docs: eSec is Implemented in eos, and one part is not - #1
Open
srpatcha wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
Conversation
The README said "Status: Planned. There is no implementation yet." The
crypto services are Implemented under §28 — 15 source files and seven test
suites passing in eos, at services/crypto/.
But flatly upgrading the status would overstate it. Package signature
verification is Experimental at best: services/pkg/eos_pkg.c verifies
against eos_pkg_public_key[32] = {0}, and the low-order-key rejection that
makes an all-zero anchor fail closed rather than open only just landed
(eos#99). A verifier with no real key authenticates nothing, and a README
claiming a working security framework should say so. Tracked as eos#98.
Also replaces the old rationale with v2.0 §10 and §21.1, adds the component
manifest as the way to depend on this, and records why splitting early is
costly — two Ed25519 implementations across eos and eBoot carried the same
bypass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
1 participant
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
This repository has three files. The README said:
The crypto services are Implemented under §28 — "feature exists and is
usable", evidenced by code and functional tests. In
eos, atservices/crypto/: 15 source files and seven test suites, all passing.But flatly upgrading the status would overstate it
Package signature verification is Experimental at best, and this README
should not let a reader assume otherwise:
An all-zero trust anchor. The low-order-key rejection that makes such a key fail
closed rather than open only just landed (embeddedos-org/eos#99) — before it,
that key accepted roughly one arbitrary signature in four. Tracked as
embeddedos-org/eos#98.
A verifier with no real key authenticates nothing. A repository called "the
security framework for EmbeddedOS" is exactly the wrong place to round that up
to "Implemented", so the README now distinguishes the two.
This is the same reasoning eos#84 applies with
EOS_ALLOW_STUB_CRYPTO, and thateAI applies with its compile-time
#warningonsecure_boot.c: a stub thatannounces itself is safe, and one that reads as finished is not.
Also in this change
Replaces the old §24 citation with v2.0's sharper pair:
Adds the component manifest (embeddedos-org/embeddedos-stack#20) as the way to
depend on eSec, and records why splitting early is costly: there are two
independent Ed25519 implementations in the platform, in eos and eBoot, and the
same low-order-key bypass was present in both. Duplication across repositories is
how one fix stops being one fix.