev-setup.sh:35
MEDIUM	sh-remote-script-execution	scripts/install.sh:173
MEDIUM	sh-remote-script-execution	scripts/install.sh:198
MEDIUM	sh-remote-script-execution	scripts/install.sh:316
MEDIUM	sh-remote-script-execution	scripts/install.sh:354
LOW	py-ssrf-outbound-request	examples/business-strategist-agent/chat.py:37
LOW	py-ssrf-outbound-request	examples/business-strategist-agent/train.py:54
LOW	secret-generic-credential	node/crates/c0mpute-core/src/webhook.rs:1165

Snippets are redacted; ThreatCrush never prints matched credential material.

[ralyodio]

Shipped in #169 (v0.2.82) together with the hosting race fix.