Fix panic on malformed OSPF packets#1229
Open
mohammadmseet-hue wants to merge 1 commit intogoogle:masterfrom
Open
Fix panic on malformed OSPF packets#1229mohammadmseet-hue wants to merge 1 commit intogoogle:masterfrom
mohammadmseet-hue wants to merge 1 commit intogoogle:masterfrom
Conversation
Validate PacketLength against actual data length in both OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 DecodeFromBytes before using it as loop bounds. Add bounds checking in getLSAsv2 and getLSAs before reading LSA headers. Malformed packets with inflated PacketLength or NumOfLSAs caused index out of range panics when the parser iterated beyond available data.
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
1 participant
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
Validate
PacketLengthagainst actual data length in bothOSPFv2andOSPFv3DecodeFromBytes, and add bounds checking ingetLSAsv2/getLSAsbefore reading LSA headers.Root cause:
ospf.PacketLengthfrom the packet header is trusted as a loop bound for Hello neighbors, DBDesc LSAs, LSRequests, and LSAck iterations. When PacketLength exceeds actual data length, reads go out of bounds.getLSAsv2indexesdata[offset+3]anddata[offset+18:offset+20]without checking bounds.Fix: Return an error if
PacketLength > len(data). Checkoffset+20 <= len(data)in LSA parsing loops.Panics fixed: 3 (Hello PacketLength overflow, DBDesc PacketLength overflow, LSUpdate with truncated LSA data)
All existing tests pass.