fix(deps): update dependency guzzlehttp/guzzle to ~7.15.2 [security]

[renovate-bot]

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
guzzlehttp/guzzle (source)	~7.10.0 → ~7.15.2

---

guzzlehttp/guzzle: Silent HTTPS-Proxy Downgrade to Cleartext

CVE-2026-55568 / GHSA-wpwq-4j6v-78m3

More information

Details

Impact

The built-in cURL handlers (GuzzleHttp\Handler\CurlHandler and GuzzleHttp\Handler\CurlMultiHandler, used by default whenever the PHP cURL extension is available) accept an https:// proxy — a proxy reached over a TLS-encrypted connection — through the proxy request option, client-level proxy defaults, or proxy environment variables such as http_proxy, https_proxy, HTTPS_PROXY, all_proxy, and ALL_PROXY.

When the installed libcurl does not support HTTPS proxies, behavior depends on the libcurl version/build:

• libcurl older than 7.50.2 silently treats an https:// proxy as a plaintext http:// proxy. The TLS connection to the proxy is never established, and the proxy leg is cleartext with no error or warning.
• libcurl 7.50.2 through 7.51.x rejects the unsupported proxy scheme at connect time, so no cleartext exposure occurs, but the failure is late and opaque.
• libcurl 7.52.0 or newer builds without HTTPS-proxy support also fail at connect time rather than downgrading.

The security-relevant case is the silent downgrade on libcurl older than 7.50.2. An application is affected when it sends requests through one of the built-in cURL handlers, configures an https:// proxy expecting the proxy connection itself to be encrypted, and runs with libcurl older than 7.50.2.

In that configuration, traffic expected to be protected by TLS on the hop to the proxy is transmitted in cleartext. Proxy authentication credentials (the Proxy-Authorization header, proxy userinfo in the proxy URL, or CURLOPT_PROXYUSERPWD) are sent without encryption, and the CONNECT target host and port for tunneled HTTPS requests are exposed. For plain HTTP requests, request headers and bodies are also exposed on the proxy leg. End-to-end HTTPS requests tunneled through the proxy remain protected by their inner TLS session; the exposure is limited to the proxy negotiation and proxy credentials.

Applications that do not configure an https:// proxy are not affected. Installations running libcurl 7.52.0 or newer built with HTTPS-proxy support are not affected because HTTPS proxies work as intended. Installations running libcurl 7.50.2 through 7.51.x, or libcurl 7.52.0 or newer built without HTTPS-proxy support, are not exposed to the silent cleartext downgrade, but Guzzle now rejects those unsupported configurations up front as well. The built-in stream handler is not affected; the issue is specific to the cURL handlers' proxy handling. Low-level cURL options under the curl request option, such as CURLOPT_PROXY or CURLOPT_PROXYTYPE, are advanced custom configuration and remain the caller's responsibility.

Patches

The issue is patched in 7.12.1 and later. Starting in that release, the built-in cURL handlers detect whether the installed libcurl supports HTTPS proxies — requiring both libcurl 7.52.0 or newer and the CURL_VERSION_HTTPS_PROXY feature bit — and reject a request configured through Guzzle's first-class proxy handling with an https:// proxy up front by throwing a GuzzleHttp\Exception\RequestException. No request bytes reach the network when the proxy cannot be used securely. Versions before 7.12.1 are affected by the silent downgrade when run against libcurl older than 7.50.2.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not configure an https:// proxy on an installation whose libcurl lacks HTTPS-proxy support, and verify the capability in application code before using one. Remember to check proxy environment variables as well as any explicit proxy option:

$curl = \curl_version();
$httpsProxyBit = \defined('CURL_VERSION_HTTPS_PROXY') ? \CURL_VERSION_HTTPS_PROXY : (1 << 21);

if (\version_compare($curl['version'], '7.52.0', '<') || 0 === ($curl['features'] & $httpsProxyBit)) {
    throw new \RuntimeException('Installed libcurl does not support HTTPS proxies.');
}

Upgrading the system libcurl to 7.52.0 or newer built with HTTPS-proxy support also resolves the underlying unsupported-proxy behavior.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-wpwq-4j6v-78m3
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wpwq-4j6v-78m3

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

guzzlehttp/guzzle: Dot-Only Cookie Domains Match All Hosts

CVE-2026-55767 / GHSA-cwxw-98qj-8qjx

More information

Details

Impact

CookieJar incorrectly accepts cookies with a dot-only Domain attribute, such as Domain=., Domain=.., Domain=..., and whitespace-padded variants such as Domain= . . In affected versions, SetCookie::matchesDomain() removes leading dots from the cookie domain, normalizing dot-only values to the empty string; SetCookie::validate() only rejected a strictly empty domain, so these cookies could be stored and the empty normalized domain was treated as matching any request host.

