Compass — Private Eligibility Firewall on 0G

Prove eligibility, not identity.

A private eligibility firewall on 0G — vulnerable migrant workers prove they qualify for services through an autonomous agent, while clinics receive only non-identifying receipts.

Track 5 — Privacy & Sovereign Infrastructure, 0G APAC Hackathon 2026.

Watch the demo — live URLs + 3-minute video
See it live — frontend, TEE, contracts, container image
The "shouldn't be possible" moment — what a subpoena actually retrieves
Maria's story — who Compass is for
What's real / what's mocked — honest scope table
Architecture — ASCII + 3D + auto-graph + gource time-lapse
0G integration — which 0G layer does what
Replicate the TEE binding yourself — browser + CLI verifier
End-to-end tests — Playwright suite
Whitepaper — 3-page technical PDF
Pillar 5 — Honesty about traction — NGO outreach log
Ecosystem citizenship — compass-eligibility-check skill
Live attestation evidence (pinned)
On-chain deployments — Galileo + Aristotle addresses
Quickstart (local dev)
Tech stack
Pre-submission audit summary — Slither, Codex, Vitest, Hardhat, Playwright
Documentation map
Honest limits
Cite this work
Contributing + security
License + credits

Why this matters

368,000 foreign domestic helpers live in Hong Kong — 9.6% of the workforce. 17% are in forced labour (Justice Centre HK, 2016). 60% are deterred from filing Labour Tribunal claims by deportation fear (Mission for Migrant Workers, 2023). Every time they ask for help, they hand over name + HKID + passport + employment contract — and every disclosure is subpoena-reachable by their employer. Compass closes that gap by letting them prove eligibility for a service without revealing who they are — using verifiable credentials, a sealed enclave, and a 0G-chain receipt that contains no identifying fields. If a court asks the clinic "who came in at 2pm last Tuesday?", the honest answer is "someone qualified for the service." That's the whole disclosure.

TAM: 27.2M migrant workers across APAC face similar disclosure traps (ILO, 2024). Cost per incident: ≈ US$22,200 lost to the worker (lost wages + recruitment debt), ≈ US$14,100 to the HK government (deflected legal aid + deportation processing). Full Business Impact section with grant pipeline at docs/whitepaper.md.

Watch the demo

3-minute walkthrough: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vg5WZHmlzZI — Maria's path from the harm to a mainnet-attested receipt in six beats (2:52, 1080p). Shooting script at Demo/script.md; visual companion at Demo/storyboard.md; editing recipe at Demo/edit-recipe.md.

The demo records on Aristotle mainnet with NEXT_PUBLIC_COMPASS_USE_MAINNET=1. Receipts mint to chainId 16661 and land on https://chainscan.0g.ai. The Phala dstack TDX enclave must be live during recording — /api/consume fails closed (503 tee_required) when the CVM is stopped.

See it live

Layer	URL
Frontend	https://app-psi-pied.vercel.app
Verify a receipt in your browser	https://app-psi-pied.vercel.app/verify
TEE receipt-signer	https://65c93172e22403466eecee47dd1cc90375014a0f-8080.dstack-pha-prod9.phala.network
AgentRegistry (0G Galileo)	`0x461eda452ffAF43c674ef42BdccfDd6B8e13C2D8`
CompassHub (0G Galileo)	`0x60BbE5fcA6D23f7d25142E721258c641b45A7c3b`
Container image	`ghcr.io/stephensook/compass-enclave:1.0.3`
Repo	https://github.com/StephenSook/Compass-OG-

The Phala CVM is stopped between demos to save free credits. Click Start in the Phala dashboard before judging — receipts cannot be minted while the CVM is off, but the historical attestation evidence is permanent (see docs/notes/phala-deployment.md).

The "shouldn't be possible" moment

Open the subpoena scene. Under a PDPO §57 disclosure order, the clinic produces this and only this:

14:32 on May 18, 2026 — Someone qualified for free legal assistance.
That's all that exists.

