One disk image, served over SMB, NFS, WebDAV, SFTP and S3 — the same users, the same per-share access, from one configuration file.

A person wants to share an image. Which protocol carries it is a property of the client at the other end: macOS and Windows reach for SMB, a Linux fleet already has NFS, a browser or a phone has HTTP. Running four servers, each with its own configuration file and its own idea of who "alice" is, is a way to get three of them subtly wrong.

So this is one binary and one file. The images are go-filesystems drivers — FAT32, exFAT, ext4, NTFS, UFS, ISO 9660, SquashFS, HFS+ — opened once and shared by every protocol behind one lock. That is every driver in the organisation of the one shape. APFS, Btrfs, XFS and ZFS open a disk image and must be told which partition — but a partition can be named for any filesystem, because a FAT32 or ext4 image has a partition table in front of it as often as an XFS one does. partition_label or partition_uuid, not an index: an index moves when a disk is repartitioned, and a filesystem is still found at the new one.

That is the whole difficulty, and it is a fact about the protocols rather than a limitation here:

So a share that names who may use it is not exported over NFS. Not a warning and not an option: a configuration that says "photos belongs to alice" and a protocol that hands photos to whoever connects cannot both be honoured, and quietly widening access is the worse of the two failures. fileshare check prints the whole matrix — every share against every protocol, and every person against every protocol — before anything is restarted.

A person can exist only at an identity provider. An oidc block makes WebDAV accept a bearer token — verified by go-authn/oidc for signature, issuer, audience and expiry — and the challenge it sends offers Basic and Bearer, so a client picks the one it can answer. Only WebDAV: SMB signs with NTLMv2, SFTP with a key, S3 with SigV4, and none of them has a field a token fits in.

⛔ A token says who the provider thinks somebody is. It does not say this server has a share for them: a valid token for a name no source here knows is refused, because the safe reading of I do not know you is not you are allowed. A site where the provider IS the directory says trust_all = true.

That refusal used to be permanent. A kerberos block gives NFS something to check, and a restricted share is then exported over it like anywhere else:

kerberos {
  realm  = "EXAMPLE.ORG"
  keytab = "/etc/fileshare/krb5.keytab"
}

The realm is compared, not just the name before the @: two realms can each have an alice, and only one of them is yours.

	Repo
	fileshare	The server: one image, four protocols, one configuration. go install github.com/go-fileshare/fileshare@latest
	portal	The server behind the UIs: OIDC login, an encrypted session, a token per fileshare server, the admin API and WebDAV passed through, files served inert.
	console	The admin console: shares, grants, volumes, across every server a portal knows. In a browser, or native.
	explorer	The file explorer: browse, upload in pieces, download, rename, copy, delete. In a browser behind the portal.

A user block is the whole directory for a household. A site whose people are already in a database or in LDAP names them where they are, through go-authn/directory — the same users block an authnd uses, so a site describes its directory once.

• 📖 Docs — https://go-fileshare.github.io/docs/
• 🌐 Site — https://go-fileshare.github.io/
• 🎨 Brand assets — https://github.com/go-fileshare/brand

_{No cgo. Six architectures under qemu. Verified against clients this project did not write: Samba's smbclient, macOS's Finder and Windows' own redirector, OpenSSH's sftp, and mount_nfs.}