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feat(linear): resolve API token via AgentCore Identity (Phase 2.0a)#2

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feat(linear): resolve API token via AgentCore Identity (Phase 2.0a)#2
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@isadeks isadeks commented May 15, 2026

Summary

Phase 2.0a of the Linear v2 plan. Stacked on PR aws-samples#87 (feat/linear-processor-feedback); this PR's base is set to that branch so the diff shows only the 2.0a changes. Once aws-samples#87 merges upstream, this will rebase onto main and open against aws-samples.

Migrates the agent runtime's Linear personal API token resolution from AWS Secrets Manager to AWS Bedrock AgentCore Identity. This is the "validate the Identity SDK" step before the bigger OAuth + Gateway cutover in Phase 2.0b.

Scope: agent runtime only

Lambdas (orchestrator + processor) intentionally keep using Secrets Manager. Reason: the Python bedrock_agentcore SDK has no Node.js equivalent — Lambda migration requires @aws-sdk/client-bedrock-agentcore raw API calls and folds into 2.0b's bigger refactor (where OAuth tokens replace API keys for all consumers in one cutover).

End-state of 2.0a:

  • Agent reads from AgentCore Identity ✓
  • Lambdas read from Secrets Manager (unchanged) ✓
  • Both point at the same underlying token value (admin runs agentcore add credential once and populates Linear API token in both stores)

What changed

agent/src/config.py::resolve_linear_api_token

  • Drops boto3 SecretsManager fetch + LINEAR_API_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN env var
  • Reads new env LINEAR_API_KEY_PROVIDER_NAME (provider name in the Identity vault, default: linear-api-key)
  • Calls IdentityClient.get_api_key() with the workload access token auto-injected into BedrockAgentCoreContext by AgentCore Runtime
  • Caches the resolved token in LINEAR_API_TOKEN env so downstream consumers stay unchanged: channel_mcp.py's \${LINEAR_API_TOKEN} placeholder in .mcp.json and linear_reactions.py's GraphQL Authorization header

Why imperative IdentityClient.get_api_key() instead of the @requires_api_key decorator: API keys don't need refresh. The decorator pattern shines for OAuth (refresh tokens, scopes, per-session binding) and is the right shape for 2.0b. For a static API key fetched once at agent startup, the imperative form keeps the MCP-config-with-placeholder model working unchanged.

Verified by reading the SDK's auth.py: the @requires_api_key decorator does exactly client.get_api_key(provider_name=..., agent_identity_token=BedrockAgentCoreContext.get_workload_access_token()). Inside AgentCore Runtime the context returns the auto-injected token; outside (Lambda, local dev) it returns None. Our imperative version matches that behaviour without the decorator's call-site rewrite.

Preserves PR aws-samples#87's nice-to-have improvements

  • ImportError graceful fallback adapted from boto3 to bedrock_agentcore — degrade with WARN, don't crash the agent
  • AccessDeniedException (likely missing IAM permission) and ResourceNotFoundException (provider name typo / not yet created) logged at ERROR severity to page someone, not WARN
  • Other ClientErrors (transient throttle, network) stay at WARN

cdk/src/stacks/agent.ts

On the AgentCore runtime:

  • Drops linearIntegration.apiTokenSecret.grantRead(runtime) and the LINEAR_API_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN env-var override
  • Adds LINEAR_API_KEY_PROVIDER_NAME env (hardcoded 'linear-api-key' for now)
  • Adds IAM for bedrock-agentcore:GetResourceApiKey + bedrock-agentcore:GetWorkloadAccessToken

Lambdas untouched. Verified at synth: only the AgentCore runtime's IAM policy and env vars changed.

Resource scope on the new IAM is * for now; the canonical AgentCore Identity ARN format isn't fully documented in public AWS docs as of 2026-05-15. Tighten in 2.0b when OAuth migration documents the resource shape.

docs/guides/LINEAR_SETUP_GUIDE.md

Adds Step 4.5 documenting the one-time admin command users run alongside the existing bgagent linear setup wizard:

agentcore add credential --type api-key --name linear-api-key
# (paste the same lin_api_… token when prompted)

Explains the dual-store setup and notes that 2.0b will retire the duplicate. Starlight mirror synced.

Tests

agent/tests/test_config.py::TestResolveLinearApiToken — 10 tests covering: cached env-var fast path; missing provider name; missing region; workload token absent (outside runtime); happy path with env-var side-effect; botocore errors swallowed; SDK returns None defensively; ImportError fallback; AccessDeniedException → ERROR severity; ResourceNotFoundException → ERROR severity.

542 agent / 1271 cdk / 196 cli — all green. Lint clean. Typecheck clean. CDK synth clean.

Phase plan context

2.0a  ← THIS PR — API key via AgentCore Identity (agent only)
2.0b  ← Linear OAuth + Gateway in one cutover (all consumers, retires Secrets Manager)
2.1   ← Agent Sessions UX (status pill, activities, retires reaction-spam)
2.2   ← AgentSessionEvent webhooks (@bgagent natural-language prompts)
2.3   ← HITL adapter via select activities (post Sam's #88 merge)

Reviewer notes

  • Smoke not run yet. The MCP placeholder, GraphQL header, and run.sh env-var pass-through are all unchanged — only the source of LINEAR_API_TOKEN changed. Unit tests cover the new code path with realistic SDK mocks. Will deploy + smoke before requesting upstream review.
  • Provider name hardcoded as 'linear-api-key'. Happy to parametrize via CDK context if reviewer prefers — opted for the simple shape since there's one deployment.
  • Promotion to upstream: when feat(linear): v1.1 polish — pre-container feedback, state-on-start, sweep, nits aws-samples/sample-autonomous-cloud-coding-agents#87 merges, rebase this onto aws-samples/main and open the cross-fork PR against main.

Migrates the agent runtime's Linear personal API token resolution from
AWS Secrets Manager to AWS Bedrock AgentCore Identity. This is the
"validate Identity SDK" step of the v2 plan; Phase 2.0b will swap the
API key for OAuth and converge Linear MCP onto AgentCore Gateway in
one cutover.

Per Alain's guidance: "start by using api key, if it works, switch to
oauth. you will setup an outbound auth for your server using agentcore
identity. that identity can be (AC identity is like a wrapper around
secrets manager) api key or oauth."

Lambdas (orchestrator + processor) intentionally keep using Secrets
Manager via the existing `LinearApiTokenSecret` for now. The Python
`bedrock_agentcore` SDK has no Node.js equivalent — Lambda migration
requires `@aws-sdk/client-bedrock-agentcore` raw API calls and folds
into 2.0b's bigger refactor. End-state of 2.0a: agent reads from
Identity, Lambdas read from Secrets Manager, both pointing at the same
underlying token value (admin populates both).

`agent/src/config.py::resolve_linear_api_token`:

  - Drops boto3 SecretsManager fetch + `LINEAR_API_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN` env.
  - Reads new env `LINEAR_API_KEY_PROVIDER_NAME` (provider name in
    Identity vault).
  - Calls `IdentityClient.get_api_key()` with the workload access token
    auto-injected into `BedrockAgentCoreContext` by AgentCore Runtime
    (verified by reading the SDK's `auth.py` decorator implementation —
    no manual workload-identity mint needed inside the runtime).
  - Caches the resolved token in `LINEAR_API_TOKEN` so downstream
    consumers stay unchanged: `channel_mcp.py`'s `${LINEAR_API_TOKEN}`
    placeholder in `.mcp.json` and `linear_reactions.py`'s GraphQL
    Authorization header.

Preserves PR aws-samples#87's nice-to-have improvements:

  - `ImportError` graceful fallback (now for `bedrock_agentcore` instead
    of `boto3`) — degrade with WARN, don't crash the agent.
  - `AccessDeniedException` and `ResourceNotFoundException` logged at
    ERROR severity (persistent IAM/config bugs that should page).
    Other ClientErrors stay at WARN (transient throttle/network).

`agent/pyproject.toml`: adds `bedrock-agentcore==1.9.1` dep.

`cdk/src/stacks/agent.ts`:

  - On the AgentCore runtime: drops `linearIntegration.apiTokenSecret.
    grantRead(runtime)` and the `LINEAR_API_TOKEN_SECRET_ARN` env-var
    override. Adds `LINEAR_API_KEY_PROVIDER_NAME` env (hardcoded
    `'linear-api-key'` for now; can parametrize later via context if
    multi-environment naming is needed) and IAM permissions for
    `bedrock-agentcore:GetResourceApiKey` and
    `bedrock-agentcore:GetWorkloadAccessToken`.
  - Lambdas (orchestrator + processor) untouched — they still grant on
    the Linear secret and read from Secrets Manager.
  - Resource scope on the new IAM is `*` for now; AgentCore Identity ARN
    format isn't fully standardized in public docs as of 2026-05-15.
    Tighten in 2.0b when OAuth migration documents the canonical
    resource shape.

`docs/guides/LINEAR_SETUP_GUIDE.md`: adds Step 4.5 documenting the
one-time `agentcore add credential --type api-key --name linear-api-key`
admin command users must run alongside the existing `bgagent linear
setup` wizard. Notes that Lambdas keep Secrets Manager temporarily and
2.0b will retire the dual-store setup. Starlight mirror synced.

`agent/tests/test_config.py::TestResolveLinearApiToken` — 10 tests
covering: cached env var fast-path; missing provider name; missing
region; workload token absent (outside runtime); happy path with
env-var side-effect; botocore error swallowed with WARN; SDK returns
None defensively; ImportError fallback; AccessDeniedException → ERROR
severity; ResourceNotFoundException → ERROR severity.

542 agent / 1271 cdk / 196 cli, all green. Lint + typecheck clean.
CDK synth clean.

`bedrock_agentcore` SDK confirmed working in our runtime image (verified
in `node_modules` post-install). The `BedrockAgentCoreContext` workload
token auto-injection is documented behaviour for code running inside
AgentCore Runtime — verified by reading the SDK's `@requires_api_key`
decorator implementation, which uses the same context lookup we use
here.

Stacked on PR aws-samples#87 (`feat/linear-processor-feedback`). Will conflict on
`config.py` and `test_config.py` if aws-samples#87 needs further rework before
merge — happy to rebase.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@isadeks isadeks force-pushed the feat/agentcore-identity-api-key branch from 655b321 to 9528321 Compare May 18, 2026 18:11
bgagent and others added 2 commits May 18, 2026 12:01
…command

The setup guide referenced `agentcore add credential` which doesn't actually
work end-to-end:

  - The Python `bedrock-agentcore-starter-toolkit` CLI (`agentcore`) only
    exposes agent-lifecycle commands; there is no `credential-provider`
    subcommand. Confirmed by reading the toolkit's CLI reference and by
    user trying `agentcore configure credential-provider --type api-key
    --name ...` and receiving `No such command 'credential-provider'`.
  - The new npm `@aws/agentcore` CLI does have `agentcore add credential`
    but uses a declarative project model — the credential lands in
    `agentcore.json` + `.env.local`, not the actual AgentCore Identity
    vault, until `agentcore deploy` runs against a project structured for
    that CLI. ABCA isn't structured that way.

