chore(deps): update cryptography requirement from >=42.0.0 to >=50.0.1

[dependabot]

Updates the requirements on cryptography to permit the latest version.

Changelog

Sourced from cryptography's changelog.

50.0.1 - 2026-08-25

* Updated Windows, macOS, and Linux wheels to be compiled with OpenSSL 4.0.2.
.. _v50-0-0:
50.0.0 - 2026-07-31

• SECURITY ISSUE: :func:~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization.pkcs7.pkcs7_decrypt_der and its PEM and S/MIME variants no longer expose distinguishable errors or timing when unwrapping a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey, which could act as a Bleichenbacher oracle for callers that decrypt untrusted messages. A random key is now substituted on failure, as described in :rfc:3218. Credit to @​X1AOxiang for reporting the issue. CVE-2026-69247
• Deprecated Diffie-Hellman key exchange over finite fields (FFDH). Everything FFDH is deprecated, including the types in cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.dh and loading FFDH keys or parameters with the key loading APIs. Users should migrate to a more modern key exchange algorithm.
• Added xof() class methods to :class:~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.SHAKE128 and :class:~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.SHAKE256 for constructing algorithm instances configured for use with :class:~cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.XOFHash.
• The :mod:X.509 verification <cryptography.x509.verification> APIs are now considered stable and are subject to our API stability policy.
• Added the :doc:/cobblestone recipe, an implementation of the Cobblestone-128 and Cobblestone-256 instantiations of the C2SP chunked-encryption specification <https://c2sp.org/chunked-encryption>_ for streaming authenticated encryption of large messages.
• Parsing a Signed Certificate Timestamp list now rejects encodings that carry trailing bytes after the list or after an individual SCT, instead of silently ignoring them.
• Added support for using :class:~cryptography.x509.Name as a field type in the :doc:/hazmat/asn1/index module.
• Loading a public key or an EC private key now rejects DER where the subjectPublicKey (or EC publicKey) BIT STRING declares a non-zero number of unused bits, instead of silently ignoring it.
• Parsing a CRL entry's InvalidityDate extension now rejects a GeneralizedTime that carries fractional seconds or another non-DER form, matching the strict encoding already required for every other X.509 time field.
• :func:~cryptography.x509.ocsp.load_der_ocsp_request and :func:~cryptography.x509.ocsp.load_der_ocsp_response now reject a request or response whose version field is not v1, the only version defined by RFC 6960, matching the version validation already performed when loading

... (truncated)

Commits

• ffde75a bump for 50.0.1 + changelog (#15520)
• dcb7050 Prepare for 50.0.0 release (#15372)
• 53fccd9 Don't leak how PKCS#7 encryptedKey decryption failed (#15369)
• d472f97 Add from __future__ import annotations to all src/ Python files (#15371)
• 908773d Bump downstream dependencies in CI (#15368)
• 2cc07cc Bump BoringSSL, OpenSSL, AWS-LC in CI (#15367)
• c94ede9 chore(deps): bump ruff from 0.16.0 to 0.16.1 (#15366)
• 67a8308 chore(deps): bump virtualenv from 21.7.0 to 21.7.1 (#15365)
• 95018ff Release the GIL in one-shot AEAD encrypt/decrypt (#15361)
• 6954733 Release the GIL during DH and DSA parameter generation (#15364)
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

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[srpatcha]

Review — eDB#72 "chore(deps): update cryptography requirement from >=42.0.0 to >=50.0.1"

head: 2200af1 author: app/dependabot ci: pass (CodeQL only — the test matrix did not run)

Verdict: This is the one of the three eDB bumps that touches a runtime security
dependency, and I verified it works: src/edb/security/encryption.py round-trips
identically under 42.0.0 and 50.0.1. The problem is what sits behind it — that module has
no tests at all, so the round-trip I ran locally is currently the only evidence that
exists either way.

What was measured

Cloned origin/master (0457c0a) and exercised the sole consumer of this dependency
under both floors, Python 3.12.14:

cryptography 42.0.0 -> round-trip OK, both key paths
cryptography 50.0.1 -> round-trip OK, both key paths

covering EncryptionManager('pw') (PBKDF2-derived key) and EncryptionManager()
(generated key), encrypt → decrypt. cryptography==50.0.1 exists on PyPI with
requires_python = "!=3.9.0,!=3.9.1,>=3.9", so it installs on every entry of the CI
matrix and satisfies pyproject.toml:11's requires-python = ">=3.11".