No name. No HKID. No employer. No documents. No fields a subpoena can pry open.

Maria's story

Maria works 16 hours a day in a Hong Kong apartment. When she needs free legal help, she should not have to hand over her passport, her contract, and her HKID just to ask the question. Compass lets her prove "I'm an FDH in HK with an open employment dispute" without disclosing who she is. Her credentials stay encrypted on her device. The clinic learns only a bucketed timestamp and a cryptographic commitment.

Maria is a composite — built from research, not a real person. The persona is inspired by the work of HELP for Domestic Workers, Bethune House Migrant Women's Refuge, and Mission for Migrant Workers in Hong Kong.

What's real / what's mocked

Component	Status	Note
AgentRegistry contract	real	ERC-7857 stripped, Galileo deployed; Slither audit clean (0 sec findings)
CompassHub contract	real	policies + Authwit + receipts, Galileo deployed; 40 unit + 5 property-invariant tests pass
Browser AES-256-GCM encryption	real	live on `/onboard` step 3 — non-extractable AES-256 in IndexedDB encrypts the issued SD-JWT VC before localStorage persist; plaintext never enters localStorage
0G Storage ciphertext upload	draft	AES-256-GCM round-trip on Node CLI; live 0G upload behind `COMPASS_LIVE_STORAGE=1`; browser-side upload is v2
Receipt-signer service	real	dstack TDX dual-boot, per-receipt quote freshness binding
Phala Cloud TDX deploy	real	live: signer `0xaba6…a7e7`, composeHash `0x1884…cea0`; live state probe at `/api/tee-status`
RA-quote-bound `attestationDigest` in receipts	real	`/api/consume` calls live Phala TEE; digest is sha256 of canonicalized receipt + per-receipt TDX quote whose `report_data` binds (signer, image, receiptId)
SD-JWT VC live issuer service	draft	`POST /api/issue` Ed25519-signs an SD-JWT VC when `ISSUER_PRIVATE_KEY` env set; rendered in `/vault` from localStorage
SD-JWT VC issuers (HELP, Bethune, Hospital)	mocked	real NGOs; signing keys are local Ed25519 fixtures, not endorsed by the NGOs
Authwit grant — browser-side EIP-712 signing	real	Privy embedded wallet signs the Compass `Grant` typed data on `/onboard` step 4 (chainId 16602, CompassHub verifying contract); no gas, no popup-required sub-flow
`CompassHub.consumeGrantAndIssueReceipt` — atomic on-chain	real	`POST /api/consume` relays Maria's signed grant; `PROVIDER_PRIVATE_KEY`-held wallet calls Galileo CompassHub; emits `GrantConsumed` + `ReceiptIssued` in one tx
Vercel frontend	real	server-rendered routes incl. `/vault`, `/about`, `/clinic/subpoena`, env-gated `/onboard` Privy + mint + issue + request-eligibility flow
Trust list governance	draft	v1 owner-managed via `docs/policies/*.json`; v2 DAO design specced at `docs/trust-list-governance.md` (5-of-7 quorum, 7-day timelock with 24h revoke expedite, on-chain TrustList contract on Aristotle)
On-chain `verifyAttestation`	stubbed	gas-prohibitive on-chain (cert chain + ECDSA + 4KB quote); off-chain via `verify-receipt` CLI is the honest substitute
0G broker `processResponse` co-signature	draft	out of scope for v1; receipt has its own signature chain
Privy embedded wallet integration	draft	wired in `/onboard` step 1 + root provider; live behind `NEXT_PUBLIC_PRIVY_APP_ID`, fixture timer in default build
`/onboard` step 2 — live `mintAgent`	draft	Privy embedded wallet → `AgentRegistry.mintAgent` on Galileo, gated on user-funded gas via faucet; fixture timer when Privy unset
Aristotle mainnet (chainId 16661) deploy	real	deployed 2026-05-11 — AgentRegistry `0xf1FAaBef1d00Db1a15b7637Dc0d8526449D06Bf9`, CompassHub `0xe42fd4F0a3197126fEeF5e6AAfC5Fb8848bBC58b`; chain-selector helpers + `activeAgentRegistry`/`activeCompassHub` guards wired; `/api/consume` routes to mainnet when `NEXT_PUBLIC_COMPASS_USE_MAINNET=1`

This table also lives at /about on the frontend with the same status badges and a live /api/tee-status probe above the table.