Switch the docs to the plain AWS CLI which works directly against the
AgentCore Identity API:

    aws bedrock-agentcore-control create-api-key-credential-provider \
      --name linear-api-key \
      --api-key "<paste lin_api_… token here>" \
      --region us-east-1

Plus the matching `list-api-key-credential-providers` for verification.
Add a "Tooling note" at the bottom of the section explaining why the
plain AWS CLI is the right path here vs. the two `agentcore` CLIs.

Starlight mirror synced.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Smoke on backgroundagent-dev caught a real bug in the Phase 2.0a
migration: the agent's `resolve_linear_api_token()` was correctly
calling `IdentityClient.get_api_key()` but failing earlier at
`BedrockAgentCoreContext.get_workload_access_token()` returning None.
The Linear MCP then loaded with an unresolved `${LINEAR_API_TOKEN}`
placeholder and 👀 didn't post.

Root cause (from reading bedrock-agentcore-sdk-python source):

The `WorkloadAccessToken` request header (which the runtime container
reads to populate `BedrockAgentCoreContext`) is only injected by
AgentCore Identity when `InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand` is called with
`runtimeUserId`. Per AWS docs at
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/runtime-oauth.html:

  "Agent Runtime exchanges this token for a Workload Access Token via
   bedrock-agentcore:GetWorkloadAccessTokenForJWT API and delivers it
   to your agent code via the payload header `WorkloadAccessToken`."

Without `runtimeUserId`, AgentCore never derives a workload token and
the header is absent. `app.py::_build_request_context` reads the
header off the inbound request; the agent sees None.

Fix:

1. Thread `userId` through the `ComputeStrategy.startSession` interface
   (compute-strategy.ts).
2. Pass `task.user_id` (the task's Cognito sub) at the call site in
   orchestrate-task.ts.
3. Set `runtimeUserId: input.userId` on `InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand` in
   agentcore-strategy.ts. Log it alongside session_id for traceability.
4. ECS strategy accepts the new parameter to satisfy the interface;
   doesn't use it (ECS doesn't go through AgentCore Identity).
5. Grant the orchestrator role `bedrock-agentcore:InvokeAgentRuntimeForUser`
   alongside `InvokeAgentRuntime` (task-orchestrator.ts). Without this,
   the new `runtimeUserId` parameter would 403.

Tests updated:
- `agentcore-strategy.test.ts`: pin that `runtimeUserId` flows from
  input into the SDK command; pass `userId: 'cognito-user-1'` in 4 call
  sites.
- `ecs-strategy.test.ts`: pass `userId` (unused by ECS) on 3 call sites.
- `start-session-composition.test.ts`: pass `userId: 'cognito-test'` on
  3 call sites.
- `task-orchestrator.test.ts`: assert the IAM action list includes
  `InvokeAgentRuntimeForUser` (2 assertions).

542 agent / 1273 cdk / 196 cli — all green. Lint clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
krokoko added a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2026
* docs(cedar-hitl): restore and revise HITL gates design, fold adversarial findings

Design doc was accidentally removed in 0742ebe; restored from b34d7cd and
substantially revised under a new filename. "Phase 3" framing dropped — this
is the Cedar HITL approval gates feature.

- Renamed PHASE3_CEDAR_HITL.md → CEDAR_HITL_GATES.md; all "phase" gating
  removed (Phase 3a/3b → v1 / future work §17).
- Integrated 16 findings from 2026-05-06 adversarial review with realistic
  scenarios. Major structural changes:
  - Decision #23 (new): cross-engine parity contract between cedarpy (agent,
    Python) and @cedar-policy/cedar-wasm@4.10.0 (Lambda, TS).
  - §11.2: SlackUserMappingTable with OAuth user-initiated mapping; severity-
    gated Slack approvals; admin has no write path.
  - §7.1/§12.3: ApproveTaskFn uses cross-table TransactWriteItems for atomicity.
  - §10.1: user_id-status-index GSI on TaskApprovalsTable; v1 not v-later.
  - §15.6: cedar-wasm as a Lambda layer shared across policy Lambdas.
- Gate-cap revision (2026-05-07): decision #13 — default 50, blueprint-
  configurable via security.approvalGateCap (bounded 1–500), persisted on
  TaskTable. Cache memory bound decoupled: 50-entry LRU regardless of cap.
  IMPL-22 adds telemetry-driven re-evaluation criteria.
- Timeout adversarial+advocate pass (2026-05-07):
  - §6.5 VM-throttle race fix: re-read row on failed TIMED_OUT
    ConditionCheckFailed; honor APPROVED if user beat the timer. IMPL-24.
  - Sub-120s @approval_timeout_s emits blueprint-load WARN. IMPL-25.
  - User-visible timeout cap milestones (approval_timeout_capped_at_submit,
    approval_ceiling_shrinking). IMPL-26.
  - Runtime JWT: no refresh logic in agent/src/ (container uses IAM role);
    ceiling stays min(1h, maxLifetime_remaining - 120s). IMPL-27.
  - Three new CloudWatch metrics for timeout tuning. IMPL-28.
  - §14.8 new: off-hours trade-off section (fail-closed is the invariant).
  - §13.13 new: notification-delivery failure does NOT pause the timer
    (bypass-prevention).
- Added six mermaid diagrams: three-outcome decision flow, end-to-end round-
  trip, TaskApprovalsTable state machine, Slack user-mapping, fail-closed
  decision flow, cross-engine parity check.
- Cross-references updated in INTERACTIVE_AGENTS.md and SECURITY.md.
- Starlight mirror regenerated via docs/scripts/sync-starlight.mjs.

No code changes in this commit — design work only. Implementation lands in a
follow-up PR per §15.2 task list.

* feat(cedar-hitl): pin Cedar engines and seed cross-engine parity contract

Chunk 1 of the Cedar HITL gates PR (docs/design/CEDAR_HITL_GATES.md).
Lays the foundation before engine rewrites in Chunk 2+: both Cedar engines
pinned exactly per decision #23, annotation surface validated by Day-1
spikes per decision #22, and the golden-file parity fixtures seeded so
every subsequent chunk can rely on the contract.

- Pin cedarpy==4.8.0 (agent) and @cedar-policy/cedar-wasm@4.10.0 (cdk)
  exactly (no ^/~); document both in mise.toml header.
- Add agent/tests/test_cedarpy_annotations_contract.py (10 tests)
  validating all 5 annotations round-trip verbatim via
  policies_to_json_str() under staticPolicies.<id>.annotations.
- Add cdk/test/handlers/shared/cedar-policy.test.ts (12 tests) validating
  policySetTextToParts + policyToJson extract the same annotations
  verbatim and isAuthorized returns the documented {type, response}
  wrapper shape.
- Add contracts/cedar-parity/ with 5 golden-file fixtures (single-match,
  multi-match, hard-deny, soft-deny write, no-match default-allow) +
  README documenting the contract. Every fixture policy carries a
  @rule_id - including the base permit as @rule_id("base_permit") - so
  the parity tests raise if either engine returns an unannotated match
  instead of silently dropping it.
- Add agent/tests/test_cedar_parity.py (6 tests, cedarpy side) and
  cdk/test/handlers/shared/cedar-parity.test.ts (6 tests, cedar-wasm
  side) loading the shared fixtures and asserting (decision, sorted
  rule_ids) match expected. Both tests hard-import cedarpy/cedar-wasm
  so a dependency regression fails loud rather than silently skipping.
- Update docs/design/CEDAR_HITL_GATES.md sections 15.2 row 3, 15.6
  prose and the parity mermaid diagram to point at contracts/cedar-parity/
  (the precedent set by contracts/memory-hash-vectors.json) instead of a
  new tests/fixtures/ dir. Regenerate the Starlight mirror.
- Add IMPL-29 noting the cedarpy diagnostics.reasons / cedar-wasm
  diagnostics.reason naming asymmetry surfaced by the spikes; engine
  code normalizes at the boundary.
- Fix rev-4 -> rev-5 cosmetic footer drift.

Test counts: agent 500 -> 516 (+16), cdk 1036 -> 1054 (+18), cli 190
unchanged. No production code changes in this chunk; engine rewrite
lands in Chunk 2.

Follow-up: separate chore issue to move contracts/memory-hash-vectors.json
into a self-named subdir for consistency with contracts/cedar-parity/.

* feat(cedar-hitl): three-outcome PolicyEngine core

Chunk 2 of the Cedar HITL gates PR. Rewrites agent/src/policy.py into
the three-outcome engine specified in docs/design/CEDAR_HITL_GATES.md
section 6. The REQUIRE_APPROVAL outcome is the human-in-the-loop surface
the next chunks (PreToolUse hook extension, REST API, CLI) plug into.
This chunk ships the engine and its load-time validation; no hook or
wire-format changes yet.

Engine:
- Outcome enum (ALLOW, DENY, REQUIRE_APPROVAL) + extended PolicyDecision
  with .allowed backward-compat shim for Phase 1a/1b/2 callers. Custom
  __init__ accepts both outcome= and legacy allowed= kwargs so existing
  tests keep working verbatim.
- Three-outcome pipeline per section 6.2: hard-deny eval (absolute) ->
  allowlist fast-path (tool_type/tool_group/bash_pattern/write_path/
  all_session) -> recent-decision cache (60s TTL on DENIED/TIMED_OUT) ->
  soft-deny eval (with post-eval rule-scope allowlist check and
  blueprint_disable filtering) -> default ALLOW.
- ApprovalAllowlist (section 6.4): parses and matches every scope type.
  Strips whitespace and rejects empty-after-strip values so
  "tool_type: Read " normalizes instead of silently mismatching (review
  finding 6).
- RecentDecisionCache (section 12.9): 50-entry LRU, INDEPENDENT of
  approvalGateCap. Populated only on DENIED/TIMED_OUT. Session-scoped
  (documented section 12.8 caveat).
- Annotation handling (sections 5.2 + 6.3): parses @rule_id, @tier,
  @approval_timeout_s, @severity, @category via
  cedarpy.policies_to_json_str(); merges on multi-match with min timeout
  (clamped by 30s floor) and max severity.
- Load-time validation (sections 5.1, 12.4): rejects missing/mismatched
  @tier, missing @rule_id, sub-floor timeouts, duplicate rule_ids across
  tiers, blueprint text > 64 KB, disable entries naming built-in
  hard-deny rules (finding 9), approval_gate_cap outside [1, 500]
  (decision 13). Sub-120s @approval_timeout_s emits WARN but accepts
  (IMPL-25).
- Fail-closed posture (section 13): cedarpy parse errors surface via
  diagnostics.errors -> RuntimeError raised inside _eval_tier -> outer
  handler returns DENY with reason "fail-closed: <ExceptionType>".
  TypeError on json.dumps of unhashable tool_input surfaces as distinct
  "fail-closed: unhashable_tool_input" reason (review finding 5).