An attacker-controlled origin that an application requests with a shared cookie jar can therefore set a cookie that Guzzle later sends to unrelated hosts using the same jar. This may allow cookie injection or session fixation against downstream services, depending on how those services interpret the injected cookie. Applications are affected when they use Guzzle's cookie support, for example new Client(['cookies' => true]) or an explicit shared CookieJar, and reuse the same jar across attacker-controlled and trusted origins.

Applications that do not use Guzzle's cookie support, or that use separate cookie jars per origin or trust boundary, are not affected. This issue is distinct from public suffix list validation: dot-only domains contain no domain label and should not match unrelated hosts.

Patches

The issue is patched in 7.12.1 and later. Starting in that release, Guzzle rejects dot-only cookie Domain attributes and prevents an empty normalized cookie domain from matching any request host.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not reuse the same CookieJar instance across untrusted and trusted origins. Use separate cookie jars per origin or trust boundary, or disable cookie handling for requests to untrusted hosts.

Avoid using new Client(['cookies' => true]) for clients that may contact unrelated hosts with different trust levels, because that option creates one shared jar for the client.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.8 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-cwxw-98qj-8qjx
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cwxw-98qj-8qjx

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Guzzle: Proxy-Authorization headers can be sent to origin servers

CVE-2026-67339 / GHSA-94pj-82f3-465w

More information

Details

Impact

In affected versions, the built-in cURL handlers (CurlHandler and CurlMultiHandler) put every first-class request header in cURL's origin header list (CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER). These handlers are the default when the PHP cURL extension is available. They move Proxy-Authorization to the proxy-only list (CURLOPT_PROXYHEADER) only when Guzzle predicts an HTTP or HTTPS proxy. A "first-class" header is part of the normal request message and can be set on a PSR-7 request, through client headers defaults, the headers request option, or middleware. It does not include a literal line supplied through raw CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, CURLOPT_PROXYHEADER, or stream_context.http.header controls.

Because that migration follows Guzzle's prediction rather than the route libcurl actually takes, the credential stays in the origin list and is sent to the origin server when a request is:

• direct, including proxy set to '' to disable proxying.
• bypassed by a no, no_proxy, or NO_PROXY match.
• sent through a SOCKS proxy, which does not use the HTTP proxy header channel.
• redirected from a safely proxied hop into any of those routes: redirect middleware re-evaluates the proxy per hop but, unlike Authorization and Cookie, does not strip Proxy-Authorization cross-origin.

On installations whose libcurl is older than 7.37.0, or whose PHP cURL extension lacks CURLOPT_PROXYHEADER, CURLOPT_HEADEROPT, and CURLHEADER_SEPARATE, no proxy-only channel is available, so cURL left the header in the origin list for every route. The stream handler also serialized first-class values before selecting a proxy. PHP removes only the first Proxy-Authorization line from CONNECT, so another first-class value or a URL-userinfo Basic line could reach the tunneled origin. A later raw stream_context.http.proxy override could instead reroute either credential directly to the origin.

The disclosed value is a private credential meant only for the proxy. RFC 9110 defines Proxy-Authorization as credentials for the next inbound proxy, and an origin is never an intended recipient. The flaw can silently give a working proxy credential to an unrelated third party. In the worst case, an attacker controls the origin and records the credential through access logs, tracing systems, or application logs. If it remains valid, the attacker can abuse a paid or access-controlled proxy, impersonate the proxy principal, or reach destinations the proxy is trusted to reach. A strong remote exploit is possible when an application sends a request to an attacker-controlled HTTP URL through a proxy with a default Proxy-Authorization header, then follows the attacker's redirect to an HTTPS or no-proxy destination that Guzzle reaches directly.

Using a first-class Proxy-Authorization header is a legitimate, documented configuration, so affected applications are not misusing the library. Guzzle does not create this field, so applications that never configure one are unaffected by the first-class-header flaw. Proxy URL userinfo is not affected on its own, but the stream handler could expose its Basic line when combined with a first-class field or a later raw stream_context.http.proxy override. CURLOPT_PROXYUSERPWD is unaffected. Literal lines supplied through raw CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, CURLOPT_PROXYHEADER, or stream_context.http.header remain caller-controlled and outside the first-class-header guarantee.

Patches

The issue is fixed in 7.14.2. The cURL handlers keep first-class Proxy-Authorization values out of the origin header list. When proxy header separation is available, they pass the values through CURLOPT_PROXYHEADER with CURLHEADER_SEPARATE. An empty value uses cURL's semicolon form to suppress credentials from proxy URL userinfo. On older builds, Guzzle drops the field for direct, bypassed, and SOCKS routes, but fails before network I/O if the request might use an HTTP or HTTPS proxy.