Architecture

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  USER DEVICE  · Next.js · user-controlled EOA        │
│  • secp256k1 key (Privy wired; fixture by default)   │
│  • AES-256-GCM vault encryption                      │
│  • SD-JWT VC selective disclosure                    │
└────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────┘
                         │  encrypted vault upload
                         ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  0G STORAGE  · Galileo testnet · encrypted blob      │
│  • ciphertext SD-JWT bundle                          │
│  • Merkle root → AgentRegistry.encryptedURI          │
└────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────┘
                         │  selectively-disclosed claims
                         ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  0G TeeML / PHALA dstack TDX                         │
│  • dstack-derived secp256k1 signer                   │
│  • per-receipt quote: report_data binds              │
│    sha256(ethAddress || composeHash || receiptId)    │
│  • policy evaluator → eligible/denied                │
└────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────┘
                         │  ReceiptIssued
                         ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  0G CHAIN  · AgentRegistry + CompassHub              │
│  • soulbound INFT (agent identity)                   │
│  • Authwit grants + nullifier replay protection      │
│  • ReceiptIssued event (15-min bucketed timestamp)   │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Visual + section-by-section breakdown: /about.

C4 system-context (Mermaid)

C4Context
  title Compass — System Context (C4 Level 1)
  Person(maria, "Worker (Maria)", "FDH in HK with an open employment dispute")
  Person(clinic, "Intake Clinician", "Verifies eligibility; cannot retain identifying data")
  Person(judge, "Court / Auditor", "Issues PDPO §57 disclosure orders")
  System(compass, "Compass", "Private eligibility firewall on 0G")
  System_Ext(ngo, "NGO Issuer", "HELP / Bethune / Mission for Migrant Workers")
  System_Ext(chain, "0G Chain", "Aristotle mainnet 16661 — ReceiptIssued events")
  System_Ext(storage, "0G Storage (v2 / draft)", "Encrypted SD-JWT VC blob — v1 keeps the credential in the browser vault only")
  System_Ext(phala, "Phala dstack TDX", "Sealed enclave receipt-signer")
  Rel(maria, compass, "Holds SD-JWT VC; requests eligibility check")
  Rel(ngo, maria, "Issues SD-JWT VC (Ed25519 signed)")
  Rel(compass, phala, "Sends selectively-disclosed claims")
  Rel(phala, compass, "Returns signed receipt + per-receipt RA quote")
  Rel(compass, chain, "Mints ReceiptIssued atomically")
  Rel(compass, storage, "Uploads encrypted vault (v2; draft in v1)")
  Rel(clinic, chain, "Reads receipt; learns only 15-min timestamp bucket")
  Rel(judge, clinic, "PDPO §57: 'who came in at 14:32?'")

Three pre-rendered views in `docs/visualizations/`

View	Best for	Open with
🎬 `compass-gource.mp4` — animated git-history time-lapse (3.2 MB)	Slide-deck B-roll, hackathon booth loop	Any video player
🛰️ `compass-architecture-3d.html` — interactive 3D force graph of the 6 layers (22 hand-curated nodes, bloom + neon, hover-to-trace)	Live demo, judge walkthrough	`python3 -m http.server 8888` then open in browser
🕸️ `compass-knowledge-graph.html` — auto-generated full-codebase graph (484 nodes / 491 edges / 132 communities) via graphify	"What touches `consumeGrantAndIssueReceipt`?"	Same as above

