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chore(deps): update dependency litellm to v1.100.4 [security] - #406

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chore(deps): update dependency litellm to v1.100.4 [security]#406
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This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change | Age | Confidence |
|

Generated Summary:

No relevant changes.

This summary was generated with ❤️ by rigging

| litellm | 1.95.0 → 1.100.4 | age | confidence |

LiteLLM: Authenticated SSRF and provider-credential exfiltration via unvalidated request-body routing parameters

CVE-2026-84377 / GHSA-3cv6-jpf6-8222

More information

Details

Impact

Any authenticated LiteLLM proxy user could redirect an outbound provider call to a destination they control and cause the proxy to send its own configured provider credentials to that destination. The proxy's request-body validation was a denylist that did not cover every sensitive parameter and did not inspect parameters nested inside other request fields, so a caller could supply a routing or credential value that the proxy applied without clearing the operator's stored key. Any authenticated user could therefore exfiltrate the operator's upstream provider credentials and other configured secrets, and perform Server-Side Request Forgery against internal services reachable from the proxy.

Patches

Fixed in 1.96.2, 1.95.1, 1.94.3, 1.93.2, 1.92.2, 1.91.5, 1.90.7, 1.89.7, and 1.88.6.

Workarounds

Set general_settings.allow_client_side_credentials to false so callers cannot override connection parameters, restrict proxy keys to trusted callers, and block the affected parameters (api_base, base_url, model_list, fallbacks, provider credential fields) at a reverse proxy or API gateway.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

LiteLLM: Privilege Escalation to Proxy Admin via Cross-Domain Reuse of the Salt Key

CVE-2026-114612 / GHSA-7hp6-4w63-5g45

More information

Details

Summary

An authenticated user with internal_user privileges can escalate to proxy_admin and achieve remote code execution. The proxy uses one encryption key for two purposes: sealing secrets at rest and minting session tokens. An attacker exploits this by requesting a new API key with a crafted metadata field containing a forged admin credential as the "secret" value. The proxy encrypts and returns this payload. When this value is then presented as a bearer token, the proxy decrypts it, trusts the forged admin identity, and grants full administrative access, including the ability to execute arbitrary commands via the MCP stdio endpoint.

Affected versions

Versions later than 1.91.0 are exploitable in the default configuration. Versions 1.87.0 through 1.90.x are exploitable only if EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=true was explicitly set.

Mitigation

Upgrade to a patched version as soon as possible.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, set EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN=false. This disables the vulnerable authentication path but also breaks CLI SSO and Claude Code gateway login.

Impact

An internal user can escalate to proxy admin and execute arbitrary commands on the host.

Discovery Credit: Hoa X. Nguyen (OPSWAT Unit 515)

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.7 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

BerriAI/litellm (litellm)

v1.100.4

Compare Source

Verify Docker Image Signature

All LiteLLM Docker images are signed with cosign. Every release is signed with the same key introduced in commit 0112e53.

Verify using the pinned commit hash (recommended):

A commit hash is cryptographically immutable, so this is the strongest way to ensure you are using the original signing key:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/0112e53046018d726492c814b3644b7d376029d0/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.100.4

Verify using the release tag (convenience):

Tags are protected in this repository and resolve to the same key. This option is easier to read but relies on tag protection rules:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/v1.100.4/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.100.4

Expected output:

The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
  - The cosign claims were validated
  - The signatures were verified against the specified public key

Full Changelog: BerriAI/litellm@v1.100.3...v1.100.4

v1.100.3

Compare Source

Verify Docker Image Signature

All LiteLLM Docker images are signed with cosign. Every release is signed with the same key introduced in commit 0112e53.

Verify using the pinned commit hash (recommended):

A commit hash is cryptographically immutable, so this is the strongest way to ensure you are using the original signing key:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/0112e53046018d726492c814b3644b7d376029d0/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.100.3

Verify using the release tag (convenience):

Tags are protected in this repository and resolve to the same key. This option is easier to read but relies on tag protection rules:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/v1.100.3/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.100.3

Expected output:

The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
  - The cosign claims were validated
  - The signatures were verified against the specified public key

What's Changed

Full Changelog: BerriAI/litellm@v1.100.2...v1.100.3

v1.100.2

Compare Source

Verify Docker Image Signature

All LiteLLM Docker images are signed with cosign. Every release is signed with the same key introduced in commit 0112e53.

Verify using the pinned commit hash (recommended):

A commit hash is cryptographically immutable, so this is the strongest way to ensure you are using the original signing key:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/0112e53046018d726492c814b3644b7d376029d0/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.100.2

Verify using the release tag (convenience):

Tags are protected in this repository and resolve to the same key. This option is easier to read but relies on tag protection rules:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/v1.100.2/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.100.2

Expected output:

The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
  - The cosign claims were validated
  - The signatures were verified against the specified public key

What's Changed

Full Changelog: BerriAI/litellm@v1.100.1...v1.100.2

v1.100.1

Compare Source

Verify Docker Image Signature

All LiteLLM Docker images are signed with cosign. Every release is signed with the same key introduced in commit 0112e53.

Verify using the pinned commit hash (recommended):

A commit hash is cryptographically immutable, so this is the strongest way to ensure you are using the original signing key:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/0112e53046018d726492c814b3644b7d376029d0/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.100.1

Verify using the release tag (convenience):

Tags are protected in this repository and resolve to the same key. This option is easier to read but relies on tag protection rules:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/v1.100.1/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.100.1

Expected output:

The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
  - The cosign claims were validated
  - The signatures were verified against the specified public key

What's Changed

Full Changelog: BerriAI/litellm@v1.100.0...v1.100.1

v1.100.0

Compare Source

Verify Docker Image Signature

All LiteLLM Docker images are signed with cosign. Every release is signed with the same key introduced in commit 0112e53.

Verify using the pinned commit hash (recommended):

A commit hash is cryptographically immutable, so this is the strongest way to ensure you are using the original signing key:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/0112e53046018d726492c814b3644b7d376029d0/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.100.0

Verify using the release tag (convenience):

Tags are protected in this repository and resolve to the same key. This option is easier to read but relies on tag protection rules:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/v1.100.0/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.100.0

Expected output:

The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
  - The cosign claims were validated
  - The signatures were verified against the specified public key

What's Changed

[!IMPORTANT]
✂ PR body was truncated to here.

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This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate CLI.

@dreadnode-renovate-bot
chore(deps): update dependency litellm to v1.100.4 [security]
7d4977d 
| datasource | package | from   | to      |
| ---------- | ------- | ------ | ------- |
| pypi       | litellm | 1.95.0 | 1.100.4 |
@dreadnode-renovate-bot dreadnode-renovate-bot Bot added the type/digest Dependency digest updates label Nov 11, 2026

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