Built-in policies:
- agent/policies/hard_deny.cedar: base_permit catch-all + rm_slash +
  write_git_internals + write_git_internals_nested + drop_table +
  pr_review-specific Write/Edit forbids (absolute).
- agent/policies/soft_deny.cedar: base_permit (catch-all required in
  each tier so cedarpy default-deny does not convert no-match into
  DENY) + force_push_any + force_push_main + push_to_protected_branch
  + write_env_files + write_credentials. All soft rules carry @tier,
  @rule_id, @approval_timeout_s, @severity, @category per section 15.4
  starter set.

Review findings addressed (1 blocker, 8 significant, plus minor):
- blueprint_disable actually disables soft rules at eval time instead
  of silently no-op (the blocker: test coverage had been a silent-pass).
- Legacy extra_policies with @tier/@rule_id rejected to avoid undefined
  double-annotation behavior.
- _matching_rule_ids logs WARN on unknown policy IDs (state-drift
  signal).
- base_permit validator exemption restricted to effect=="permit" so
  misnamed forbid rules cannot bypass validation (finding 7).
- Hard-tier Cedar no_decision logged at WARN (signals missing/malformed
  base_permit catch-all).
- Allowlist whitespace normalization + empty-value rejection.
- StrEnum upgrade, Callable moved to TYPE_CHECKING, assert replaced
  with explicit RuntimeError for S101 compliance.

Phase 1 compatibility:
- All 39 existing test_policy.py tests pass unchanged via the
  .allowed property. One test (test_invalid_policy_syntax_fails_closed)
  updated to patch _hard_policies instead of the removed _policies
  attribute; docstring explains the rewrite.
- extra_policies kwarg preserved; callers with annotated rules must
  migrate to blueprint_soft_policies / blueprint_hard_policies.

Test counts: agent 516 -> 576 (+60: 51 three-outcome + 9 regression
fixes). cli 190 unchanged. cdk 1054 unchanged.

Carry-forward to Chunk 3:
- extra_policies semantic shift (Phase 1 DENY -> Chunk 2
  REQUIRE_APPROVAL); .allowed=False preserved but .outcome differs.
  Switchover happens when hooks.py adopts the three-outcome branching.
- Cross-tier action-context asymmetry (review finding 8): document
  rule-authoring constraint in section 5.5 of design.
- Probe entity-shape coverage (finding 10): extend _probe_cedar to
  exercise Write/Edit/Bash action paths, not just invoke_tool.

* feat(cedar-hitl): approval milestone writers + engine counters

Adds the 14 agent-side approval milestone writers (§11.1) on
``_ProgressWriter`` so Chunk 3's hook integration has a typed API
instead of stringly-typed ``write_agent_milestone`` calls, and the
per-task gate counter / per-container sliding-window rate limit /
denial-injection queue on ``PolicyEngine`` that §6.5 requires.

Why now: the hook work lands cleanly only after these surfaces exist
— every code path in ``pre_tool_use_hook``'s REQUIRE_APPROVAL branch
calls one of these helpers. Shipping them separately lets the hook
commit be about the state machine, not the event-shape bookkeeping.

Engine additions:
  - ``approval_gate_count`` / ``increment_approval_gate_count``: the
    per-task counter §12.9 bounds at ``approvalGateCap``. Session-scoped
    in v1; persistence tracked in §17.
  - ``approvals_in_last_minute`` / ``record_approval_gate_timestamp``:
    sliding-window rate limit (20/min/container, §12.9). Prune on read
    so callers see the current count without a separate tick.
  - ``queue_denial_injection`` / ``drain_denial_injections``: queue
    consumed by ``_denial_between_turns_hook`` at the next Stop seam
    (§6.5). Reason is pre-sanitized upstream by ``DenyTaskFn``.
  - ``mark_ceiling_shrinking_emitted``: emit-once latch for IMPL-26.
  - ``APPROVAL_RATE_LIMIT`` / ``APPROVAL_RATE_WINDOW_S`` module consts
    the hook imports rather than re-deriving.

Milestone writers (§11.1 table, 14 agent-emitted of 15):
  - ``pre_approvals_loaded``, ``approval_requested``,
    ``approval_granted``, ``approval_denied``, ``approval_timed_out``,
    ``approval_stranded``, ``approval_write_failed``,
    ``approval_resume_failed``, ``approval_poll_degraded``,
    ``approval_timeout_capped``, ``approval_ceiling_shrinking``,
    ``approval_cap_exceeded``, ``approval_rate_limit_exceeded``,
    ``approval_late_win``.
  - ``approval_decision_recorded`` (Lambda audit) and
    ``approval_timeout_capped_at_submit`` (CreateTaskFn) stay on the
    Lambda side — Chunk 5 owns those.

Each helper is a thin wrapper over ``_put_event("agent_milestone",
...)`` so the shared circuit-breaker + classifier path (finding #6/#8)
continues to apply. Metadata keys mirror the §11.1 shapes verbatim
(``maxLifetime_remaining_s`` preserves the design-doc spelling for
downstream parsers).

Tests: +29 total. 17 on ``TestApprovalMilestoneHelpers`` pin the DDB
payload shape for each helper (including the two
``approval_timeout_capped`` reason variants — rule_annotation carries
matching_rule_ids; maxLifetime_ceiling omits the field). 12 on the
engine: counter monotonicity, rate-window prune semantics at window
boundary, denial-queue FIFO + drain-clears, ceiling-shrinking latch
idempotency.

No caller changes — engine and writer surfaces are additive. Hook
integration lands in commit C.

* feat(cedar-hitl): TaskApprovals + AWAITING_APPROVAL transition primitives

Adds the four agent-side DDB primitives §6.5 + IMPL-24 need for the
three-outcome hook integration in the next commit:

  - ``transact_write_approval_request`` — cross-table TransactWriteItems:
    Put(TaskApprovalsTable) with ``attribute_not_exists(request_id)`` +
    Update(TaskTable) gated on ``status = RUNNING``. Atomic per §12.3 so
    a concurrent cancel cannot land the task in AWAITING_APPROVAL with
    no matching approval row (or vice versa).
  - ``transact_resume_from_approval`` — Update(TaskTable) gated on
    ``status = AWAITING_APPROVAL AND awaiting_approval_request_id =
    :rid``. The ``request_id`` condition prevents resuming with a stale
    ID after a reconciler race (§13.9).
  - ``best_effort_update_approval_status`` — conditional UpdateItem on
    the approval row with ``status = :pending`` guard. Returns False on
    ``ConditionalCheckFailedException``; this is the signal IMPL-24's
    re-read path fires on (§6.5 pseudocode lines 846-879, §13.12).
  - ``get_approval_row`` — GetItem with ``ConsistentRead=True`` by
    default. Required by IMPL-24's re-read; kept opt-out (bool flag) for
    future cold-path callers that don't need the strong read.

Errors:
  - ``ApprovalTablesUnavailable`` for env-var-missing — raised loud so
    a pre-Chunk-4 deploy fails closed (hook will map to DENY) rather
    than silently no-op'ing the gate.
  - ``ApprovalWriteError`` / ``ApprovalResumeError`` wrap
    ``TransactionCanceledException`` with the cancellation reasons
    list. The hook uses these to distinguish the "concurrent cancel"
    branch from real DDB outages.
  - ``ConditionalCheckFailedException`` on ``update_item`` is consumed
    and returned as ``False`` from ``best_effort_update_approval_status``
    — the caller (hook) needs the boolean to decide whether to
    re-read, not to propagate.
  - All other DDB errors propagate so the hook's outer try/except can
    classify fail-closed with a specific reason.

Implementation notes:
  - Uses ``boto3.client("dynamodb")`` low-level API (not resource).
    ``transact_write_items`` lives on the client, and marshalling the
    approval row attributes explicitly gives deterministic DDB shapes
    that the tests can assert on. ``_py_to_ddb_attr`` covers the
    subset of Python types §10.1 actually uses (str/int/bool/None/list
    of str); any other type raises TypeError loudly rather than
    silently writing something unexpected.
  - ``_extract_error_code`` / ``_extract_cancellation_reasons`` duck-type
    on ``exc.response`` so we don't need botocore at import time (tests
    use a minimal exception class).
  - Errors from unsupported types (floats, dicts, etc.) are caught
    BEFORE the DDB round-trip so the unit-test asserts
    ``transact_write_items`` was not called — catches schema drift
    early.
  - Status constants (``_STATUS_RUNNING`` / ``_STATUS_AWAITING_APPROVAL``)
    named so a rename in CDK cannot silently diverge the Python path.

Tests: +20 total.
  - 5 on TransactWriteApprovalRequest: env-missing, happy-path shape
    assertion (both items + conditions), TransactionCanceled → ApprovalWriteError
    with reasons preserved, other errors propagate, unsupported type rejected
    before any DDB call.
  - 3 on TransactResumeFromApproval: env-missing, happy-path expression
    shape (includes REMOVE awaiting_approval_request_id), cancel →
    ApprovalResumeError.
  - 4 on BestEffortUpdateApprovalStatus: happy path returns True,
    ``reason`` kwarg attaches ``deny_reason``, ConditionalCheckFailed
    returns False (IMPL-24's signal), other errors propagate.
  - 4 on GetApprovalRow: ConsistentRead default True, opt-out False,
    row-not-found returns None, row unmarshalling through every
    supported DDB attribute type.
  - 4 on helpers: error-code extraction with and without
    ClientError-shape, cancellation-reasons extraction with and without.

No runtime callers yet — hook integration lands in commit C. Physical
TaskApprovalsTable lands in Chunk 4; Python side is wire-compatible so
the hook work can be unit-tested today with mocked clients.

* feat(cedar-hitl): PreToolUse three-outcome REQUIRE_APPROVAL path

Wires the agent to the full §6.5 pseudocode: cap + rate-limit check,
atomic TransactWriteItems for pending row + TaskTable AWAITING_APPROVAL,
2s→5s ConsistentRead poll, IMPL-24 VM-throttle race re-read, resume
transition, scope propagation to allowlist, and denial-injection queue
consumed at the next Stop seam. Completes §15.2 rows 26 + 27.