0G integration

Component	0G Layer	Role
Agent ID	0G Chain (AgentRegistry)	Soulbound INFT bound to user EOA; carries encrypted vault URI
Encrypted vault	0G Storage	AES-256-GCM ciphertext of SD-JWT bundle; root hash on-chain
Sealed inference	0G TeeML / Phala dstack TDX	Receives selectively-disclosed claims; signs receipt with sealed key
Receipt log	0G Chain (CompassHub)	ReceiptIssued: receiptId, policyId, nullifier, agentIdCommitment, resultHash, attestationDigest, expiry, 15-min timestamp bucket

Replicate the TEE binding yourself

No-CLI path: open https://app-psi-pied.vercel.app/verify in any browser, drop a Compass receipt-bundle JSON, click Verify receipt →. Your browser re-runs the four cryptographic checks below using @noble/curves + @noble/hashes — no clone, no npm install, no terminal. Click Try sample to load the bundled fixture and watch all four checks tick green in ~150ms (the page auto-swaps the composeHash to the fixture value for that case). Source: app/src/lib/verifyReceipt.ts.

The CLI scripts below stay as the canonical reference for anyone who'd rather verify in-terminal. Same four checks, same canonicalization, same curve library — /verify is a 1:1 browser port.

Two scripts let any judge re-verify the cryptographic chain independently. Clone, install, run:

git clone https://github.com/StephenSook/Compass-OG-.git
cd Compass-OG-/enclave && npm install --legacy-peer-deps

A. Verify the live deploy's attestation

npm run verify-deploy -- \
  https://65c93172e22403466eecee47dd1cc90375014a0f-8080.dstack-pha-prod9.phala.network

Expected output (when CVM is running):

[verify-deploy] /health source=tee signer=0xaba6b92ff8199275eb090c9b3049141fd431a7e7
[verify-deploy] ethAddress:    0xaba6b92ff8199275eb090c9b3049141fd431a7e7
[verify-deploy] composeHash:   0x1884e756bba03fc75f8354a04b294372c770a2720a10b7b3c6cd970a42bdcea0
[verify-deploy] running verifyReportDataBinding...
[verify-deploy] OK — quote binds to (ethAddress, composeHash)

Captured evidence: docs/notes/phala-deployment.md.

B. Verify a receipt end-to-end (offline OR live OR user-supplied bundle)

# Offline — verifies the bundled sample receipt without needing Phala running
npm run mint-sample-receipt        # generates enclave/samples/receipt-sample.json
npm run verify-receipt -- --sample \
  --expected-compose 0xabababababababababababababababababababababababababababababababab

# Live — mints a fresh receipt against the running Phala CVM and verifies it
npm run verify-receipt -- \
  --live https://65c93172e22403466eecee47dd1cc90375014a0f-8080.dstack-pha-prod9.phala.network \
  --expected-compose 0x1884e756bba03fc75f8354a04b294372c770a2720a10b7b3c6cd970a42bdcea0

# Bundle — verifies a JSON receipt someone else minted (no network needed)
npm run verify-receipt -- \
  --bundle ./path/to/received-receipt.json \
  --expected-compose 0x1884e756bba03fc75f8354a04b294372c770a2720a10b7b3c6cd970a42bdcea0

Expected output (PASS):

[verify-receipt] ✓ attestationDigest = sha256(canonicalize(receipt))
[verify-receipt] ✓ signature ECDSA-recovers to claimed signer
[verify-receipt] ✓ receipt.quoteCommitment = sha256(perReceiptQuoteHex)
[verify-receipt] ✓ quote report_data binds (signerAddress || composeHash || receiptId)
[verify-receipt] PASS — receipt verified against TEE attestation.

Tampering produces explicit failure codes (REPORT_DATA_MISMATCH, QUOTE_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH, ENV_MODE_RECEIPT, QUOTE_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED) — see enclave/src/verify-attestation.ts.

Out of scope (next layer): full Intel DCAP verification of the TDX quote signature chain — run via the DStack Verifier or Intel QVL externally.

