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Roadmap: operational, manually testable AS / DC / TP — prioritized open issues #255

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Description

@dfcoffin

Purpose

Prioritise every open issue towards one objective: operational Authorization Server, Data Custodian and Third Party applications that can be tested by hand, quickly.

  • Phases run in order. Within a phase, the order is the critical path.
  • Size: S ≈ a day, M ≈ a few days, L ≈ a week or more.

Principles:

  • Unblock the end-to-end flow before adding breadth.
  • Make local setup reproducible before debugging it.
  • Fix wrong data exposure before anything is shared.
  • Keep one source of truth for each concern: schema = Flyway, access rules = one policy, registration = RFC 7591.

Completed issues are struck through.


Progress (updated 2026-11-18)

Done in Phase 1:

Found and fixed along the way:

Filed since this roadmap:

Issue Topic Source Placed in
#267 TP Flyway split from #241 Phase 1, item 4a; done
#256 DC Batch/Bulk API Phase 2
#266 NAESB errata for REQ.21 v4.1 OAuth 2.0 Scope submitted 2026-11-15 tracking only, no code change
#271 AS and DC H2 console settings #270 review Phase 2, item 9a
#273 openespi-common's jar application.properties and application-<profile>.yml override each application's own config #272 review Phase 2, item 14
#274 The AS drops the PKCE code_challenge in the DC delegation, so PKCE is off in the TP for now #146 Phase 2, item 9b
#276 AS remembered consent skips the DC delegation, so a repeat authorization gets no Subscription and no token-response URIs #146 Phase 1, item 5a
#277 AboutControllerTest fails on a JDK whose java.version is exactly 25 Continuous
#278 Enumeration XML values: REQ.21 needs numeric codes for ServiceKind and PhaseCodeKind, and exact literals for the other kinds, never Java constant names #197 Phase 3, schema compliance
#279 DC Batch/Subscription #197 Phase 1, item 6
#281 Every ESPI atom:id a permanent, repeatable UUID v5 from business keys: no random v4, no URL or token names #280 Phase 2, item 10a

TP now:

  • Form login: admin/admin is the TP administrator; customer/customer on local.
  • The H2 console is limited to the TP administrator.
  • local is the default profile and listens on 127.0.0.1 only.
  • Flyway owns the schema on H2, MySQL and PostgreSQL (ddl-auto: validate, with schema tests on all three).

TP OAuth client (#146):

  • Uses Spring Security oauth2Client. The TP customer stays signed in while authorizing at the DC.
  • Tokens and the token-response URIs are stored in the TP's ESPI authorizations table (Flyway V6).
  • The TP administrator obtains the FB=34_35 client access token on the admin page.
  • Verified end to end on local.

ESPI XML (#197):

  • Each resource is now inside <atom:content>, in both the DC export and the TP reader.
  • EspiXmlSchemaValidator checks ESPI XML against atom.xsd, espi.xsd and customer.xsd.
  • The feed published and the empty feed's link type were fixed.
  • docs/ESPI_ATOM_PROFILE.md records where ESPI deliberately differs from RFC 4287.
  • Decision 3 below is resolved.

#202 split:

Next: #279 DC Batch/Subscription, then minimal #89, so the TP fetches, validates and displays the customer's data. That is the last Phase 1 exit criterion.

Phase 1: Manually testable locally (critical path)

Exit criteria:

  1. scripts/local/start-all → smoke passes.
  2. A TP user logs in to the TP and authorizes access, then logs in and consents at the DC.
  3. The TP receives a token and displays that customer's usage data.
  4. Admin and token checks run from docs/LOCAL_TESTING.md.
# Item Size Why now
1 ✅ #254 Local manual-test kit (aligned local profiles, AS admin bootstrap, start/stop/smoke scripts, runbook) — done, PR #259 S Removes the hidden-secret and mismatch friction; everything after builds on it
2 ✅ #253 DC local sample dataset — done, PR #261, with a seed runner instead of Flyway. The DC-local slice of #241 (Flyway on H2) was not done and remains in #241 S–M Without data, consent and feeds can't be exercised
3 ✅ #232 AS → DC delegation drops the authorize parameters (400) — done, PR #262 (follow-up #263, PR #264) S Blocks the customer flow
4 ✅ #249 TP username/password login — done, PR #268 (review follow-up PR #270) M A TP user must exist to start the flow; before this, the login button gave a 500
4a ✅ #267 TP Flyway owns the schema in every profile (split from #241) — done, PR #272 M Not needed for the local H2 exit criteria; needed to run the TP on MySQL/PostgreSQL. Can run in parallel with #249
5 ✅ #146 TP OAuth client wiring (authorize → callback → token storage) — done, PR #275. The #202 AS-side gaps moved to Phase 2, item 11a M TP must obtain and store the token and know where the customer's resources are
5a #276 AS remembered consent skips the DC delegation (no Subscription, no URIs on a repeat authorization) S–M Every repeat authorization during manual testing hits it; today only an AS restart clears it
6 ✅ #197 <atom:content>, getResource(), empty feed, XSD validation — done, PR #280 → #279 DC Batch/Subscription (next; pass the feed's resource name to buildFeed explicitly) → minimal #89 (TP fetches the Subscription, validates it with EspiXmlSchemaValidator in off/report/enforce mode, captures it on local/dev only, and displays a UsagePoint and its readings) M + M TP must show data to prove the flow end to end
7 ✅ #211 customer scope narrowing → invalid_scope — done, PR #265 S–M Consent with fewer function blocks must work
8 #225 401 (not 302) on unauthenticated token / introspect / revoke; #234 missing AS H2 tables S + S Makes curl testing and the logs trustworthy