The stream handler removes the field from origin headers before choosing a route. If it selects a proxy, it accepts one value, including empty, writes a validated proxy header, and gives that value precedence over proxy URL userinfo. Multiple values, line breaks, and raw proxy overrides that could reroute generated credentials fail before connection. Direct and bypassed requests drop the field. Versions before 7.14.2 are affected by these origin-bound credential paths.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, remove first-class Proxy-Authorization fields from requests, client defaults, and middleware. Supply proxy credentials instead through proxy URL userinfo, for example http://user:pass@proxy.example:8080, or use CURLOPT_PROXYUSERPWD with the cURL handlers. Do not combine proxy URL userinfo with a first-class field or a raw stream_context.http.proxy override. If a first-class field is unavoidable, use libcurl 7.37.0 or newer with CURLOPT_PROXYHEADER, CURLOPT_HEADEROPT, and CURLHEADER_SEPARATE, and ensure the field is never present on a client that can issue direct, bypassed, or SOCKS requests or follow redirects into those routes. A newer libcurl is necessary but does not fix Guzzle's route-dependent migration by itself, and disabling redirects reduces but does not eliminate exposure.

References

• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110.html#section-11.7.2
• https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_PROXYHEADER.html
• https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_HEADEROPT.html
• https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER.html

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-94pj-82f3-465w
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3876
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/9e4580d4b9981e903dc6323fe37f50a96e85b05e
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.14.2
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67339
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/guzzlehttp-guzzle-before-proxy-authorization-header-disclosure
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-94pj-82f3-465w

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Guzzle: Cookie Disclosure and Injection via IP-Address Domains

CVE-2026-59883 / GHSA-g446-98w2-8p5w

More information

Details

Impact

CookieJar does not restrict a cookie scoped to an IP address to the exact host that set it. When a stored cookie's Domain attribute is an IPv4 literal (Domain=192.168.0.1), a bracketed IPv6 literal (Domain=[::1]), or a bare numeric value that denotes an IPv4 address (Domain=1, which is 0.0.0.1), SetCookie::matchesDomain() applies ordinary subdomain (suffix) matching to it instead of requiring an exact host. The IP-address check inside matchesDomain() is applied only to the request host and never to the cookie's own domain, and response cookies that carry an explicit Domain attribute are stored as suffix-matchable. As a result Guzzle sends such a cookie to any host whose name ends in that value as a trailing label, for example sending a Domain=192.168.0.1 cookie to evil.192.168.0.1, or a Domain=1 cookie to evil.1. The same flaw lets a look-alike host store a cookie that Guzzle then sends to the bare IP address. Depending on how the receiving service interprets the cookie, the impact is cross-host cookie disclosure, cookie injection, or session fixation.

You are affected if your application uses Guzzle's cookie support, for example new Client(['cookies' => true]) or an explicit CookieJar, reuses one cookie jar across more than one host or trust boundary, and that jar can hold a cookie scoped to an IP-address or bare-numeric host. To actually leak a cookie the application must also resolve and connect to a look-alike host whose name ends in the IP-address label, such as evil.192.168.0.1. Such names are not publicly registrable, so in practice an attacker needs some influence over name resolution, which is realistic on private, split-horizon, container, or development networks. You are not affected if you do not use Guzzle's cookie support, if you use a separate cookie jar per host or trust boundary, or if your jars never hold cookies scoped to IP-address or bare-numeric hosts. This issue is independent of public suffix list validation. Per RFC 6265, an IP-address cookie domain must match only the exact host that set it and must never match a subdomain.

Patches

The issue is patched in 7.12.3 and later. Starting in that release, Guzzle matches an IPv4 literal, a bracketed IPv6 literal, or a bare-numeric cookie Domain only against the exact request host, and no longer applies subdomain suffix matching to them.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not reuse one CookieJar instance across untrusted and trusted origins. Use a separate cookie jar per host or trust boundary, or disable cookie handling for requests to untrusted hosts, and avoid scoping cookies to IP-address or bare-numeric hosts. In particular, avoid new Client(['cookies' => true]) for any client that may contact unrelated hosts at different trust levels, because that option creates a single shared jar for the whole client.

References

• https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6265#section-5.1.3
• https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6265#section-5.3
• https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-ipv4-parser

Severity

• CVSS Score: 4.7 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-g446-98w2-8p5w
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59883
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3694
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/b9944c161b12d9ee9c9334cfc5b9659ecd7451f8
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.12.3
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g446-98w2-8p5w

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Guzzle: Host-only cookie scope is not preserved

CVE-2026-67355 / GHSA-wm3w-8rrp-j577

More information

Details

Impact

In affected versions, CookieJar does not preserve whether a response cookie was set without a Domain attribute or with an empty one. A cookie without Domain is host-only and must be returned only to the exact host that set it. Under current cookie processing rules, an empty Domain value is also host-only. Guzzle instead stores the request host in the cookie's Domain field and later applies ordinary domain matching, as though the server had supplied a valid domain. For example, a host-only sid=secret cookie set by example.com can subsequently be sent to child.example.com. FileCookieJar and SessionCookieJar also persist the request host without recording the host-only state, so reloading a jar preserves the widened scope.

