auths-proof 0.1.x is prelaunch, pre-audit software with no production
users. Do not rely on it as the sole production authorization control for
high-value actions. No independent security review has been completed.
Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately through the repository host's Security Advisory feature. Do not open a public issue containing an exploit, private key, sensitive proof, or customer data.
Include:
- affected commit and crate;
- proof or input bytes where safe;
- expected and actual verdict;
- reproduction steps;
- security impact;
- whether the issue is already public.
- deterministic encoding and domain separation;
- grant/action content identifiers;
- delegation attenuation;
- trust-anchor handling;
- adapter selection and algorithm confusion;
- raw Ed25519/P-256 verification;
- evidence and reference validation;
- replay/context binding;
- parser panic, memory, and CPU exhaustion;
- WASM/native verdict divergence;
- CLI behavior that could misrepresent a verdict.
- Private keys are managed outside this repository.
- Raw-key principals have no rotation or revocation.
ExpiryOnlygrants cannot be revoked before expiry.- The host owns challenge uniqueness and consumption.
- The host must execute the same body supplied to verification.
- The host selects and canonically binds trusted adapter configuration, anchors, time, composition, assurance, status, and limits.
- The host must treat
Indeterminateas non-authorizing, bound retries, and provide new trusted facts before a retry can change the outcome. - Self-contained WASM supports raw key,
did:key, anddid:keri; configured DID-web, WebAuthn, HSM, and SPIFFE deployments require their own exact registry construction.
See docs/threat-model.md for the full boundary.
Changes to algorithms, key encodings, signature encodings, domain strings, or signed bytes require:
- an ADR;
- positive, negative, and algorithm-confusion vectors;
- golden-wire review;
- conformance and fuzz coverage;
- explicit registry update;
- independent review before release.