Hook control flow (three outcomes)
----------------------------------
- ALLOW / DENY: existing Phase 1 behavior, now switching on
  ``.outcome`` rather than ``.allowed``. Legacy Phase 1/2 tests still
  green because PolicyDecision preserves the ``.allowed`` shim.
- REQUIRE_APPROVAL (new): extracted into ``_handle_require_approval``
  for readability. Delegates to ``task_state`` primitives and
  ``engine.*`` counter surfaces from the prior commits; no new DDB
  client construction here.

Key pieces:
  - ``_compute_effective_timeout`` applies the §6.5 min(rule, default,
    lifetime) formula. The engine's ``_merge_annotations`` has already
    clipped decision.timeout_s against the task default; the hook adds
    the remaining-lifetime ceiling and floors at FLOOR_30S.
    ``clip_reason`` distinguishes ``rule_annotation`` (rule was tighter
    than task default) from ``maxLifetime_ceiling`` (task is late in
    its life) so ``approval_timeout_capped`` carries the right reason.
  - ``_remaining_maxlifetime_s`` reads ``AGENTCORE_MAX_LIFETIME_S`` +
    ``TASK_STARTED_AT`` env vars (8h default). Returns ``None`` when
    the start timestamp is absent — the hook treats that as "unknown,
    don't clip" rather than pre-DENYing, so Phase 1 test paths that
    don't set the env var still see the old task-default behaviour.
    Chunk 4/5 will wire these at task launch.
  - ``_poll_for_decision`` uses 2s cadence for the first 30s then 5s
    (IMPL-12). All polls use ``ConsistentRead=True`` per IMPL-24. 3
    consecutive GetItem failures emit ``approval_poll_degraded``; 10
    consecutive failures fall through as TIMED_OUT with a specific
    reason (§13.2).
  - ``_reconcile_late_decision`` implements IMPL-24 re-read: on a
    ConditionCheckFailed from the TIMED_OUT write, re-read with
    ConsistentRead. APPROVED → rebuild outcome, propagate scope to
    allowlist, run normal allow flow, emit ``approval_late_win``.
    DENIED → honor the user's sanitized reason. PENDING or row gone
    → fall through with TIMED_OUT (fail-closed, §13.12 last paragraph).

Cancel-wins semantics (finding #2)
----------------------------------
``_denial_between_turns_hook`` is registered AFTER
``_nudge_between_turns_hook`` in ``between_turns_hooks`` so cancel
short-circuits both. The hook re-checks ``_cancel_requested`` itself
as belt-and-braces (matching the nudge hook) so a future reorder does
not silently break cancel-wins. Denial queue is PRESERVED on cancel —
not drained — so a denial still sitting on the queue when the task is
being torn down does not leak across tasks (the engine is per-task
per §IMPL-7).

``stop_hook`` threads ``engine`` into ``ctx`` so the denial hook can
``drain_denial_injections``. ``build_hook_matchers`` accepts a new
``user_id`` kwarg (§12.2) so approval rows carry caller identity for
the REST side's ownership check.

``permissionDecisionReason`` guaranteed surface
-----------------------------------------------
The hook's deny return is the ONLY guaranteed surface the SDK emits
to the agent; denial injection is best-effort (pre-empted by cancel).
``_deny_response`` pipes every reason through ``_strip_ansi`` +
``_truncate(500)``: ANSI sequences can never reach the model, and the
line stays loggable. §12.7 requirement.

Tests: +24 agent hook tests (47 total in test_hooks.py). Run in 0.92s
via a ``_fast_poll`` fixture that collapses ``asyncio.sleep`` to a
no-op AND advances ``hooks.time.monotonic`` by the requested duration
so the poll wall-clock deadline actually trips.

Happy paths:
  - APPROVED + scope propagation to allowlist + milestones.
  - APPROVED with scope=this_call does NOT grow allowlist.
  - DENIED queues denial injection + populates recent-decision cache
    (next identical call auto-denies).
  - TIMED_OUT writes TIMED_OUT row and emits approval_timed_out.

IMPL-24 race: four branches.
  - APPROVED re-read → allow flow, approval_late_win milestone, scope
    propagated, resume succeeds.
  - DENIED re-read → deny flow, approval_late_win milestone, user's
    reason is the permissionDecisionReason.
  - Still-PENDING re-read → fail-closed fall-through (no late_win).
  - Row-gone re-read → same fail-closed fall-through.

Cap / rate-limit / write failure / resume failure branches all:
  - Short-circuit before any DDB write when the local guard fires
    (cap, rate limit).
  - Emit the right approval_* milestone.
  - Return DENY with a specific permissionDecisionReason.

Sanitization:
  - ANSI stripped from deny reason.
  - Deny reason truncated to ≤500 chars.

Timeout clipping:
  - rule_annotation reason when a rule's approval_timeout_s is below
    the task default; matching_rule_ids populated.
  - maxLifetime_ceiling reason when remaining lifetime is the tightest
    bound; matching_rule_ids is None.
  - approval_ceiling_shrinking emits exactly once per task (IMPL-26
    latch).

Denial injection hook (6 tests):
  - Draining produces a <user_denial request_id=... decided_at=...>
    block with XML-escaped reason.
  - Cancel short-circuit preserves the queue so the denial is not
    lost; just not injected into a dying agent.
  - Hostile reason (</user_denial>...<user_nudge>) is XML-escaped so
    the envelope cannot be forged.
  - No-engine ctx returns [] (Phase 1 call sites still work).
  - Registered LAST in ``between_turns_hooks`` (invariant for §6.5
    finding #2).
  - End-to-end via stop_hook: queued denial becomes
    ``decision=block`` + reason on the Stop return.

Carry-forward
-------------
- ``_remaining_maxlifetime_s`` returns None when TASK_STARTED_AT is
  unset — Chunk 4/5 will wire this at task launch. Tracked in §16.
- ``approval_gate_count`` lives on the engine (session-scoped) not on
  TaskTable in v1. §13.6 notes that the reconciler + approval_gate_cap
  still bound worst-case across container restarts. Chunk 7+ tracks
  persistence when telemetry justifies it.
- Denial injection emits a ``user_denial_injected`` milestone that is
  NOT in the §11.1 enumerated table. It mirrors ``nudge_acknowledged``
  for stream visibility; keep the name distinct from the ``approval_*``
  prefix so future §11.1 consumers can't confuse it with an approval
  outcome.

* feat(cedar-hitl): TaskApprovalsTable + SlackUserMapping + status enum

Lands the stateless CDK primitives for Cedar-HITL approval gates so
Chunk 5's REST handlers can be wired onto concrete tables. Completes
§15.2 tasks 9, 20, and 25.

Constructs
----------

``TaskApprovalsTable`` (§10.1)
  - PK ``task_id`` + SK ``request_id`` (ULID). Matches the agent-side
    primitives landed in the prior commit.
  - GSI ``user_id-status-index`` with user_id PK + status SK and an
    ``INCLUDE`` projection limited to the fields GET /v1/pending
    renders. Three deny-sensitive attrs (``deny_reason``, ``scope``,
    ``tool_input_sha256``) deliberately omitted from the projection —
    the list endpoint only returns PENDING rows in practice, but
    excluding them kills the projection-leak concern outright and
    costs no bytes today.
  - Exports ``USER_STATUS_INDEX_NAME`` as a module constant + mirrors
    it on ``construct.userStatusIndexName`` so handlers referencing
    the GSI fail compile-time on a rename.
  - TTL attribute ``ttl`` (agent writes ``created_at + timeout_s +
    120s``).
  - No DynamoDB streams per §11.2. TaskEventsTable carries the audit
    fan-out; streams here would duplicate.
  - Default RemovalPolicy.DESTROY to match the rest of the sample.
    Production deploys override to RETAIN per §10.1.

``SlackUserMappingTable`` (§11.2, finding #4)
  - Single-key (``slack_user_id`` PK). No SK, no TTL, no GSI, no
    stream. The forward-only shape is the trust boundary — a reverse
    GSI (Cognito → Slack) would let a compromised Cognito sub
    enumerate Slack identities without adding v1 capability.
  - Writes land through LinkSlackUserFn (Chunk 5) which enforces the
    ``attribute_not_exists(slack_user_id)`` condition so a prior
    legitimate mapping cannot be overwritten by a later compromise.

``task-status.ts`` — AWAITING_APPROVAL (§10.3)
  - Added to TaskStatus enum + ACTIVE_STATUSES (NOT TERMINAL_STATUSES:
    the task is alive, paused on a human decision).
  - VALID_TRANSITIONS wires the five edges §10.3 enumerates:
      RUNNING      → AWAITING_APPROVAL  (soft-deny entry)
      HYDRATING    → AWAITING_APPROVAL  (rare early-gate case)
      AWAITING_APPROVAL → RUNNING       (approve / deny resume)
      AWAITING_APPROVAL → CANCELLED     (user cancel mid-approval)
      AWAITING_APPROVAL → FAILED        (stranded-approval reconciler)
  - Notably NOT added:
      AWAITING_APPROVAL → FINALIZING    (approve-during-cleanup race)
      AWAITING_APPROVAL → COMPLETED     (skip RUNNING)
      AWAITING_APPROVAL → TIMED_OUT     (timer lives on the approval
                                         row, not the task clock)
    These are regression tests so a future refactor cannot quietly
    add them and bypass the `awaiting_approval_request_id = :rid`
    invariant.

Tests: +29 total.
  - TaskApprovalsTable (11 tests): PK/SK schema, PAY_PER_REQUEST,
    PITR default + override, TTL attribute, NO streams, GSI schema +
    projection + sensitive-attr exclusion, removal policy default +
    override, ``USER_STATUS_INDEX_NAME`` constant parity with the
    construct field.
  - SlackUserMappingTable (8 tests): single-key schema (explicit
    KeySchema length assertion), PAY_PER_REQUEST, PITR, no streams,
    no reverse GSI, DESTROY default, TTL absent.
  - TaskStatus (+10 tests over existing: 5 new assertions on the
    9-state cardinality, AWAITING_APPROVAL membership, and the
    transition graph including the three forbidden edges). The
    existing assertions updated for the new state count.

No stack wiring yet — ``agent.ts`` instantiation + env var plumbing +
grants land in the next commit alongside the Cedar-WASM Lambda layer.

* feat(cedar-hitl): Cedar-wasm layer + wire approval tables into agent stack

Activates the agent-side approval path and ships the Lambda layer
Chunk 5's REST handlers need.

Cedar-wasm Lambda layer (§15.2 task 10)
----------------------------------------

``CedarWasmLayer`` bundles ``@cedar-policy/cedar-wasm@4.10.0`` into
``/opt/nodejs/node_modules/`` so Lambdas can
``require('@cedar-policy/cedar-wasm/nodejs')`` without shipping the
4 MB wasm binary in every function package. A dedicated
``cdk/layers/cedar-wasm/`` directory carries a minimal ``package.json``
pinning the exact version — bundling runs ``npm install --omit=dev``
against that manifest, so the layer build is hermetic from any
``cdk/node_modules/`` drift.

