feat(sync): support secure passwordless device pairing - #5
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Add short-lived anonymous pairing sessions that bind a new device to an account and transfer only an encrypted payload. Supports OpenTubeX/OpenTubeX#914
📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughChangesThe pull request adds secure device pairing for enhanced-privacy sync. It adds persistent pairing sessions, transactional database operations, six HTTP endpoints, validation, rate limits, authentication, capability reporting, tests, and protocol documentation. Secure device pairing
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The PR enables passwordless device pairing, but expired pairing metadata can remain stored beyond the stated two-minute retention when no further pairing requests occur. Merge should wait for independent cleanup or explicit owner acceptance; the other noted risks are bounded retry and documentation follow-ups. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant RecipientDevice
participant PairingHandler
participant PairingDatabase
participant AccountDevice
RecipientDevice->>PairingHandler: Create pairing session
PairingHandler->>PairingDatabase: Persist session and expiration
AccountDevice->>PairingHandler: Claim session with account JWT
PairingHandler->>PairingDatabase: Claim session and issue claim JWT
AccountDevice->>PairingHandler: Approve encrypted payload
PairingHandler->>PairingDatabase: Store approval and payload
RecipientDevice->>PairingHandler: Consume payload with recipient token
PairingHandler->>PairingDatabase: Atomically delete and return payload
Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 37.78% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 45 functions across 10 files. (7 skipped: 7 unsupported.)
✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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ApprovabilityVerdict: Not approved Macroscope's review found this PR not approvable — This PR adds a production passwordless device-pairing workflow with new public endpoints, JWT issuance, encrypted payload relay, authentication changes, and persistent session storage. Because it expands security-sensitive authentication behavior and introduces a substantial new capability, human review is required. Not approved because:
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Actionable comments posted: 5
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Inline comments:
In `@PRIVACY.md`:
- Around line 41-44: Update the encrypted relay payload description in
PRIVACY.md to include the privacy salt and six-digit verification code, matching
the disclosure in README.md, or explicitly state that the listed fields are
non-exhaustive.
- Line 45: The ciphertext-tampering guarantee is inaccurate: update the wording
at PRIVACY.md lines 45-45 and README.md lines 217-218 to state that the server
cannot decrypt the encrypted payload or forge a valid replacement without the
QR-only secret, while acknowledging it can drop or overwrite stored ciphertext.
In `@README.md`:
- Around line 220-221: Update the README session-limit wording to say “active
pairing sessions” instead of “active anonymous sessions,” matching the all-row
count performed by pairing_session.count().
In `@src/database/pairing.rs`:
- Around line 82-105: The claim flow around the active-session count and Diesel
update must recognize retries from the same account: before enforcing
MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_PER_ACCOUNT, look up and return the existing matching
unapproved PairingSession when account_id already equals owner_id, preserving
the normal limit and claim behavior for other accounts. Add a test covering a
retry after the initial claim commits but its response is lost.
- Around line 37-39: Add and start a production background cleanup task near the
pairing database flow that periodically deletes rows whose expires_at is at or
before the current time, independently of create, claim, or cancel traffic;
reuse the existing diesel deletion query and connection handling, and ensure
cleanup runs within the two-minute PAIRING_TTL_MS retention limit.
🪄 Autofix
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
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ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: Organization UI
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Run ID: 6b2bc863-9682-493d-9d71-029a585828f4
⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
Cargo.lockis excluded by!**/*.lock
📒 Files selected for processing (17)
Cargo.tomlPRIVACY.mdREADME.mdmigrations/postgres/2026-08-26-000000-0000_key_pairing/down.sqlmigrations/postgres/2026-08-26-000000-0000_key_pairing/up.sqlmigrations/sqlite/2026-08-26-000000-0000_key_pairing/down.sqlmigrations/sqlite/2026-08-26-000000-0000_key_pairing/up.sqlsrc/database.rssrc/database/pairing.rssrc/dto.rssrc/handlers.rssrc/handlers/encrypted_sync.rssrc/handlers/pairing.rssrc/handlers/user.rssrc/main.rssrc/models.rssrc/schema.rs
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1 participant
Problem
OpenTubeX users need a safe way to move an enhanced-privacy sync key to another device. Requiring the account password and privacy passphrase on the receiving device removes most of the value of QR pairing, while putting either secret in the QR code would expose it to the server or scanner.
Solution
Add version 1 short-lived pairing sessions. A receiving device creates an anonymous, recipient-token-bound request. An authenticated device claims it for the account, receives a fresh JWT for the new device, and uploads that token plus the username and privacy key only as an HPKE-encrypted payload for the recipient.
The server validates request sizes and canonical encodings, rate-limits active requests, binds approval to the claimed account and device IDs, and deletes sessions when they are consumed or cancelled. Expired rows are removed by a background cleanup task, normally within 30 seconds after their two-minute expiry. SQLite and PostgreSQL receive the same initial pairing migration. The health response advertises key_pairing: 1.
Supports OpenTubeX/OpenTubeX#914. Client implementation: OpenTubeX/OpenTubeX#943.
Testing
Privacy
The server never receives the account password, privacy passphrase, privacy key, transferred JWT plaintext, or six-digit verification code. Pairing metadata expires after two minutes, and the cleanup task normally deletes expired rows within another 30 seconds. PRIVACY.md documents the temporary device metadata.