v0.4.0 - AKS security rules, CBOM, PQC expansion, OpenSSF compliance and docs#191
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… compliance mappings, docs
* feat: add sentinel/ingest.py — Log Analytics ingestion via HMAC-SHA256 * feat: add sentinel/__init__.py * feat: add KQL rule — HIGH severity finding detected * feat: add KQL rule — misconfiguration wave detection * feat: add KQL rule — new resource type critical detection * Delete sentinel/rules directory * Create rules * Delete sentinel/rules * Add KQL rule for high severity findings * Add Misconfiguration Wave detection rule * Add KQL rule for persistent misconfiguration detection * Add KQL rule for new critical resource types This rule identifies new resource types with critical findings that have occurred in the last 24 hours, excluding known types from the last 30 days. * Add script to generate test findings in JSON format This script generates test findings related to security compliance and saves them in a JSON file. * Add Sentinel integration test plan and results Added a comprehensive test plan for Sentinel integration, detailing test objectives, results, and acceptance criteria for various KQL rules and data ingestion. * docs: add sentinel integration setup guide Added a comprehensive setup guide for integrating Sentinel with Azure, covering prerequisites, workspace creation, activation, environment variable setup, ingestion, log verification, KQL rules deployment, and incident verification.
* Add az_net_003.py to check NSG rules for port 443 This script detects Network Security Groups (NSGs) with unrestricted inbound access on port 443 and provides remediation guidance. * Add AZ-NET-004 rule for empty NSG detection This script detects Network Security Groups (NSGs) that have no custom security rules configured, providing details for remediation. * Add AZ-NET-005 rule for DDoS protection check This script detects virtual networks in Azure that do not have DDoS protection enabled and provides remediation steps. * feat: add rule AZ-NET-006 — public IP unassociated with any resource This rule detects public IP addresses that are not associated with any resource, providing details for remediation. * feat: add rule AZ-NET-007 — Application Gateway without WAF enabled This rule detects Application Gateways that do not have WAF enabled, logging findings and providing remediation steps. * feat: add rule AZ-NET-008 — load balancer with no backend pool This rule detects load balancers in Azure that are not configured with a backend pool, indicating potential misconfiguration or unnecessary costs. * feat: add rule AZ-NET-009 — VPN gateway using outdated IKE version This script detects VPN gateways using the outdated IKEv1 protocol and provides remediation steps to migrate to IKEv2. * feat: add rule AZ-NET-010 — subnet with no NSG attached This script detects subnets in Azure that do not have a Network Security Group (NSG) attached, logging findings and providing remediation guidance. * feat: add playbook fix_az_net_003.sh This script updates the NSG rule to restrict inbound traffic on port 443 to a specified IP range. * feat: add playbook fix_az_net_004.sh This script adds a default deny-all inbound rule to a specified NSG. * feat: add playbook fix_az_net_005.sh This script enables DDoS protection on a specified virtual network in Azure. It checks for required parameters and provides usage instructions if they are missing. * feat: add playbook fix_az_net_006.sh This script deletes unassociated public IP addresses in Azure. * feat: add playbook fix_az_net_007.sh This script enables WAF on an Application Gateway, ensuring compliance with the AZ-NET-007 rule. * feat: add playbook fix_az_net_008.sh Script to remediate AZ-NET-008 by deleting empty load balancers. * feat:add script to update VPN connection to IKEv2 This script updates a VPN connection to use IKEv2, ensuring compliance with the AZ-NET-009 rule. * feat: add playbook fix_az_net_010.sh This script attaches a specified network security group to a given subnet in a virtual network, ensuring compliance with the AZ-NET-010 rule. * Clarify description and add note for public-facing services Updated the description to clarify the risk of exposing port 443 and added a note regarding public-facing services. * Change severity level from MEDIUM to HIGH * fix: AZ-NET-005 severity changed to LOW — DDoS Standard high cost on small subscriptions * Add note about NetworkManagementClient usage Added a note regarding the creation of NetworkManagementClient directly and suggested a follow-up for consistency. * Add note about NetworkManagementClient usage Added a note regarding the use of NetworkManagementClient and suggested a follow-up for consistency. * Add additional security controls to CIS Azure benchmark * Refine control descriptions in nist_csf.json Updated descriptions for various controls to enhance clarity and specificity regarding remote access management, data protection, and security measures. * fix: add AZ-NET-003 to AZ-NET-010 to ISO27001 compliance framework Updated descriptions for various controls to clarify compliance requirements and improve security guidance. --------- Co-authored-by: Vishnu Ajith <86302373+Vishnu2707@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: add rule AZ-STOR-003 storage lifecycle policy check * feat: add rule AZ-STOR-003 storage lifecycle policy check