C. Tutorial — verify someone else's Compass receipt

If you've received a Compass receipt JSON (e.g., a clinic showed you their copy and you want to independently confirm it's TEE-attested), the verifier runs offline in <30 seconds:

# 1. Clone + install (one-time)
git clone https://github.com/StephenSook/Compass-OG-.git
cd Compass-OG-/enclave
npm install --legacy-peer-deps

# 2. Save the receipt JSON to a file
#    (the bundle should contain receipt, attestationDigest,
#    signature, signerAddress, perReceiptQuoteHex)
cp /path/to/their-receipt.json ./inbound.json

# 3. Verify against the trust anchor pinned in this repo
npm run verify-receipt -- \
  --bundle ./inbound.json \
  --expected-compose 0x1884e756bba03fc75f8354a04b294372c770a2720a10b7b3c6cd970a42bdcea0

What you've now proven, independently of any party:

The receipt's attestationDigest is the canonical sha256 of the receipt — no field was tampered.
The signature recovers to a specific Ethereum address — that address is the receipt-signer.
The receipt's quoteCommitment is the sha256 of a TDX quote — the receipt commits to a specific TDX quote.
That TDX quote's report_data binds the (signer, image, receiptId) triple — defeats archived-quote replay across deployments.
The recovered composeHash matches 0x1884…cea0 — the same image pinned in docs/notes/phala-deployment.md.

If the bundle is tampered, the CLI exits with a specific failure code indicating which check failed. There is no graceful-degradation fallback that hides a tamper.

End-to-end tests

Playwright suite at app/tests/e2e/ covers page renders, API endpoints, and browser-side crypto. Three projects run in parallel: chromium-desktop (1280×800) and chromium-mobile (iPhone 13 viewport).

cd app
npm install                          # one-time, includes @playwright/test
npm run test:e2e:install             # one-time, installs Chromium
BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000 npm run test:e2e

Run against a Vercel deployment (the prod URL is SSO-gated; pass the deployment-protection bypass token):

BASE_URL=https://app-psi-pied.vercel.app \
VERCEL_BYPASS_TOKEN=<paste-from-Vercel-Settings-Deployment-Protection> \
  npm run test:e2e

Coverage:

Suite	Asserts
`pages.spec.ts`	/ + /about (incl. live TEE-status badge) + /vault + /clinic/subpoena + /clinic/inbox + /audit + /policies/help-legal-aid + /receipt/1 + /onboard server-render correctly
`api.spec.ts`	/api/tee-status returns valid mode; /api/issue 503-or-200 by env; /api/consume rejects malformed bodies cleanly
`crypto.spec.ts`	AES-256-GCM round-trip + GCM auth-tag tamper rejection + IndexedDB CryptoKey persist + StoredLiveCredential type-guard, all via `page.evaluate` against a live origin

The wallet-gated flows (Privy login → mint → issue → request eligibility) need a funded Galileo wallet and are deliberately NOT in the suite — they're covered by manual click-through per the verification protocol in feedback_autonomous_verification.md.

Whitepaper

3-page technical whitepaper covering threat model, architecture, cryptographic protocol, honest limits, and roadmap: docs/whitepaper.pdf (markdown source: docs/whitepaper.md).

Pillar 5 — Honesty about traction

#	Target	Type	Drafted	Sent	Replied
1	HELP for Domestic Workers	NGO (persona check)	2026-05-10	—	—
2	Bethune House Migrant Women's Refuge	NGO (persona check)	2026-05-10	—	—
3	Mission for Migrant Workers	NGO (community check)	2026-05-10	—	—
4	Open Society Foundations	Foundation	2026-05-10	—	—
5	Luminate	Foundation	2026-05-10	—	—
6	HK Jockey Club Charities Trust	Foundation	2026-05-10	—	—

Drafts live at docs/outreach/. Even no-response counts: silence after a logged-and-dated send is a more honest traction signal than no contact at all. The Sent and Replied columns update post-send.

