ci: pin third-party actions to commit SHA#1396
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Found during a follow-up audit after #1393. Pins the five third-party (non-actions/*, non-docker/*) GitHub Actions used across this repo's workflows to the commit SHA their mutable tag currently resolves to: - dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable -> @4be7066a (branch, not a tag) - azure/setup-helm@v4 -> @1a275c3b (v4.3.1) - aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4 -> @7474bc46 (v4.3.1) - Swatinem/rust-cache@v2 -> @e18b4977 (v2, 2026-03-12) - helm/chart-releaser-action@v1.6.0 -> @a917fd15 (already a full semver tag, but tags are still mutable refs an attacker with push access to the upstream repo could retarget) Rationale: a tag (branch or lightweight/annotated) can be moved by anyone with push access to the upstream action repo, silently swapping in malicious code the next time a workflow run pulls it. A commit SHA is immutable. This is the mitigation GitHub's own security hardening guide recommends for any third-party action, and is already how this repo pins actions/checkout, docker/*, etc. via major version tags maintained by GitHub/Docker directly (lower-risk, first-party) -- third-party individual/org-maintained actions get the stricter treatment. Each pin keeps the version as a trailing comment for human readability and to make future version bumps a one-line diff. No behavior change -- every SHA is the exact commit the previous tag pointed to at time of audit, verified via the GitHub API tags list endpoint (returns commit SHA directly, avoiding annotated-tag object SHA confusion).
chaodu-agent
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Jul 14, 2026
…pin actions (#37) Follow-up to a workflow-security audit across oablab/chi, oablab/ecsctl, and openabdev/ghpool (companion of openabdev/openab#1393/#1395/#1396, which fixed the same pattern in openab's release-pr.yml). release-pr.yml and release.yml expanded ${{ inputs.version }}, ${{ inputs.tag }}, and ${{ steps.*.outputs.* }} directly inside run: shell blocks across five jobs (resolve-version, create-release, build, docker, docker-manifest). Actions expands ${{ }} before bash ever sees the script, so a crafted version/tag string can break out of the shell string context. Threat model: release-pr.yml is workflow_dispatch-only (requires repo write access + carries an App token with contents:write + pull-requests:write via steps.app-token.outputs.token). release.yml triggers on 'push: tags' too, which is also gated on write access to push a tag. Same insider/leaked-credential threat model as openab's release-pr.yml. Fix: every inputs.*/steps.*.outputs.* reference in a run: block now goes through env: and is referenced as "$VAR" in shell, matching the canonical pattern already applied across openab's workflows. No behavioral change. Also SHA-pins dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable and Swatinem/rust-cache@v2 across ci.yml, e2e.yml, and release.yml (same rationale as openabdev/openab#1396: a mutable tag/branch ref can be moved by anyone with push access to the upstream action repo; a commit SHA cannot). Version kept as a trailing comment for readability. Co-authored-by: chaodu-agent <chaodu-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
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What
Pins the five third-party (non-
actions/*, non-docker/*) GitHub Actions used in this repo's workflows to an immutable commit SHA, found during a follow-up audit after #1393.dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable(a branch, not a tag)@4be7066aazure/setup-helm@v4@1a275c3b(v4.3.1)aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4@7474bc46(v4.3.1)Swatinem/rust-cache@v2@e18b4977(v2, 2026-03-12)helm/chart-releaser-action@v1.6.0@a917fd15(v1.6.0)Each occurrence (18 total across 11 workflow files) keeps the version as a trailing comment for readability and to keep future bumps a one-line diff.
Why
A tag — branch, lightweight, or annotated — can be moved by anyone with push access to the upstream action repo, silently swapping in different (potentially malicious) code the next time a workflow pulls it. A commit SHA is immutable regardless of what happens upstream. This is the mitigation GitHub's own Actions security hardening guide recommends for third-party actions specifically.
helm/chart-releaser-action@v1.6.0is already a full semver tag rather than a rolling major version, but the tag itself is still a mutable ref, so it's included for consistency.First-party actions (
actions/*maintained by GitHub,docker/*maintained by Docker) are left on major-version tags — lower supply-chain risk than individually- or org-maintained third-party actions, and this repo already follows that convention.Verification
gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/tags(returns commit SHA directly — avoids the annotated-tag object-SHA vs. commit-SHA confusion some other lookup paths hit) and cross-checked against the tag name it corresponds toactionlintclean on the diff (one pre-existing unrelated finding onbuild-oabctl.yml— an empty-stringchoiceoption — predates this change and is out of scope)