* docs: add SOC 2 Type II compliance framework mapping for all 20 rules Added SOC 2 Type II framework with detailed controls for security measures and compliance requirements. * feat: add soc2 to FRAMEWORK_FILE_MAP in finding.py add soc2.json to FRAMEWORK_FILE_MAP in finding.py * feat: add soc2 to SUPPORTED_FRAMEWORKS in compliance.py Added 'soc2' to the list of supported compliance frameworks. * Add SOC 2 controls for data protection and management
* refactor: add get_virtual_networks() and get_public_ip_addresses() to AzureClient * Refactor DDoS protection check to use azure_client * refactor: AZ-NET-006 now uses azure_client.get_public_ip_addresses()
- Python syntax check on all rule files - Rule structure validation (RULE_ID, SEVERITY, FRAMEWORKS) + RULE_ID uniqueness - Hardcoded credential scan - Playbook existence + bash syntax check for every rule - Compliance JSON validation for all four framework files (inc. soc2.json) - API syntax check - Compliance vs rule cross-reference check - CI summary step with per-check pass/fail table (if: always) - Fix duplicate DESCRIPTION assignment in az_net_003.py - Add pyyaml to requirements.txt for local YAML validation - Add docs/ci-pipeline.md with local run commands and design rationale - Update CI_PIPELINE_GUIDE.md with final PR description Closes #30
…d-safe rate limit (#162) * fix(reliability): score endpoint 500, DB pooling, async CVE enrichment, thread-safe rate limit Closes #150. - REL-001: remove duplicate GROUP BY in get_score() that made /api/score always return 500 - REL-002: replace fragile INTERVAL '%s minutes' string substitution with make_interval(mins => %s) - REL-003: DatabaseManager now borrows connections from a shared psycopg2 connection pool per DSN (DB_POOL_MAX_CONN, default 10) instead of opening a new connection per request - REL-004: POST /api/scans/<id>/enrich now runs CVE enrichment in a background thread and returns 202 immediately, instead of blocking on synchronous NVD lookups until the request times out - REL-005: lock-guard the NVD client's rate-limit check so concurrent callers can't fire requests closer together than the allowed gap - Fix a bug found during review: a failed enrichment write could leave the connection in an aborted-transaction state, silently swallowing the follow-up FAILED status update and leaving the scan stuck at ENRICHING forever; now rolls back first * fix(tests): consolidate duplicate module import style flagged by code-quality bot Both test_database_manager_reliability.py and test_nvd_client.py imported scanner/api modules with both 'import X as x' and 'from X import y' forms. Consolidated to one form each; test_nvd_client.py switches to string-path mock.patch() targets instead of importing the module object, avoiding the need to touch ~15 pre-existing call sites. * fix(scanner): encapsulate NVD rate limiter state to resolve unused-global false positive Replaces the bare module-level _last_request_time global (mutated via the global keyword) with a small _RateLimiter class holding the timestamp and lock as instance state. Same behavior, but removes the pattern the code-quality bot's static analysis was misreading as an unused global (it couldn't see the value is read by the next invocation of the same function via module state). * style: apply ruff format to satisfy new CI lint gate * fix(reliability): restore attempt-count check in recover_stale_scans The "mark failed" query lost its COALESCE(attempt_count, 1) >= %s clause during an earlier merge, while still passing 2 params to a query with only 1 placeholder — this would raise at runtime against a real database and would mark stale scans failed on their first timeout instead of after max_attempts retries. Restore the clause to match the tested, correct version. Also drop the now-superseded REL-002 test, whose single-query assumptions predate the retry-attempt feature; equivalent coverage now lives in tests/test_async_scan_persistence.py. * fix: remove dead run_migrations() call from create_app() A previous merge auto-resolved cleanly across files but left this call site stranded: api/models/finding.py dropped run_migrations() (schema is now Alembic-managed, applied via startup.sh) while api/app.py still called it whenever DATABASE_URL was set. Git's merge saw no conflict because the removal and the call site were in different files, but the result crashed create_app() with AttributeError in any environment with a real DATABASE_URL configured (e.g. CI's Postgres service), which is exactly why this passed locally (no DATABASE_URL set) but failed in CI.