Ecosystem citizenship — `compass-eligibility-check` skill

The receipt verifier above is also packaged as a reusable Claude Code / OpenClaw skill at skills/compass-eligibility-check/. Any agent or CI step in the 0G ecosystem can install it and ask "is this Compass receipt valid?" without needing to clone the full repo or wire the TEE chain by hand.

Skill inputs:

a live Phala enclave URL — the CLI mints a fresh receipt and verifies the chain end-to-end (--live mode), OR
the bundled sample fixture for offline demos (--sample mode), OR
a --bundle <path> to a previously-saved receipt JSON (offline verify).

Skill output: structured JSON with verified: true/false plus the recovered signerAddress, composeHash, policyId, timestampBucket, agentIdCommitment, and per-check pass/fail (attestationDigestMatch, signatureRecovers, quoteCommitmentMatch, reportDataBinding, composeHashTrusted).

Why publish it as a skill: per Track 5's ecosystem-citizenship criterion, shipping reusable primitives multiplies the project's value beyond a single demo. The skill format means a downstream agent — clinic intake bot, partner NGO compliance check, audit pipeline — can verify Compass receipts with one tool call.

Live attestation evidence (pinned)

Field	Value
Phala URL	`https://65c93172e22403466eecee47dd1cc90375014a0f-8080.dstack-pha-prod9.phala.network`
TEE signer eth address	`0xaba6b92ff8199275eb090c9b3049141fd431a7e7`
dstack `composeHash`	`0x1884e756bba03fc75f8354a04b294372c770a2720a10b7b3c6cd970a42bdcea0`
Phala app ID	`65c93172e22403466eecee47dd1cc90375014a0f`
Phala instance ID	`0263ebb91641237ca840f3b46e6f3d56920197ae`
Image digest	`sha256:f3ed653050216ee4ad6a332e6e38d02c5d0166ff33b55ff80acd9973ae2727d1`
dstack runtime	`dstack-0.5.9` (production channel, not DEV)
Quote version	TDX v4 (10020 hex chars)
Signature chain entries	2
Bound at	2026-05-08T01:38:14 UTC

On-chain deployments

Network	Contract	Address
0G Galileo (chainId 16602)	AgentRegistry	`0x461eda452ffAF43c674ef42BdccfDd6B8e13C2D8`
0G Galileo (chainId 16602)	CompassHub	`0x60BbE5fcA6D23f7d25142E721258c641b45A7c3b`
0G Aristotle (mainnet, chainId 16661)	AgentRegistry	`0xf1FAaBef1d00Db1a15b7637Dc0d8526449D06Bf9`
0G Aristotle (mainnet, chainId 16661)	CompassHub	`0xe42fd4F0a3197126fEeF5e6AAfC5Fb8848bBC58b`

Deployer: 0x05b5Bb550eb8401fC4b8a33bf566C03f49ef5d34. Provider relayer (server-side consumeGrantAndIssueReceipt caller): 0xaD736a7233847Cf1D73a7D820b32424CF8125b0a — funded 0.1 OG on Galileo, key in app/.env + Vercel env. Deployment record: docs/deployments/. HELP policy registered on Galileo CompassHub at policyId 0x21b8b0e6…2d08f per docs/notes/0g-galileo-policy-setup.md.

Quickstart (local dev)

# Clone
git clone https://github.com/StephenSook/Compass-OG-.git
cd Compass-OG-

# Frontend
cd app && npm install && npm run dev          # → http://localhost:3000

# Receipt-signer (env mode — for development without dstack)
cd ../enclave && npm install --legacy-peer-deps && npx tsc
COMPASS_FORCE_LOCAL=1 \
COMPASS_RECEIPT_SIGNER_KEY=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 \
  node dist/server.js                          # → http://localhost:8080/health

# Tests
cd enclave && npx vitest run                   # 103 passed | 3 skipped
cd ../contracts && npx hardhat test            # 40+ unit tests + 5 invariants

Production TEE deploy via Phala Cloud: see enclave/phala/deploy.md.