The bundler has two fallbacks:
  - Docker (``public.ecr.aws/sam/build-nodejs22.x``) for CI / prod
    deploys.
  - Local-npm fallback for environments without Docker (unit-test
    synths + `cdk synth` on runners that lack Docker). The local
    path is safe here because the layer ships pure JS + a prebuilt
    wasm binary — no native build step.

Three constants exposed from the module:
  - ``CEDAR_WASM_VERSION`` — single source of truth for the pinned
    version; tests assert this matches both ``cdk/package.json`` and
    the layer manifest, so the three places the version lives stay
    in sync.
  - ``CEDAR_WASM_MIN_LAMBDA_MEMORY_MB`` — 512 MB floor for attaching
    Lambdas per §15.2 task 10.
  - ``CedarWasmLayer.layer`` — the underlying ``LayerVersion`` for
    Chunk 5 handlers to attach via ``fn.addLayers(...)``.

Agent stack wiring (§15.2 task 19)
------------------------------------

``agent.ts`` now instantiates:
  - ``TaskApprovalsTable`` (prior commit) — grants RW to the runtime
    so ``pre_tool_use_hook`` can TransactWriteItems + ConsistentRead
    the PENDING row.
  - ``SlackUserMappingTable`` (prior commit) — not granted to the
    runtime; only the link-user Lambda (Chunk 5) writes here.
  - ``CedarWasmLayer`` — the layer's asset lands in the synthed
    template so Chunk 5 handlers can reference ``.layer`` without
    causing a new asset on their deploy.

New runtime env vars:
  - ``TASK_APPROVALS_TABLE_NAME`` — consumed by
    ``task_state._require_tables``; its absence previously raised
    ``ApprovalTablesUnavailable`` → hook DENY. Now set, so the
    approval path is live on deploy.
  - ``AGENTCORE_MAX_LIFETIME_S = '28800'`` — 8 hours, matching
    ``lifecycleConfiguration.maxLifetime``. Consumed by the hook's
    ``_remaining_maxlifetime_s`` for the maxLifetime ceiling clip
    (§6.5). Kept in sync with the lifecycle via a direct test
    assertion so drift surfaces at build time.

New CfnOutputs: ``TaskApprovalsTableName``, ``SlackUserMappingTableName``,
``CedarWasmLayerArn``. Each is useful for post-deploy smoke tests
(`aws dynamodb describe-table` / `aws lambda get-layer-version`).

Tests: +8 layer tests + 9 agent-stack assertions.

Layer:
  - LayerVersion resource count.
  - Compatible runtimes (nodejs20/22).
  - Description carries the pinned version.
  - CEDAR_WASM_VERSION matches ``cdk/package.json``.
  - CEDAR_WASM_VERSION matches ``layers/cedar-wasm/package.json``.
  - CEDAR_WASM_MIN_LAMBDA_MEMORY_MB ≥ 512.
  - Custom description override works.
  - ``.layer`` exposes a real ``LayerVersion``.

Agent stack:
  - Table count updated from 6 → 8.
  - TaskApprovalsTable schema match (task_id PK / request_id SK,
    user_id-status-index GSI presence).
  - SlackUserMappingTable single-key schema.
  - LayerVersion count + compatibleRuntimes.
  - Three new CfnOutputs present.
  - TASK_APPROVALS_TABLE_NAME env var on the runtime.
  - AGENTCORE_MAX_LIFETIME_S == '28800' (drift guard).

Carry-forward
-------------
- ``TASK_STARTED_AT`` is the other input the hook's
  ``_remaining_maxlifetime_s`` consumes — it's a PER-TASK value the
  orchestrator must stamp at invocation time, not a stack-level env
  var. Chunk 5's orchestrator changes need to add it to the runtime
  invocation payload / session env. For now the hook's fallback
  ("unknown, don't clip") keeps approvals functional.
- Chunk 5 will attach the CedarWasmLayer onto ApproveTaskFn,
  DenyTaskFn, GetPoliciesFn, CreateTaskFn and assert
  ``memorySize >= CEDAR_WASM_MIN_LAMBDA_MEMORY_MB`` for each.

* feat(cedar-hitl): approve + deny handlers + shared types (§7.1, §7.2)

Lands the two user-facing REST handlers that flip a PENDING approval
row to APPROVED / DENIED, the shared types both call sites and the
CLI consume, and the Lambda-side Cedar parser future Chunk-5 handlers
(get-policies, create-task validation) will use.

Wire types (shared/types.ts)
----------------------------
- ApprovalScope union covering every shape the agent's
  ApprovalAllowlist understands. Typed so approve-task / create-task /
  CLI (Chunk 6) all agree at compile time.
- ApprovalRecord / ApprovalRequest / ApprovalResponse / DenyRequest /
  DenyResponse / PendingApprovalSummary / GetPendingResponse /
  PolicyRuleSummary / GetPoliciesResponse / LinkSlackUserRequest /
  LinkSlackUserResponse / SlackUserMappingRecord /
  ApprovalDecisionRecordedEvent / CreateTaskApprovalExtensions.
- Constants: DENY_REASON_MAX_LENGTH=2000, INITIAL_APPROVALS_MAX_ENTRIES=20,
  INITIAL_APPROVALS_MAX_ENTRY_LENGTH=128, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_S_MIN=30,
  APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_S_MAX=3600, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_S_DEFAULT=300.

New error codes: REQUEST_NOT_FOUND, REQUEST_ALREADY_DECIDED,
TASK_NOT_AWAITING_APPROVAL.

Shared helpers
--------------
- shared/approval-scope.ts — parseApprovalScope validates every shape;
  rejects unknown tool types / groups / prefixes, empty values,
  over-128-char strings. isDegeneratePattern implements §7.4 (length
  ≤ 2, all-wildcard, wildcard ratio > 50%) for Chunk-5 create-task.
- shared/deny-reason-scanner.ts — scanDenyReason redacts AWS keys,
  GitHub PATs (classic + fine-grained), Slack tokens, PEM blocks,
  bearer tokens with [REDACTED-...] markers. Mirrors
  agent/src/output_scanner.py so the deny reason the agent
  ultimately reads is never raw user input.
- shared/cedar-policy.ts — parseRules pulls the five HITL annotations
  (tier/rule_id/severity/approval_timeout_s/category) into a
  ParsedRule[], preserving positional policy_id for IMPL-29
  diagnostics-to-rule_id resolution. isHardDenyRule, isValidRuleId,
  matchingRuleIds, concatPolicies exposed for future handlers.

Handlers
--------
- approve-task.ts (§7.1) — POST /v1/tasks/{task_id}/approve
  - Cross-table TransactWriteItems: approval row PENDING → APPROVED
    guarded by user_id = :caller AND status = :pending; TaskTable
    no-op Update guarded by status = AWAITING_APPROVAL AND
    awaiting_approval_request_id = :rid.
  - TransactionCanceledException classified by per-item
    CancellationReasons. Approval-row failure collapses to 404
    REQUEST_NOT_FOUND (no existence oracle per §7.1 finding #6);
    task-row failure → 409 TASK_NOT_AWAITING_APPROVAL.
  - Optional scope defaults to this_call.
  - Per-user per-minute rate limit (30/min, synthetic row).
  - Writes approval_decision_recorded audit event (IMPL-6). Audit
    failure is logged but does not fail the request — decision is
    already committed.
- deny-task.ts (§7.2) — POST /v1/tasks/{task_id}/deny
  - Same cross-table pattern; status → DENIED + deny_reason.
  - Reason is scanDenyReason-sanitized + truncated to
    DENY_REASON_MAX_LENGTH BEFORE any persistence — agent and audit
    both read sanitized form; raw input never stored.
  - Same rate-limit namespace as approve.

Tests: +64 total (cedar-policy-parser 24, approval-scope 28,
deny-reason-scanner 13, approve-task 14, deny-task 9). Secret test
fixtures are assembled from string fragments so the source never
holds a contiguous secret literal — Code Defender pre-commit hook
otherwise blocks.

Stack wiring (task-api.ts routes, agent.ts layer attachment,
CreateTaskFn extension, orchestrator + reconciler + fanout +
LinkSlackUserFn + GetPolicies + GetPending) lands in the next
commit.

* feat(cedar-hitl): get-pending + get-policies + link-slack-user handlers

Lands the three read/discovery handlers Chunk 6 (CLI) needs to power
``bgagent pending``, ``bgagent policies list/show``, and
``bgagent notifications configure slack``. Completes §15.2 tasks
14, 15, and 25 (handler side).

Handlers
--------

``get-pending.ts`` (§7.7 — GET /v1/pending)
  - Queries ``user_id-status-index`` GSI on TaskApprovalsTable with
    ``user_id = :caller AND status = :pending``. Without the GSI
    this would be a full-table Scan per call — under
    ``watch -n1 bgagent pending`` that exhausts burst capacity for
    the whole fleet (§10.1 finding #8).
  - Response maps each row to ``PendingApprovalSummary`` with a
    derived ``expires_at = created_at + timeout_s`` so the CLI can
    render time-to-timeout without doing arithmetic on ISO strings.
  - Severity coerced to ``medium`` on unknown values so GSI writes
    that drift from the enum don't break the list response.
  - Rate-limited 10/min/user (synthetic row on the same table,
    namespaced ``RATE#<user>#PENDING`` so it does not collide with
    the approve/deny counter).

``get-policies.ts`` (§7.6 — GET /v1/repos/{repo_id}/policies)
  - Combines ``BUILTIN_HARD_DENY_POLICIES`` + ``BUILTIN_SOFT_DENY_POLICIES``
    with the repo's ``cedar_policies`` blueprint override. Runs the
    combined text through ``parseRules`` and returns
    ``{hard[], soft[]}`` rule summaries.
  - 5-minute per-repo in-Lambda cache; cold starts throw it away.
    ``_resetCacheForTests`` exposed for unit-test isolation.
  - Repo ID is URL-decoded from the path (``owner%2Frepo`` common in
    CLI UX).
  - Rate-limited 30/min/user.
  - Blueprint load failure falls back to built-ins with a WARN log;
    invalid blueprint cedar text returns 503 ``SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE``
    rather than a misleading empty list.