Phase 2: Safe to share (sandbox / demo deployment)

# Item Size Notes
9 Fixes for privately reported security advisories (tracked in GitHub Security Advisories) M Before anything is exposed beyond localhost
9a #271 AS and DC H2 console settings (AS web-allow-others: true, no console module; DC permitAll), aligned with the TP's (#270) S Before anything is exposed beyond localhost
9b #274 AS carries the PKCE code_challenge through the DC delegation; then restore PKCE in the TP (TpCustomerAuthorizationRequestResolver) S–M The TP sends no PKCE until then
10 #187 resource scoping: ESPI GETs must be limited to the token's Subscription/Authorization (today Subscription-scoped GETs ignore subscriptionId, per CLAUDE.md) L Prevents one customer's data being returned for another's token
10a #281 permanent, repeatable UUID v5 atom:ids: remove the random v4 default from IdentifiedObject; use a per-DC namespace and names from business keys; Authorization from correlationId; IntervalBlock from the interval start; single-resource endpoints return <entry> M–L Third Parties rely on stable ids to recognise repeated data; ids must not change once data is shared. Single-resource <entry> fits with #187
11 #138 consent withdrawal → token revocation + subscription cleanup M
11a #202 (AS side) token-response URIs: FB_51 gating, no re-provisioning on refresh, the FB=34_35 client access token's authorizationURI + Bulk resourceURI / customerResourceURI → #256 DC Batch/Bulk API (Third Party client access token only, scoped to its own Authorizations) S–M + M–L #256 after #202 and #251; uses the #187 scoping. The TP already stores and shows the client token's URIs
12 #251 registration access token (RFC 7591 + FB=36_40 renewal, DC accepts it for ApplicationInformation) → #252 TP self-registration M + L Replaces the seeded TP client; spike done
13 #131 dependency CVEs; #237 CodeQL triage M
14 #241 (DC, including local Flyway on H2, and AS; the TP part moved to #267) + #145 / #123 / #152 vendor schema alignment; #273 openespi-common's jar config overriding each application's (its broken docker/prod/aws-sandbox profile files block those deployment profiles); #200 audit-log writers; #199 abandoned-authorization cleanup M–L Needed for the MySQL/PostgreSQL deployment profiles
15 #233 metadata advertises unsupported JWT/JWKS features; #188 TLS certificates S + M

Phase 3: ESPI completeness and certification readiness

Continuous: quality and hygiene (pick up alongside)


Closed after review (confirmed 2026-11-16)

All six were closed with a comment giving the reason: #141, #204, #205 and #98 as completed; #203 and #117 as not planned.

# Reason
#141 Done in #250: DC Authorization endpoints implemented with per-TP filtering (AdminCaller, AdminRowScopeTest)
#204 Done: admin API bearer tokens are on main (merged with the GHSA-mh65 fix, 40812eb)
#205 Done: admin user store + passkey MFA + bootstrap are on main (same merge)
#203 Superseded by #251: the certification question is answered, since REQ.21 requires the registration access token
#98 Delivered by #116; no description of its own; remaining work is in #187 / #119
#117 Obsolete: pr-checks.yml no longer exists, and no workflow runs Spotless

Decisions needed

  1. Third Party: register itself via RFC 7591 dynamic client registration and manage its registration #252: how a Third Party receives its RFC 7591 initial access token during onboarding: from the DC operator, from GBA, or through another out-of-band step.
  2. Registration access token: issue it on RFC 7591 registration, renew via FB=36_40, and require it for ApplicationInformation #251: RFC 7592 (Experimental) says a registration access token should not expire while the client is registered; ESPI renews an expired one through FB=36_40. Document this as a deliberate ESPI profile choice.
  3. ✅ Third Party cannot unmarshal any ESPI Atom feed (AtomFeedDto date adapters + abstract entry type) #197: adopting the <atom:content> wrapper changes the wire format for both DC export and TP import. Confirm it should be done as one change. Resolved: done as one change in PR feat(common): ESPI resources inside atom:content, and XSD validation of ESPI XML (#197) #280, following the certified ScriptLogs and the DMD validator's atom.xsd.
  4. ESPI atom:id: every resource id a permanent, repeatable UUID v5 from business keys (no random v4, no URL or token names) #281: see that issue's "Points to settle":
    • the client_credentials Authorization's name input (proposal: the AS's own grant record id);
    • whether the DC namespace is non-public configuration, since account and serial numbers are guessable names.

References

RFC 7591 (Dynamic Client Registration), RFC 7592 (Registration Management, Experimental), NAESB REQ.21 v4.1, GBA Generating Persistent UUIDs, docs/ESPI_ATOM_PROFILE.md, CLAUDE.md "Known Issues"

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Activity

  1. dfcoffin commented on Nov 14, 2026

    @dfcoffin
    ContributorAuthor

    Roadmap update:

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