* test: add scanner rule and engine validation coverage Expand scanner rule regression coverage so all 45 rules have dedicated compliant and non-compliant cases (includes az_net_015). Add ScanEngine integration tests for rule loading, score consistency, and rule-failure isolation. Extend MockAzureClient test support only; no production code is changed. Full suite: 170 passed. Rule regression slice: 92 passed. Engine integration: 4 passed. Note: AZ-NET-009 and AZ-NET-012 tests validate intended isolated rule logic. The production integration defects discovered during validation are documented separately in the validation report. * docs: add comprehensive validation report Document the full OpenShield validation pass across environment setup, static checks, backend tests, scanner rules, engine integration, local API smoke tests, frontend build, AI/RAG, CVE/NVD, Sentinel review, security checks, documentation accuracy, and live deployment status. The report records remaining follow-up issues including AZ-NET-009, AZ-NET-012, AI chunker syntax failure, Sentinel field mapping mismatch, stale documentation counts, dependency CVEs, and deferred Azure/Sentinel live validation. * test: relax engine rule-count assertions to >= 45 Future rule additions should not break the engine integration tests. Assert at least the current 45-rule coverage exists rather than the exact total (addresses reviewer feedback). * test: finalize validation coverage for merge * test: apply ruff format and line-length fixes to validation tests
…ials (#176) * docs: add design spec for Terraform IaC + Azure OIDC (issue #160) * docs: add implementation plan for Terraform IaC + Azure OIDC (issue #160) * infra: add Terraform provider/backend skeleton for Render and Vercel * infra: define Render Postgres, web service, and shared secrets env group * infra: define Vercel projects for the dashboard and website * infra: add Terraform outputs and module README * ci: add Terraform fmt/validate/plan workflow for infra PRs * ci: authenticate to Azure via OIDC instead of a long-lived client secret * docs: document one-time Azure AD federated credential setup for OIDC * docs: update secrets table for OIDC, add secrets inventory doc
…ing, playbook path traversal (#161) * fix(security): body size limit, Gemini key in header, AI rate limiting, playbook path traversal guard Closes #149. - SEC-002: cap request bodies at 2MB with a JSON 413 handler - SEC-003: send the Gemini API key via x-goog-api-key header instead of a URL query param, so it never leaks into logs - SEC-004: add a lightweight in-memory rate limiter (20 req/min/IP) on all AI endpoints - SEC-005: validate rule_id and confirm the resolved script path stays inside playbooks/cli/ before reading it - SEC-001 was already fixed on dev via #144; added a regression test to lock it in * fix(security): back rate limiter with Postgres, trust Render's proxy hop for client IP - Merge latest dev (ruff lint/format CI gate) and reformat the one flagged file - Replace the in-memory rate limiter with a Postgres-backed shared counter (rate_limit_hits table + advisory transaction lock) so all gunicorn worker processes enforce one real limit instead of each having its own counter - Add ProxyFix so request.remote_addr reflects the real client behind Render's reverse proxy instead of collapsing every caller into one IP - Reuse the existing g.db connection instead of a second untracked one, so it's closed by the app's existing teardown handler instead of leaking - Refuse (503) instead of silently and permanently disabling rate limiting when DATABASE_URL is unset, and roll back on a mid-transaction error * fix(tests): use single import style for api.rate_limit
…ervices (#172) * infra: add deterministic Render deploy pipeline * infra: make Render deploy workflow manual * fix(deploy): coordinate API and worker releases * fix(deploy): add resilient Render polling * test(deploy): cover coordinated deployment failures * docs(deploy): document dual-service Render releases * fix(deploy): avoid logging dispatch input * fix(deploy): correct rollback path and Render web configuration * docs(deploy): retire obsolete Render deployment guide --------- Co-authored-by: Vishnu Ajith <86302373+Vishnu2707@users.noreply.github.com>
…184) app_id/key_id are Azure AD identifiers, not the secret value itself (Microsoft Graph never returns password credential secret text after creation) — but key_id isn't needed to diagnose a malformed endDateTime either way, so drop it from the log line rather than argue the classification. Fixes #178 (CodeQL: clear-text logging of sensitive information, both findings — same log statement).