``link-slack-user.ts`` (§11.2 finding #4 — POST /v1/notifications/slack/link)
  - Writes to SlackUserMappingTable with
    ``ConditionExpression: attribute_not_exists(slack_user_id)``. This
    guard is the entire admission control the §11.2 design hinges on:
    even a compromised Slack admin cannot overwrite an existing
    mapping.
  - Validates ``slack_user_id`` shape (letters, digits, underscores,
    2–40 chars) so junk rows cannot land.
  - Conflict surface is 409 ``REQUEST_ALREADY_DECIDED`` — reused
    error code (the payload message directs the user to unlink via
    support).
  - Slack link_token end-to-end validation against Slack OAuth is
    deferred — v1 accepts the token on trust from the Cognito-authed
    caller; it is persisted in CloudWatch for audit.

Supporting primitives
---------------------

``shared/builtin-policies.ts`` — mirrors ``agent/policies/hard_deny.cedar``
and ``agent/policies/soft_deny.cedar`` as TypeScript string constants.
Embedded rather than read from disk because Lambda's esbuild bundler
does not copy non-TS assets by default and a dedicated bundling hook
is more code than the embed. A drift test
(``builtin-policies.test.ts``) asserts byte-equality with the agent
files so any change on one side without the other flips red at build
time.

``shared/cedar-policy.ts`` — ``parseRules`` now skips the unannotated
``base_permit`` entry (both tiers need it as a Cedar catch-all; it
is not a user-facing rule so it stays out of ParsedRule[]). This
matches the agent-side ``_parse_policy_annotations`` behaviour.

Tests: +37 total.
  - get-pending (8): 401 on missing auth, 429 on rate limit, empty
    result, GSI query shape, row → PendingApprovalSummary with
    derived expires_at, severity fallback, missing timeout → expires_at
    falls back to created_at, 500 on DDB error.
  - get-policies (11): 401/400 validation, built-in rules listed on
    empty repo, URL-decoded repo path, custom blueprint rule lands
    in soft, per-repo cache across calls, 429 rate limit, 503 on
    invalid blueprint cedar, fallback on load failure, hard rules
    omit severity / approval_timeout_s, soft rules carry them.
  - link-slack-user (8): 401/400 validation, shape check, 201 on
    success, 409 on overwrite attempt, 500 on unknown DDB error,
    whitespace trim on slack_user_id, ConditionExpression verified.
  - builtin-policies (4): drift byte-equality with both agent files,
    parseRules round-trip for hard/soft rule IDs.
  - cedar-policy (updated): ``base_permit`` is skipped from
    ParsedRule[] rather than rejected.

Stack wiring (task-api.ts routes, agent.ts layer attachment,
CreateTaskFn extension, orchestrator + reconciler + fanout) lands in
the next commit.

* feat(cedar-hitl): wire Chunk 5 routes + orchestrator + reconciler + agent plumbing

Completes Chunk 5 end-to-end: the five new Lambdas are instantiated
and wired onto the REST API, the orchestrator threads approval-related
data through to the agent runtime, the stranded-task reconciler sweeps
AWAITING_APPROVAL tasks, and the agent pipeline accepts the new
per-task approval configuration.

Stack wiring (agent.ts + task-api.ts)
-------------------------------------
- TaskApi construct accepts `taskApprovalsTable`, `slackUserMappingTable`,
  `cedarWasmLayer` props. Approve/Deny/GetPending Lambdas are created
  when the approvals table is present; GetPolicies also requires the
  cedar-wasm layer + RepoTable. Slack-link Lambda attaches when the
  slack mapping table is provided.
- New routes:
    POST /tasks/{task_id}/approve
    POST /tasks/{task_id}/deny
    GET  /pending
    GET  /repos/{repo_id}/policies
    POST /notifications/slack/link
- GetPoliciesFn configures `memorySize: 512` (Cedar-wasm floor from
  §15.2 task 10) and externalizes `@cedar-policy/cedar-wasm` from the
  esbuild bundle so the layer provides the wasm binary at runtime.
- CedarWasmLayer compatibleRuntimes extended to include nodejs24.x
  (the Lambda runtime) — the Node 20/22 list was the original §15.2
  spec but the actual function uses Node 24.
- agent.ts passes all three new constructs into TaskApi.

Orchestrator (shared/orchestrator.ts)
-------------------------------------
- `finalizeTask` now treats AWAITING_APPROVAL as a "task still alive"
  terminal-timeout source: on poll exhaustion the task transitions to
  TIMED_OUT with a distinct `approval_poll_timeout` reason + error
  message ("Orchestrator poll timeout exceeded while awaiting approval").
  The stranded-approval reconciler is the secondary safety net (§13.6)
  for tasks the orchestrator already lost track of.
- Invocation payload now carries three new fields:
    - `task_started_at` (ISO 8601 at HYDRATING → RUNNING time) —
      consumed by the agent hook's `_remaining_maxlifetime_s` so the
      §6.5 maxLifetime ceiling math uses the real task clock instead
      of the fail-open fallback.
    - `approval_timeout_s` (when the submit payload supplied it).
    - `initial_approvals` (when the submit payload supplied entries).

Stranded-task reconciler
------------------------
- Sweeps AWAITING_APPROVAL in addition to SUBMITTED/HYDRATING.
- New `APPROVAL_STRANDED_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` env var (default 7200s =
  2h) — double §7.3's 1h ceiling so this reconciler never races the
  happy-path timer.
- Distinct failure message on approval-stranded vs generic-stranded
  so users see "approval stranded — container evicted" rather than
  the misleading "no pipeline attached" copy.

Fanout (handlers/fanout-task-events.ts)
---------------------------------------
- Slack channel default set replaces the forward-compat
  `approval_required` stub with the real §11.1 events:
  `approval_requested` and `approval_stranded`. Other approval
  milestones (granted/denied/timed_out/late_win/etc.) stay out of
  default routing to avoid notification fatigue — the CLI surfaces
  those confirmations directly.
- Email default replaces `approval_required` with `approval_requested`
  (high-severity gates only; severity gating happens in the dispatcher).

Create-task validation (shared/create-task-core.ts)
---------------------------------------------------
- New request fields:
    - `approval_timeout_s` — integer within
      `[APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_S_MIN, APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_S_MAX]`.
    - `initial_approvals` — array of scope strings; each entry must
      be a valid `ApprovalScope` per `parseApprovalScope`; bash_pattern
      and write_path scopes get the §7.4 degenerate-pattern check.
- TaskRecord extended with `approval_timeout_s`, `initial_approvals`,
  `approval_gate_count` (seeded to 0 at admission), and
  `awaiting_approval_request_id` (written atomically by the agent's
  `transact_write_approval_request` primitive).

Agent plumbing (models.py / config.py / pipeline.py / runner.py / server.py)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- `TaskConfig` adds `approval_timeout_s`, `initial_approvals`.
- `build_config`, `run_task`, `_run_task_background`, and
  `_extract_invocation_params` thread the two new fields from payload
  → config → PolicyEngine.
- `server._extract_invocation_params` stamps `os.environ["TASK_STARTED_AT"]`
  from the payload so the hook's `_remaining_maxlifetime_s` returns
  real values (carry-forward from Chunk 3 resolved).
- `runner.py` constructs PolicyEngine with `initial_approvals` +
  `task_default_timeout_s` when supplied; the engine clamps bad
  values at construction time.

Tests
-----
All CDK tests pass: 1219 / 1219.
All agent tests pass: 648 / 648.

Affected suites (changes only):
  - test/stacks/agent.test.ts: cedar-wasm layer CompatibleRuntimes
    now expects `nodejs24.x`; table count still 8.
  - test/constructs/cedar-wasm-layer.test.ts: same runtime expansion.
  - test/handlers/fanout-task-events.test.ts: approval_required →
    approval_requested/approval_stranded in Slack default set;
    approval_required → approval_requested in Email default set.
  - test/handlers/reconcile-stranded-tasks.test.ts: primeResponses
    now queue a third `Items: []` for AWAITING_APPROVAL queries;
    queryCalls assertion bumped to 3.

Carry-forward (non-blocking)
----------------------------
- GetPoliciesFn has write access to TaskApprovalsTable (for the
  rate-limit counter path). A future permissions audit should
  tighten this to a single-item write scoped to `RATE#<user>#*`.
- TASK_STARTED_AT env var is only set when a payload supplies it;
  server.py still supports the Phase 2 no-payload startup path.

* feat(cedar-hitl): Chunk 6 CLI — approve / deny / pending / policies

Ships the four user-facing commands that close the Cedar HITL loop:
once Chunks 1-5 have a PENDING approval row and the Slack/Email fan-out
has notified the user, Chunk 6 is how they actually respond.

New commands (cli/src/commands/)
--------------------------------
- `bgagent approve <task-id> <request-id> [--scope <scope>] [--yes]`
  Default scope is `this_call`; callers extend allowlist with
  `tool_type:Bash`, `rule:<id>`, etc. `all_session` is the only scope
  that requires `--yes` to confirm — mirrors the safety UX from
  §8.4. Error classification maps 404 → "run `bgagent pending`", 409
  → "task no longer awaiting approval", 429 → rate-limit, 401 → login.
- `bgagent deny <task-id> <request-id> [--reason ... | --reason-file ...]`
  `--reason-file` accepts multi-line reasons that would otherwise
  need shell quoting. Client-side `DENY_REASON_MAX_LENGTH` cap avoids
  a round-trip on obviously-too-long reasons; the server still
  truncates. Reason is sanitized server-side (output_scanner) before
  ever reaching the agent.
- `bgagent pending [--output text|json]`
  Lists every PENDING approval owned by the caller. Rendered with
  approve/deny hints inline so the user can copy-paste the next
  command. JSON output for scripting. Rate-limited server-side.
- `bgagent policies list --repo <owner/repo> [--tier hard|soft]`
  `bgagent policies show --repo <owner/repo> --rule <rule_id>`
  Discovery commands so users can find rule IDs without reading CDK
  source. Both subcommands reuse a single `listPolicies` API call
  and filter locally.

Wire changes
------------
- `cli/src/api-client.ts`: `approveTask`, `denyTask`, `listPending`,
  `listPolicies` — each matching the §7.1 / §7.2 / §7.6 / §7.7
  request/response shapes. `approveTask` omits the `scope` body field
  when unset so the server's `this_call` default applies.
- `cli/src/types.ts`: mirrors the Chunk 5 server types verbatim —
  `ApprovalScope` union, `ApprovalRequest/Response`, `DenyRequest/Response`,
  `PendingApprovalSummary`, `GetPoliciesResponse`, `PolicyRuleSummary`,
  plus the five constants (`DENY_REASON_MAX_LENGTH`,
  `INITIAL_APPROVALS_MAX_ENTRIES`, `INITIAL_APPROVALS_MAX_ENTRY_LENGTH`,
  `APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_S_MIN/MAX/DEFAULT`).
- `cli/src/bin/bgagent.ts`: registers the four new commands in the
  order they appear in help output.

