chock-cursor-plugins

Chock policies as Cursor plugins — guards ship a real beforeShellExecution deny hook, gates judge the write at preToolUse.

An agent running in your editor can already touch your shell, your git history, and your CI config. You want it to move fast without being the reason a stray terraform destroy actually happens. Telling it to be careful in a prompt is not a guarantee; a plugin that can refuse the command is closer to one — a matched destructive command is denied in the editor before it runs, witnessed on a real Cursor install (2026-08-24), with benign commands in the same session still allowed.

Install

Cursor reads this repository as a plugin marketplace via .cursor-plugin/marketplace.json:

# Team marketplace: Dashboard -> Plugins -> Add Marketplace -> Import from Repo
#   https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-cursor-plugins
# Local install of one plugin (developer flow):
#   copy cursor/<plugin-id>/ to ~/.cursor/plugins/local/<plugin-id>/ and reload Cursor

What you get

Two kinds of package enforce here, at different events.

Guard policies ship a beforeShellExecution hook, a guard script and a stdlib-only adapter. The hook returns Cursor's permission: "deny" response and the command is refused. This needs python3 and a usable bash on PATH — without them the hook fails open, and every guard's description says so verbatim.

Gate policies judge what a turn writes, not what it runs. They ship the policy's gate and its runner instead of a shell guard, wired at preToolUse — judging the file a write would create, before it lands — and again at stop, re-reading what the turn actually left on disk. They need python3; without it a fail-open client allows silently, but a gate that cannot reach a decision refuses rather than allowing something it never judged. Cursor does not hold the turn's end, so a refusal at stop is handed back to the agent as a follow-up message once.

Advisory policies are a skill the client reads; nothing stops a violation. See PLUGINS.md for the full list: each policy, its version, and whether it enforces or advises in this client.

Generated from chock-catalog

Every file here is compiled from policy sources in chock-catalog by chock. Pull requests against this repository are closed automatically — open them against the catalog instead.

• Generated only: CI regenerates from the pinned catalog and fails on any difference.
• Byte-identical guards: each guard script is a verbatim copy of its policy's source in the catalog, and the hook adapter a verbatim copy of its framework source.
• Best-effort, not a boundary: guards are pattern-based filters; see SECURITY.md.
• Tested upstream, and gated: every policy ships an eval suite (base/<policy>/evals/suite.yaml) in the catalog, and the publish workflow runs chock check and chock check --only evals before packaging anything — a policy whose evals fail cannot reach this repository. The tests live in the catalog because the policy source does; this repository is compiled output.
• This README is hand-written, as are SECURITY.md and the workflows under .github/, so they sit outside the generated-only guarantee.

Verify it yourself

Nothing above asks for trust that cannot be checked. This rebuilds the published tree from source and compares it with what is committed here:

git clone https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-cursor-plugins dist
git clone https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog catalog
git clone --branch "$(tr -d '[:space:]' < catalog/.framework-ref)" \
  https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock framework
pip install ./framework
chock plugin build --repo catalog --policies-dir base --format cursor --out-dir dist
chock marketplace build --dist dist --tree cursor
git -C dist diff --exit-code && git -C dist status --porcelain

Silence from both git commands means this repository is byte-identical to a fresh build from the catalog. The framework ref comes from the catalog's own .framework-ref, which is what the publish and Generated-only workflows read, so this recipe cannot drift from the release a tree was actually built with. chock-market.lock records a sha256 per published plugin directory, so one package can be checked without rebuilding the rest.

If you are listing these plugins in a marketplace, pin both a tag and the full commit SHA. The tag names the release; the SHA is what holds the reviewed bytes still.

Contributing

You want to	Go to
Fix or add a policy	chock-catalog — it reaches every client from there, including this one
Report that a guard did or did not block on your Cursor version	an issue on chock, which records the witnessed-blocking claims these packages carry; "it fails open where you say it fails closed" is the most useful result you can send
Report a bug in how packages are generated	chock, where the emitter lives
Fix this README	here — it is hand-written, not generated

Part of open-coder-ai

agentseam	the primitives — one handler API and a verified capability matrix across 16 agents
chock	the compiler — one policy into git hooks, CI gates and native pre-tool hooks
chock-catalog	the policies — 42, each labelled enforced or advisory, with replayed evals
context-report	the evidence — a signed report of whether an agent artifact actually works
chock-threat-intel	the threat ledger the catalog's policies answer to
chock-{claude,cursor,copilot,codex}-plugins	the catalog, packaged for each agent's plugin format (generated)
chock-quickstart · chock-example	template repos: what chock init leaves behind, and a full adoption

License

Apache-2.0, same as the framework and the catalog.