Harden CI against malicious PRs#10
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- CODEOWNERS: auto-request maintainer review on every PR, mandatory code-owner approval for workflows + install scripts + source files - dependabot.yml: weekly PRs that bump pinned action SHAs to latest release - Pin actions/checkout to SHA (v4.3.1) so an upstream compromise of the moving v4 tag does not silently execute attacker code in our runners - Default workflow permissions to contents:read; release.yml keeps its explicit contents:write opt-in so writes are visible per-workflow
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Summary
Defense-in-depth against malicious contributor PRs and supply-chain attacks. None of this changes runtime behavior of phpvm — only what GitHub Actions allows.
ghoutside this PR).actions/checkout(@v4.3.1→34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5). If the movingv4tag is force-pushed by an attacker who compromises the action repo, our runners still execute the verified commit we pinned to.permissions: contents: readat CI workflow level — defense-in-depth so any newly added job inherits read-only by default.release.ymlkeeps its explicitcontents: writeso writes remain visible per-workflow.Test plan
dependabot.yml(visible in Insights → Dependency graph → Dependabot)ghcommands provided in the chat🤖 Generated with Claude Code