Tests: +27 new (217 total).
  - approve (9): default scope, custom scope, all_session guard +
    `--yes` bypass, JSON output, 404/409/401/429 error classifications.
  - deny (6): no-reason path, `--reason`, `--reason-file` with
    tmpdir fixture, mutually-exclusive rejection, over-length rejection,
    404 classification.
  - pending (5): empty render, populated render with approve/deny
    hints, JSON output, 401 and 429 classifications.
  - policies (7): list both tiers, `--tier` filter, `--output json`,
    bad `--tier`, show found rule, show unknown rule, 404
    repo-not-onboarded classification.

Carry-forward
-------------
- `submit.ts` extension with `--approval-timeout` / `--pre-approve`
  flags is deferred to a follow-up commit — the server already accepts
  these fields on POST /v1/tasks (Chunk 5), and `bgagent submit`
  already forwards unknown payload fields through the existing
  request path, so users can set them via `--body-file` today until
  the explicit flags land.
- `--output json` on error branches currently returns a CliError
  instead of a JSON error envelope; matches the pattern the existing
  commands use (status, cancel, nudge). Follow-up to standardize
  JSON error envelopes across the whole CLI if that becomes a
  common scripting pain point.

* feat(cedar-hitl): Chunk 7a — persist gate counter + IMPL-23 cache observability

Persist approval_gate_count to TaskTable across container restarts per
§13.6 so the cumulative gate budget survives eviction. Emit
pre_approvals_loaded after PolicyEngine init per §4 step 7 / §11.1 so
operators see the starting approval posture in the live SSE stream.
Add IMPL-23 cache-hit observability: cache hits attach metadata to
PolicyDecision, hook forwards to new write_policy_decision_cached
progress helper (decision_source="recent_decision_cache").

Why: container restarts were silently resetting the per-task gate
counter, re-exposing users to another approvalGateCap-worth of gates
per restart. Cache-driven denies were invisible in TaskEventsTable
beyond the initial gate. Fresh tasks emitted no "starting posture"
signal so dashboards could not distinguish "no pre-approvals seeded"
from "agent has not started".

Surface additions:
- task_state.increment_approval_gate_count_in_ddb — best-effort
  atomic ADD on approval_gate_count
- PolicyEngine(initial_approval_gate_count=N) — seed session counter
- TaskConfig.initial_approval_gate_count — orchestrator payload field
- progress_writer.write_policy_decision_cached — IMPL-23 emitter
- PolicyDecision.cache_hit_metadata — observability-only field
- _CachedDecision.original_decision_ts — wall-clock preservation
- runner._initialize_policy_engine_and_hooks — extracted helper

Counter survival is a safety bound, not correctness: DDB failure
does NOT block the gate (§13.6). Joint-update invariant on status
+ awaiting_approval_request_id (§10.2) is preserved — counter uses
separate UpdateItem, not merged into resume transaction.

Tests: +36 agent (648→684), +8 CDK (1219→1227), +6 new runner tests.

* feat(cedar-hitl): Chunk 7b — persist approval_gate_cap from blueprint

Capture the per-task approval-gate cap at submit-time (§4 step 5,
decision #13, §13.6) so a blueprint-configured override is frozen
onto the TaskRecord. Mid-task blueprint edits cannot shift the cap
beneath a running task; container restarts re-seed the agent's
PolicyEngine from the persisted value instead of its compile-time
default-50.

Why: Chunk 7a added approval_gate_count persistence but the cap
itself was still resolved from the blueprint on every restart —
so an operator lowering security.approvalGateCap mid-task would
retroactively fail-close the running task. The design has always
said cap is frozen at submit; this chunk makes the implementation
match.

Surface additions:
- BlueprintProps.security.approvalGateCap (CDK, synth-validated
  [1, 500] integer) — new per-repo blueprint prop
- RepoConfig.approval_gate_cap + BlueprintConfig.approval_gate_cap
- TaskRecord.approval_gate_cap + APPROVAL_GATE_CAP_{MIN,MAX,DEFAULT}
- create-task-core now calls loadRepoConfig, resolves cap, bounds-
  checks, persists; returns 503 SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE on invalid
  blueprint data (permanent until admin re-deploys, not transient)
- orchestrator.ts: isValidApprovalGateCap integer+bounds guard;
  logs warn if a persisted cap is structurally invalid (schema
  drift / hand-edited DDB row)
- TaskConfig.approval_gate_cap: int | None = None (agent-side);
  runner threads to PolicyEngine kwarg when not None
- "Task created" log line now carries approval_gate_cap +
  approval_gate_cap_source ("blueprint" | "platform_default") so
  operators can detect a broken-plumbing deploy at the single
  chokepoint where all fallback layers converge

Per silent-failure review:
- HIGH: 500 → 503 + logger.error for permanent misconfig
- HIGH: cap + source in task-created log (catches 4-layer cascade)
- MEDIUM: orchestrator guard tightened past typeof (NaN, Infinity,
  floats, out-of-bounds all omitted + warned)

Tests: CDK 1263/1263 (+36), agent 694/694 (+10). CLI unchanged.

* feat(cedar-hitl): Chunk 7c — observability wrap-up for resolved cap + warn path

Close three deferred items from Chunks 7a/7b before Chunks 8-10:

- runner.py init log now carries approval_gate_cap=N +
  approval_gate_cap_source=threaded|engine_default. Matches the
  handler log key so CloudWatch Insights can join across the
  cascade; agent can't distinguish blueprint-override from
  platform-default-frozen (handler log is the ground truth).

- server.py adds _warn_cw helper routing [server/warn] lines to
  a dedicated CloudWatch stream (server_warn/<task_id>). stdout
  print is preserved for local dev + existing capsys tests.
  AgentCore does not forward container stdout to APPLICATION_LOGS,
  so pre-7c warnings about malformed invocation payloads were
  invisible in production. Failure counter shared with _debug_cw
  for a single alarm surface; hoisted above writer defs for
  import-time ordering safety.

- blueprint.ts emits a synth-time info annotation when
  security.approvalGateCap is omitted so operators see a signal
  that the repo will rely on the platform default of 50. Without
  this, the default was a silent fallback at the handler layer —
  only visible by inspecting a TaskRecord at runtime.

Tests: agent 694→700 (+6), cdk 1263→1265 (+2), cli unchanged.
Design refs: §4 step 5, §11.1, §13.6, decision #13.

* feat(cedar-hitl): Chunk 8a — extend approval outcome event schema

Add created_at / effective_timeout_s / matching_rule_ids to
approval_granted / approval_denied / approval_timed_out events so
the incoming ApprovalMetricsPublisher Lambda (Chunk 8b) can compute
decision latency and emit a rule_id-dimensioned timeout breakdown
without a round-trip GetItem against TaskEventsTable.

Fields are added conditionally — omitted from metadata when the
caller did not supply them — so the event stream stays free of
null-value noise and legacy callers continue to produce valid
payloads. Publisher handles missing fields via explicit skip-and-log
on the specific metric branch (not fallback-to-zero).

Agent tests extended: +6 progress_writer tests, +3 hooks tests.
Baseline 700 → 710. No consumer wired yet — this commit is a
forward-compatible superset; Chunk 8b ships the CDK publisher +
dashboard widgets.

* feat(cedar-hitl): Chunk 8b — ApprovalMetricsPublisher + native CloudWatch dashboard widgets

Ship the Cedar-HITL dashboard widgets from §11.3 / IMPL-28 via the
MetricsPublisher architecture (Option E):

- New ApprovalMetricsPublisher Lambda consumes TaskEventsTable DDB
  stream as consumer #2 (FanoutConsumer is #1; stream is within its
  2-consumer soft cap — documented in task-events-table.ts).
- Handler emits CloudWatch EMF for 3 metrics in namespace
  ABCA/Cedar-HITL:
    * ApprovalRequestCount  +  ClippedApprovalCount (reason dim)  →
      ApprovalTimeoutClipRate widget (MathExpression with IF-guard
      against NaN on zero-denominator periods)
    * TimedOutEffectiveTimeout (rule_id dim with allowlist
      cardinality cap) → ApprovalTimeoutBreakdown widget
    * ApprovalDecisionLatencyMs (outcome dim) → ApprovalDecisionLatency
      widget with per-outcome p50/p90/p99
- Observability-of-observability (silent-failure review):
    * MetricsPublisherHeartbeat per batch so dashboard gaps
      distinguish "no traffic" from "pipeline broken"
    * MetricEmitSkipped with a reason dim on schema mismatches,
      parse anomalies, unknown rule ids — never fall back to
      latency=0 or count=0 which would poison percentile widgets
    * Expected high-volume skip reasons (non-milestone events,
      REMOVE records) DO NOT emit MetricEmitSkipped — only
      anomaly reasons (missing keys, missing milestone name) do,
      so real signal isn't drowned
    * Structured log lines alongside every skip so the absence of
      metrics is also observable via CloudWatch Logs Insights
- Cardinality caps via ``RULE_ID_ALLOWLIST`` + ``normalizeClipReason``.
  Unknown values collapse to ``other`` / ``unknown`` buckets with
  dashboard series so the collapse is discoverable rather than
  silently accruing custom-metric cost.
- Event-source-mapping filter pattern rejects non-agent_milestone
  records at the service layer; handler-layer allowlist catches
  anything that slips through. Filter pattern correctness tested
  structurally + positively/negatively probed (silent-failure H3).
- Per-record try/catch + reportBatchItemFailures + SQS DLQ mirror
  the fanout-task-events.ts poison-pill pattern exactly.

Deferred to Chunk 10 chore issues:
- DLQ alarms (fanout + publisher) — fire-into-void until
  notification channel lands, so wire with §11.5 alarms as a group
- Explicit log-group declaration (IAM drift defense)
- stdout-flush race documentation (pre-existing pattern in fanout)
- EMF 100-updates/sec throttle alarm

Tests: cdk 1265 → 1327 (+62); agent 710 (unchanged); cli 217
(unchanged). All pass. §11.5 alarm plumbing now unblocked —
publisher provides the metrics infrastructure the design always
intended; only the notification-channel SNS wiring is left.

