nvpulse is pre-1.0. Security fixes go into the latest release only.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
latest 0.x |
✅ |
| older | ❌ |
Please don't open a public issue for security problems.
Report it privately instead, either way works:
- through GitHub: the repository's Security tab → Report a vulnerability (direct link)
- by email to the maintainer, at the address in
pyproject.toml
Include:
- what an attacker can do and under which conditions (local user? needs root?)
- steps or a proof of concept (a crafted process name, a PATH layout, …)
- your nvpulse version (
nvpulse --version), OS, terminal and driver version
You can expect an acknowledgement within a week. Once a fix is released, you'll be credited in the changelog unless you'd rather not be.
nvpulse runs locally and has no network listener. The interesting attack surface is:
- Untrusted text on screen. Process names and command lines are chosen by whoever started the process. That includes other users on a shared GPU box.
- Signalling processes (
k/K), especially when nvpulse runs as root. - Executing the real
nvidia-smiin passthrough mode (PATH lookup). - The settings file, which can turn off redaction and read-only mode.
- What
--dumpand--onceprint, since both get pasted and piped elsewhere. - The CI / release supply chain.
docs/security.md has the threat model and the mitigations in place.