Findings

#	Severity	File:line	Finding	Recommended fix
1	High	src/edb/security/encryption.py (whole file)	The only module that imports cryptography — AES-256-GCM at rest, PBKDF2HMAC key derivation — has no test coverage. grep -rln "encryption|AESGCM|encrypt" tests/ returns nothing; tests/unit/ contains only test_unit_core.py and test_unit_kv.py. So an eight-major-version bump of a cryptographic library lands with nothing to catch a behaviour change, and .ai/security.md is explicit that "the firmware building proves nothing about its security — every claim here needs a check that was actually run".	Add tests/unit/test_unit_encryption.py before merging: encrypt/decrypt round-trip on both key paths, wrong-key rejection, truncated and zero-length ciphertext, tampered tag, and a fixed known-answer vector so a future library change cannot silently alter the wire format of data already at rest.
2	High	.github/workflows/ci.yml:33	The test job installs from requirements.txt, a file that does not exist in this repository. The most recent CI — eDB push run on master concluded failure with ERROR: Could not open requirements file: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: 'requirements.txt'. Line 34 then installs only pytest pytest-cov pytest-benchmark mypy ruff — never the project. Nothing in CI installs cryptography at all, so the floor this PR raises is read by no check.	Replace ci.yml:33-34 with pip install -e ".[dev]". This is the change that makes the runtime dependency actually resolve in CI, and it fixes a job that currently cannot pass.
3	Medium	pyproject.toml:33	Raising a floor is not a pin, and this repo has no lockfile. >=50.0.1 still resolves to whatever is newest at install time, and it does nothing for anyone who already resolved 42.x. It also excludes consumers on distribution-packaged cryptography, which is a real cost for an embedded-adjacent project — 50.x was published recently. There is no advisory cited in the PR body, so I cannot tell whether this is a CVE response or routine version drift; the title says chore(deps), which suggests the latter.	Merge it, but add a lockfile or constraints file for the tested configuration so "what we tested" and "what a user gets" are the same thing. If it is advisory-driven, say which advisory in the commit message — that is the difference between a floor a maintainer may lower and one they must not.
4	Medium	(repo-wide)	.github/dependabot.yml was removed from master by eaf4e1c (PR #68): "Dependabot is disabled org-wide: config removed here, and alerts plus automated security fixes turned off via the API. 90 open Dependabot PRs". This matters more here than on the other two eDB PRs: there is now no automated channel that will tell this repo about the next cryptography advisory. .github/STANDARDS.md:74-77 claims SPDX/CycloneDX SBOMs and NTIA minimum elements, and §14.1 of the master design requires vulnerability reporting and advisory processes — but those cover EmbeddedOS's own disclosures outward, not consumption of third-party advisories inward. This PR is an orphan of that decommissioned automation: nothing will rebase or supersede it.	Merge or close it deliberately, and put a replacement in place — GitHub's dependency review action, pip-audit in CI, or osv-scanner. I have appended an architecture proposal on this gap to .ai/autoreview/proposals/2026-09.md.
5	Medium	.github/workflows/ci.yml:8 (at base 5e436bd6)	The Test (Python …) matrix did not run on this PR; the only checks are Analyze (Python)/CodeQL and assign. Root cause, verified: at base 5e436bd6 the trigger was pull_request: branches: [main] while this PR targets master. Fixed on master by #70 (6d53641); this PR is 3 commits behind. The green tick is CodeQL, not tests.	Rebase onto origin/master.
6	Medium	repo setting: branches/master/protection	required_status_checks: null on master — reviews required, no check required. CI — eDB failing on master blocks nothing, which is how finding 2 has survived.	Set required status checks once finding 2 makes the job passable.

Architecture conformance

Conforms.

• §5.1 architectural law. cryptography is a third-party library beneath eDB, not a
  higher-level EmbeddedOS product. Nothing points up a tier.
• §14.1 security principles. "Use reviewed cryptographic libraries; do not invent
  cryptographic primitives." src/edb/security/encryption.py:10-12 imports AESGCM and
  PBKDF2HMAC from cryptography rather than hand-rolling them, and this PR keeps that
  library current. Directionally correct.
• §21 tier placement. eDB is Tier 3 — Advanced. A runtime dependency of eDB belongs in
  eDB's pyproject.toml. §21.1 untouched.
• Gap, not a deviation. .ai/security.md requires key management to be reviewed as
  one system across eBoot, eSec, eOTA and release signing (§14.1). eDB's
  EncryptionManager derives and holds a data-at-rest key entirely on its own, outside
  that system. That is a pre-existing structural question well beyond a dependency bump —
  raising it here only so it is on the record, not as a finding against this PR.

Proposed changes

1. Fix ci.yml:33-34 → pip install -e ".[dev]" (finding 2). Without it nothing in CI
   installs cryptography at any version.
2. Add tests/unit/test_unit_encryption.py (finding 1). This is the one item I would not
   merge without — the bump is almost certainly fine, but "almost certainly" is what the
   test is for.
3. Merge this PR.
4. Add pip-audit or osv-scanner to CI to replace the disabled Dependabot alerts
   (finding 4).
5. Set required status checks on master (finding 6).

Not checked

• The changelogs for cryptography 43 through 50. I measured behaviour on this
  codebase's two code paths rather than reading eight major releases. A change this
  module does not exercise would not appear in my result.
• Whether an advisory motivates this bump. The PR body cites none and it is titled
  chore(deps); I did not search the advisory databases for cryptography in the
  42.x–50.x range. If one exists, my Medium on finding 3 is too low.
• The rest of src/edb/security/. Only encryption.py was read, because it is the
  only file that imports cryptography. JWT handling, bcrypt usage and the audit path
  were not reviewed.
• Key management and storage. Where EDB_ENCRYPTION_KEY comes from in a deployment,
  and what happens on rotation, were not examined. Note that importing the config with no
  key set prints "No EDB_ENCRYPTION_KEY configured! A random secret was generated for this
  session" and continues — a fail-open default worth its own review, outside this diff.
• Platform coverage. All runs were Python 3.12.14 on Linux; cryptography ships
  compiled wheels per platform and I exercised only one.

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Automated architecture review of 2200af170b91 — scheduled, model claude-opus-5, checked against the EmbeddedOS Master Design v2.0. Advisory only: this reviewer never approves, requests changes, or merges. Reply here to discuss or push back — a wrong finding is a bug worth reporting.