* docs(cedar-hitl): Chunk 9 — sync design doc to Chunks 7b / 8a / 8b

Bring CEDAR_HITL_GATES.md current with the code that shipped in
Chunks 7b (approval_gate_cap persist), 8a (outcome event schema
superset), and 8b (ApprovalMetricsPublisher + dashboard widgets):

- §10.2 adds the missing approval_gate_cap row (carry-forward
  drift from Chunk 7b). Bounds + frozen-at-submit semantics
  documented.
- §11.1 outcome events (approval_granted / approval_denied /
  approval_timed_out) now document the Chunk 8a optional fields
  (created_at, effective_timeout_s, matching_rule_ids) plus the
  publisher's skip-on-missing-field policy.
- §11.1 intro names ApprovalMetricsPublisherFn as consumer #2 and
  points to §11.3 for the metric schema.
- §11.3 rewritten to describe the Option E architecture:
  publisher Lambda + EMF + native CloudWatch metrics in namespace
  ABCA/Cedar-HITL, MathExpression with divide-by-zero guard,
  rule_id cardinality cap, observability-of-observability via
  heartbeat + skip meta-metrics, widget layout (12/12 over 24),
  2-consumer stream budget. Dropped the stale "Retired the old
  bundled widget" line — that widget never shipped.
- §11.5 reframed as "deferred (notification-channel gated)" with
  a plumbing-status paragraph noting the metric infra now exists;
  only SNS wiring remains. Alarm list expanded to include DLQ
  and publisher-health alarms.
- §16 IMPL-28 rewritten for Option E; §15.2 row 46 expanded to
  reference the 4 new test files; Appendix B checklist updated.

Starlight mirror regenerated via ``cd docs && node
scripts/sync-starlight.mjs``.

No code changes. Test baselines unchanged. Adversarial
comment-analyzer review verified every new claim against
committed code — zero inaccuracies.

* feat(cedar-hitl): Chunk 10 review fixes — close 2 blockers + tighten 2 mediums

Full-branch adversarial review (code-reviewer + silent-failure-hunter
on all 18 commits) surfaced findings that only appear at final-state.
Addressing the blockers + low-cost meds before deploy:

B2 — stranded approvals were invisible to the dashboard:
  - Reconciler writes ``event_type: 'task_stranded'``; the metrics
    publisher's event-source filter only accepts
    ``event_type: 'agent_milestone'``, so AWAITING_APPROVAL evictions
    produced zero §11.3 signal.
  - Fix: reconciler now additionally emits an ``agent_milestone``
    with ``milestone: 'approval_stranded'`` when the stranded task
    was AWAITING_APPROVAL. Publisher allowlist extended; classifier
    emits ``ApprovalStrandedCount`` counter. SUBMITTED / HYDRATING
    stranded events unchanged (guarded by test).

B1 — heartbeat comment was false reassurance:
  - Event-source filter blocks Lambda invocation when no
    ``agent_milestone`` records exist in the poll window, so a
    quiet period produces the same widget gap as a broken
    pipeline. The code + design-doc wording claimed "gap =
    pipeline broken" which would mislead the on-call.
  - Fix: corrected module + function docstrings to describe the
    heartbeat as "present when active, not pipeline-alive-always."
    Operators should alarm on the combination
    (heartbeat-absent + recent TaskEventsTable traffic) or wire
    a scheduled canary — the latter tracked as a §11.5 follow-up.

M1 — safety-critical milestones produced zero dashboard signal:
  - ``approval_cap_exceeded`` (§12.9 per-task cap) and
    ``approval_rate_limit_exceeded`` (per-user per-minute rate)
    were emitted by the agent but not on the publisher allowlist.
    A production bug where every gate hit the cap would have
    been invisible.
  - Fix: both added to APPROVAL_METRIC_MILESTONES with
    ``ApprovalCapExceededCount`` / ``ApprovalRateLimitExceededCount``
    counters. No dimensions — the request_id in the event carries
    per-user correlation for ad-hoc log-insights investigation.

H2 — filter / handler eventName disagreement:
  - Event-source filter required ``INSERT``; handler accepted
    ``INSERT`` and ``MODIFY``. Benign today (TaskEventsTable is
    put-only), but a future chunk MODIFY-ing records would be
    silently dropped by the filter while the handler was ready
    to process them.
  - Fix: handler now INSERT-only, matching the filter. Single
    source of truth on the eventName invariant.

M1-rename — ``expected_non_approval_milestone`` skip reason was
misleading (the non-metric approval milestones like
``approval_late_win`` also land in this bucket). Renamed to
``expected_milestone_not_tracked``.

Tests: cdk 1327 → 1332 (+5: 3 classifier branches for new metrics,
1 reconciler AWAITING_APPROVAL path, 1 SUBMITTED-not-double-counted
guard). Agent + CLI unchanged. All pre-commit hooks green; pre-push
security fails only on the 3 pre-existing CVEs tracked for chore
issue filing.

Deferred findings from the same review (file as chore issues):
- H1: agent-dies-between-TIMED_OUT-and-resume loses latency
  (edge, affects p99 bias)
- H3: late-win APPROVED created_at staleness invariant
  (works today, document invariant)
- H4: _warn_cw daemon-thread burst under adversarial payload
- M2-M4: late-win metric, rename helpers, etc.

No upstream PR filing this chunk — deploy to Sam's AWS account
for integration testing first.

* fix(cedar-hitl): suppress AwsSolutions-IAM5 on Runtime ExecutionRole overflow policies

Synth + deploy were blocked by cdk-nag: the Cedar HITL additions
(TaskApprovalsTable grant + SlackUserMappingTable + extra env vars
threaded to the AgentCore runtime) pushed the runtime ExecutionRole
past CDK's inline-policy size limit, so CDK auto-splits excess
statements into ``OverflowPolicy1``. The overflow inherits the same
wildcard ``bedrock:InvokeModel*`` / CloudWatch actions as the base
policy but lives at a path
(``Runtime/ExecutionRole/OverflowPolicy1/Resource``) that the
existing ``addResourceSuppressions(runtime, ..., applyToChildren:
true)`` cannot reach — CDK creates overflow policies lazily during
synth ``prepare()``, after the construct tree has been frozen and
after static suppressions have been cached.

Suppress via an Aspect at MUTATING priority so the suppression is
applied before cdk-nag's READONLY visitor runs. Matches any path
containing ``/Runtime/ExecutionRole/OverflowPolicy`` + ending
``/Resource`` so future ``OverflowPolicy2``, etc. are covered
without hardcoding indices.

Verified: ``mise //cdk:synth`` now completes cleanly.
``mise //cdk:test`` still 1332/1332.

* fix(cedar-hitl): E2E deploy-readiness — policies bundle + onboarding gate + CLI error visibility

Three E2E T1.4 + T2.2 findings from the Chunk 10 integration-test
session. Batched into one commit since all three need the same
redeploy to verify:

1. agent/Dockerfile: COPY policies/ into the container image.
   ``PolicyEngine.__init__`` reads
   ``/app/policies/hard_deny.cedar`` + ``soft_deny.cedar`` at import
   time via ``_POLICIES_DIR = Path(__file__).parent.parent /
   "policies"``. The Dockerfile only copied ``src/``, so the
   directory was missing and every Cedar-HITL task failed at 0 turns
   with ``missing built-in hard-deny policies``. Introduced
   alongside Chunk 2 when the policy files were first added —
   Dockerfile was never updated. Zero tasks on this branch ever
   su…
…ally work

End-to-end smoke on backgroundagent-dev surfaced two more silent failure
modes after the runtimeUserId fix landed:

## 1) Per-thread ContextVar propagation (agent/src/server.py)

`BedrockAgentCoreContext.get_workload_access_token()` returned None inside
the pipeline thread even though the platform delivered the token on the
inbound request. Cause: Python ContextVar storage is per-thread, not
shared across `threading.Thread` boundaries. Our `_run_task_background`
spawns a new thread for the pipeline, so any context-var the SDK's
middleware sets in the request handler thread doesn't reach it.

Compounding factor: the SDK's `_build_request_context` middleware only
runs when using `BedrockAgentCoreApp` from `bedrock_agentcore.runtime`.
Plain FastAPI apps like ours never get that bridge at all.

Fix: read the workload token off the request in `_extract_invocation_params`
(handling both observed header spellings — `WorkloadAccessToken` and
`x-amzn-bedrock-agentcore-runtime-workload-accesstoken`), thread it through
the kwargs of `_run_task_background`, and have the pipeline thread call
`BedrockAgentCoreContext.set_workload_access_token` on entry.

## 2) Runtime role needs GetSecretValue on the Identity vault prefix
   (cdk/src/stacks/agent.ts)

After (1) was applied, `IdentityClient.get_api_key()` actually fired and
got `AccessDeniedException: ... not authorized to perform:
secretsmanager:GetSecretValue`.

Cause: AgentCore Identity stores api-key credentials in Secrets Manager
under reserved prefix `bedrock-agentcore-identity!*` (the actual ARN
shape: `arn:aws:secretsmanager:REGION:ACCOUNT:secret:bedrock-agentcore-
identity!default/apikey/<provider-name>-<hash>`). The `GetResourceApiKey`
control-plane API surfaces the underlying secret to the caller, and AWS
verifies the *caller* role (our runtime role) has `GetSecretValue` on
the actual secret resource — not the SLR.

Fix: grant the runtime role `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue` scoped to
the `bedrock-agentcore-identity!*` prefix in the current
account/region. Tightly scoped to Identity-managed secrets; doesn't
leak read access to other Secrets Manager resources.

## Verified working end-to-end (backgroundagent-dev, 2026-05-18)

- Runtime container reads workload token from request, propagates across
  thread boundary, calls IdentityClient successfully
- 👀 reaction posts at +525ms after task pickup, no warnings
- Linear MCP loads cleanly with the resolved token
- No more `workload access token not in context` WARN
- No more `AccessDeniedException` from `GetResourceApiKey`

Three undocumented requirements total for Phase 2.0a (combining with
the runtimeUserId fix from the prior commit):

  1. Caller (orchestrator) sends `runtimeUserId` and has
     `InvokeAgentRuntimeForUser` IAM
  2. Runtime container bridges the workload-token header into the
     ContextVar, with per-thread propagation if the pipeline runs in a
     spawned thread
  3. Runtime role has `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue` on
     `bedrock-agentcore-identity!*`

All three are silent failures on their own; missing any one returns None
or AccessDenied without obvious "you forgot X" diagnostics. Will file an
upstream issue against `aws/bedrock-agentcore-sdk-python` summarising
all three so others don't burn the same cycles.

Tests: 542 agent / 1273 cdk / 196 cli — all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
isadeks pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 21, 2026
Vercel posts the success `deployment_status` webhook the moment its
build finishes, which on the Linear-driven path is ~7-15s before the
agent's `gh pr create` returns. The processor's first lookup against
the GitHub commit-pulls API came back empty and we'd silently drop
the screenshot.

Add a retry wrapper with backoff (0s, 5s, 10s, 20s — total max ~35s)
around the PR lookup. The first hit returns immediately, so the
warm-cache happy path is unchanged.

Verified end-to-end on backgroundagent-dev: Linear issue ABCA-70 →
agent → PR #2 in vercel-abca-linear → Vercel preview → screenshot
landed on both the GitHub PR and the Linear issue.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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