Tech stack

Solidity 0.8.24 + Hardhat for AgentRegistry + CompassHub
TypeScript 5.6 for receipt-signer (Express) + holder/issuer/verifier
Next.js 16 App Router + Tailwind v4 (Cinematic Privacy aesthetic)
Intel TDX via Phala dstack-0.5.9 for the sealed enclave
@phala/dstack-sdk@0.5.7 for getKey / getQuote / info
@noble/curves secp256k1 + @noble/hashes keccak256/sha256 for receipt signing
@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc + @sd-jwt/jwt-status-list for credential issuance + revocation
@0gfoundation/0g-storage-ts-sdk + @0gfoundation/0g-compute-ts-sdk for 0G integration
Vercel for frontend hosting · GHCR for the enclave image

103 vitest tests + 95% Solidity branch coverage + Playwright E2E suite at app/tests/e2e/ covering page renders + API endpoints + browser-side crypto. CI on every push: .github/workflows/ci.yml.

Pre-submission audit summary

Check	Tool	Result
Solidity static analysis	Slither 0.11.5 (101 detectors)	0 sec findings · 2 INFO documented in audit report
Property-based invariants	Hardhat fuzz	5 invariants passing (monotonic nullifiers, soulbound, no-receipt-without-grant, etc.)
Solidity unit tests	Hardhat / Mocha	40 passing covering Authwit + policy-registry + atomic-flow + invariants
Receipt-signer logic	Vitest	103 passing
Frontend E2E smoke	Playwright (chromium-desktop + chromium-mobile)	scaffolded; suite runs against localhost or Vercel deploy with bypass token
Cryptographic adversarial review	Codex (GPT-5.5) pre-submission	1 BLOCKER fixed (`agentIdCommitment` mismatch between enclave receipt-doc and on-chain `ReceiptIssued`); 4 MEDIUM resolved or documented in `docs/honest-limits.md` items 15-17
Independent receipt verification	`verify-receipt` CLI	re-derives full TEE chain from a single `receiptId`

Documentation map

Doc	Purpose
docs/whitepaper.pdf	3-page submission whitepaper (threat model + architecture + protocol + honest limits + roadmap)
docs/architecture.md	Full architecture walkthrough
docs/threat-model.md	9 attack surfaces with mitigations
docs/honest-limits.md	What Compass does NOT protect against (17 items, including Codex pre-review findings)
docs/audits/slither-2026-05-10.md	Slither static-analysis audit of AgentRegistry + CompassHub (0 sec findings)
docs/schemas/receipt-v1.json	Canonical receipt schema (v1.2.0)
docs/policies/	Three demo eligibility policies (HELP, Bethune, Hospital)
docs/notes/phala-deployment.md	Live TEE deployment evidence
docs/notes/0g-galileo-policy-setup.md	Galileo on-chain HELP policy + provider relayer setup
docs/notes/0g-aristotle-deploy-checklist.md	9-step Aristotle mainnet deploy procedure (gated on OG funding)
docs/notes/0g-mainnet-funding-options.md	Ranked paths to acquire OG on Aristotle (credits, bridge, onramps, exchanges)
docs/notes/codex-tee-architecture-review.md	Adversarial architecture review
docs/adr/	Architecture Decision Records — 3 ADRs covering platform choice (0G + Phala TDX), credential format (SD-JWT VC over PCD/ZK), and per-receipt quote binding
docs/trust-list-governance.md	v1 stub → v2 DAO design for trusted-issuer governance
docs/outreach/README.md	6 NGO + foundation cold-email drafts (Pillar 5 traction log)
skills/compass-eligibility-check/SKILL.md	Reusable Claude Code / OpenClaw verification skill
enclave/phala/deploy.md	Phala Cloud deploy runbook
enclave/src/verify-attestation.ts	Verifier-side TEE binding chain

Honest limits

Compass narrows disclosure but does not eliminate it. Coercion, deniable encryption, full k-anonymity against statistical re-identification, and SD-JWT VC draft churn all remain open issues. See docs/honest-limits.md for the full list.

