The latest release, and nothing else. This is a single-maintainer personal project with no SLA — see docs/stability.md.

Do not open a public issue.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting, which is enabled on this repository. If that is not available to you, email blairham@me.com with go-pre-commit in the subject.

Please include what you would want to receive: the version, the platform, the smallest reproduction you have, and what an attacker gets out of it.

Expect an acknowledgement within a week. This is a side project, so that is a best effort and not a commitment. If a fix is warranted it ships in the next release with an advisory; you will be credited unless you ask not to be.

This tool downloads and executes code by design — that is what a hook framework does — so the interesting boundary is whose code, and whether the tool can be made to run something the user did not ask for.

• Supply-chain integrity of the installer. The composite action verifies the release archive against checksums.txt before extracting it. A way to make it skip, or pass, that check is in scope.
• Cache and store handling. Path traversal out of ~/.cache/pre-commit when cloning a hook repository or naming an environment directory; a malicious repo or manifest that writes outside the store.
• Config parsing. A .pre-commit-config.yaml or .pre-commit-hooks.yaml that causes execution the config does not describe — command injection through a hook's entry, args, or filename arguments.
• Git hook installation. install writing something other than what it reports, or clobbering an existing hook without the documented backup.
• Divergence from upstream that has a security consequence — for example, honoring something upstream deliberately rejects.

• Hooks doing what they were configured to do. If your .pre-commit-config.yaml points at a repository, this tool clones it and runs it. That is the design, it is upstream's design, and a hostile entry in your own config is not a vulnerability in the runner. Review what you add.
• Behavior inherited from upstream by intent. clean removes the entire store, including environments Python pre-commit built — that is documented and matches upstream. Report it upstream if you think it is wrong there.
• The shared cache directory. Sharing ~/.cache/pre-commit with the Python tool is deliberate and documented in docs/parity.md.
• Vulnerabilities in hooks you run, or in the repositories they come from. Those belong to their maintainers.
• Anything requiring an attacker who already has write access to your repo, your config, or your machine.