…180) (#183) * fix(security): validate embed URLs by origin instead of substring match toEmbedUrl()'s fallback branch used raw.includes(...) to check for a known-safe embed URL, then returned the unvalidated input unmodified. A crafted string containing the substring anywhere could pass the check while breaking out of the iframe's src="..." attribute it gets interpolated into unescaped, injecting arbitrary markup. Validate via new URL(raw).hostname against an exact allowlist instead, and escape the result at every interpolation site as defense in depth. Also escape the two playground select-field values that were concatenated into an HTML-shaped string unescaped. Fixes #179 (CodeQL: DOM text reinterpreted as HTML x3, incomplete URL substring sanitization x1). * fix(security): move AI provider API key to in-memory-only storage A prior fix for this same CodeQL alert removed the localStorage.setItem call for the user's bring-your-own AI provider key but left the getter/isConfigured() reading from the now-permanently-empty key, silently breaking every AI feature (chat, summary, insights, prioritisation all gated behind isConfigured()). Store the key in a module-scoped variable instead of any browser storage. It never survives a page reload (the standard, expected trade-off for a secret that must not persist), but the feature works again and the key is never written to localStorage/sessionStorage. provider/model (not secret) still persist in localStorage as before. Fixes #180 (CodeQL: clear text storage of sensitive information). * fix(security): stop leaking exception details in API error responses Every affected route returned str(exc) (or an f-string embedding it) directly in the JSON response body. Some catch broad `except Exception`, which can surface raw database driver errors, connection details, or internal paths to the client rather than just intentional validation messages. Replace with a fixed, generic message per error class; the existing logger.error(...)/logger.warning(...) calls already capture full detail server-side. In api/routes/ai.py, extract a shared _ai_error_response() helper since the same 3-exception pattern (VectorStoreNotBuilt, ValueError, RuntimeError from get_completion()) repeated verbatim across 4 routes, and add the server-side logging that was missing there entirely. Also fixes an f-string leak in compliance.py's FileNotFoundError handler that the "detail" key search missed. Fixes #177 (CodeQL: information exposure through an exception, all 27 findings across api/app.py and 8 api/routes/ modules). * fix: remove escapeHTML() misapplied to .textContent sinks Self-review caught that the defense-in-depth escapeHTML() calls added for #179 wrapped values assigned via .textContent, not .innerHTML. .textContent never interprets HTML, so escaping there adds no security value while risking visible text corruption (a literal "&" shown on screen) if the underlying value ever contains a special character. toEmbedUrl()'s URL-origin validation is the real, load-bearing fix and is unaffected by this change — it guarantees embedUrl can only ever be '' or a well-formed https://youtube.com|vimeo.com URL regardless of which DOM property ultimately consumes it.
* fix(security): harden workflow shell execution Route deployment inputs through environment variables and replace remote installer pipes with checksum-verified Syft archives. Consolidate workflow permissions so deployment validation can run. Addresses #182. * fix(security): resolve remaining Semgrep findings Pin workflow and browser dependencies, remove unsafe evaluation and dynamic query construction, enforce trusted network destinations, harden local containers, and prevent sensitive JWT error logging. Fixes #182. * style(security): format endpoint validation * fix(security): preserve validated URL suppression
…amework mappings, HNDL exposure window and migration roadmap (#187) Signed-off-by: Vishnu Ajith <27vishnu07@gmail.com>
* feat(scanner): add enterprise AKS security rule pack * style(scanner): format AKS rules * ci: document AKS SDK license exception
Two residual issues from #183's merge, found in post-merge review: - toEmbedUrl() validated the host via new URL() but returned the raw input, so an attribute-injection payload on an allowed host (e.g. https://www.youtube.com/embed/abc" onload="alert(1)) passed validation and kept its literal double-quote, breaking out of the iframe src="..." attribute. Now returns parsed.href, which percent-encodes quotes, spaces, and brackets. - The switch to in-memory key storage removed the localStorage write but never purged keys that older builds had already stored, so existing users kept a plaintext ai_api_key indefinitely. Added a one-time purge on module load (not read into memory) and in clear(). Both fixes ship with regression tests confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code and pass against the fix. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… badge compliance (#190)
Vishnu2707
requested review from
SHAURYAKSHARMA24,
parthrohit22,
ritiksah141 and
vogonPrayas
as code owners
July 15, 2026 00:50
TFT444
previously approved these changes
Jul 15, 2026
Vishnu2707
removed request for
SHAURYAKSHARMA24,
parthrohit22,
ritiksah141 and
vogonPrayas
July 15, 2026 00:51
Dependency Review✅ No vulnerabilities or license issues or OpenSSF Scorecard issues found.OpenSSF Scorecard
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TFT444
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Jul 15, 2026
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What does this PR do?
Merges dev into main for the v0.4.0 release.
Type of change
What's included
New Scanner Rules
PQC Expansion
Documentation and Compliance
Testing
Related issues
Closes #186
Closes #187
Closes #188
Closes #189