The receipt-signer key is enclave-bound by virtue of dstack getKey's deterministic-key-sealed-to-MR_TD primitive plus the per-receipt quote's report_data = sha256(ethAddress || composeHash || receiptId) binding. Per-receipt freshness defeats the quote-replay attack a single boot quote would leave open. Verifier-side trust chain documented in enclave/src/verify-attestation.ts.

Cite this work

If you reference Compass in academic, journalistic, or developer-survey work, please cite as:

@misc{compass2026,
  title  = {Compass: A Private Eligibility Firewall on 0G},
  author = {Sookra, Stephen},
  year   = {2026},
  url    = {https://github.com/StephenSook/Compass-OG-},
  note   = {0G APAC Hackathon Track 5 (Privacy \& Sovereign Infrastructure).
            Aristotle mainnet (chainId 16661): CompassHub
            0xe42fd4F0a3197126fEeF5e6AAfC5Fb8848bBC58b, AgentRegistry
            0xf1FAaBef1d00Db1a15b7637Dc0d8526449D06Bf9.}
}

Plain-text citation: Sookra, Stephen. Compass: A Private Eligibility Firewall on 0G. 2026. https://github.com/StephenSook/Compass-OG-.

For media coverage, founder quotes, and brand assets, see docs/press-kit.md.

Contributing + security

CONTRIBUTING.md — local setup, conventions, testing expectations.
CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md — community standards (scoped specifically to Compass' anti-trafficking mission).
SECURITY.md — responsible-disclosure policy and reporter hall-of-fame.
CHANGELOG.md — release notes by milestone.

Issue templates under .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/; PR template at .github/pull_request_template.md.

License + credits

MIT — see LICENSE.

Solo build by Stephen Sookra (Atlanta). Pair-coded with Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), adversarially reviewed by Codex (GPT-5.5) for security boundaries, Gemini 2.5 Pro for long-context audits.

Persona narrative inspired by the work of HELP for Domestic Workers, Bethune House Migrant Women's Refuge, and Mission for Migrant Workers in Hong Kong. Compass does not represent any real worker; the demo flow is a composite.

Built on the 0G APAC Hackathon, May 2026. Track 5 — Privacy & Sovereign Infrastructure.

Name		Name	Last commit message	Last commit date
Latest commit History 185 Commits
.github		.github
Demo		Demo
app		app
contracts		contracts
docs		docs
enclave		enclave
skills/compass-eligibility-check		skills/compass-eligibility-check
.env.example		.env.example
.gitignore		.gitignore
.renovaterc.json		.renovaterc.json
CHANGELOG.md		CHANGELOG.md
CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md		CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
CONTRIBUTING.md		CONTRIBUTING.md
LICENSE		LICENSE
README.md		README.md
SECURITY.md		SECURITY.md
SUPPORT.md		SUPPORT.md

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Compass — Private Eligibility Firewall on 0G

Table of contents

Why this matters

Watch the demo

See it live

The "shouldn't be possible" moment

Maria's story

What's real / what's mocked

Architecture

C4 system-context (Mermaid)

Three pre-rendered views in docs/visualizations/

0G integration

Replicate the TEE binding yourself

A. Verify the live deploy's attestation

B. Verify a receipt end-to-end (offline OR live OR user-supplied bundle)

C. Tutorial — verify someone else's Compass receipt

End-to-end tests

Whitepaper

Pillar 5 — Honesty about traction

Ecosystem citizenship — compass-eligibility-check skill

Live attestation evidence (pinned)

On-chain deployments

Quickstart (local dev)

Tech stack

Pre-submission audit summary

Documentation map

Honest limits

Cite this work

Contributing + security

License + credits

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Three pre-rendered views in `docs/visualizations/`

Ecosystem citizenship — `compass-eligibility-check` skill

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