An attacker who controls or can observe a child host can therefore receive cookies that were intended only for its parent host. Depending on the cookie, this can disclose session identifiers, authorization tokens, or other sensitive state. Exploitation requires the application to enable Guzzle's cookie support, reuse the same built-in cookie jar, receive a host-only cookie from a parent host, and later make a matching request to a less-trusted child host. The cookie's other restrictions still apply. Its path must match, a Secure cookie is sent only over a secure connection, and an expired cookie is not sent.

Applications that do not use Guzzle's cookie support are not affected. Applications are also not affected by this disclosure if they use a separate jar for every host or trust boundary, never request a less-trusted subdomain with the same jar, or only store cookies carrying a valid, non-empty Domain attribute. The incorrect behavior occurs between an otherwise valid parent host and its subdomains.

Patches

The issue is patched in 7.15.1 and later. Starting in that release, Guzzle records whether a response cookie is host-only and matches it only against the exact host. The host-only flag is part of cookie identity for replacement and response-driven deletion. Cookies carrying a valid, non-empty Domain attribute retain their existing domain-matching behavior. A host-only cookie can coexist with an explicit-domain cookie having the same name, domain string, and path.

The built-in persistent jars now write a boolean HostOnly marker for every stored cookie record. They reject records where that marker is missing or is not a boolean, and validate all records before changing the live jar. Persisted cookie records written by an older version are therefore rejected rather than silently interpreted with an unsafe scope. Loading non-empty file or session data written without this marker throws a RuntimeException until the data is deleted, regenerated, or correctly annotated. Versions before 7.15.1 are affected.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not reuse one CookieJar instance across parent and child hosts with different trust levels. Use a separate cookie jar for each host or trust boundary, disable cookie handling for requests to less-trusted hosts, or avoid making those requests through a client configured with a shared jar. In particular, avoid new Client(['cookies' => true]) for a client that may contact both a trusted parent host and less-trusted subdomains, because that option creates one jar for the whole client.

When upgrading, delete or rotate existing FileCookieJar and SessionCookieJar data that contains cookie records written without a HostOnly marker. Records may instead be annotated manually only when the original presence or absence of the cookie's Domain attribute is known. The stored domain string is not sufficient to infer it safely.

References

• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10025.html#section-4.1.2.3
• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10025.html#section-5.7
• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10025.html#section-5.8.3

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-wm3w-8rrp-j577
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3901
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/7b68220d6543f6f80fe62e633361fc9d4ead14d4
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.15.1
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67355
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/guzzlehttp-guzzle-before-host-only-cookie-scope
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wm3w-8rrp-j577

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Guzzle: Unbounded response cookies risk denial of service

CVE-2026-67353 / GHSA-f283-ghqc-fg79

More information

Details

Impact

In affected versions, Guzzle's built-in CookieJar accepts any number of Set-Cookie header fields from one response, with no limit on the size of each field. When a later request matches the stored cookies, Guzzle places every match into one generated Cookie header without limiting the number of cookies or the total header length.

A malicious or compromised server can therefore return many large cookies, causing Guzzle to store attacker-controlled data in memory and copy it into later request headers. This can increase memory use and processing time. It can also make later requests fail when the generated header exceeds a limit in a handler, HTTP implementation, proxy, or destination server. A server on one sibling host, such as attacker.example.com, can also set parent-domain cookies that are later selected for another sibling, such as service.example.com. The denial can therefore affect a different service that uses the same jar.

An application is affected when it enables the built-in cookie support, receives an attacker-controlled response, and retains or reuses the jar. The issue affects both built-in handlers because Guzzle manages these cookies itself instead of using libcurl's native cookie engine. cURL addressed a similar denial-of-service issue in CVE-2022-32205 by limiting the cookies it accepts and sends, but those native limits do not protect Guzzle's separate jar. Applications that do not use cookies, use separate jars for untrusted origins, or use a third-party CookieJarInterface with suitable limits are not affected by this behavior. The demonstrated direct impact is limited to availability. The patch does not impose a lifetime limit on a jar built up over an unlimited number of responses or populated directly by application code.

Patches

The issue is patched in 7.15.1 and later. Starting in that release, the built-in CookieJar ignores a Set-Cookie field value longer than 8,190 bytes and applies at most 50 successful cookie insertions or replacements from one response. When generating a request, it emits at most 150 matching name=value pairs and limits the complete Cookie: header line to 8,190 bytes, including the field name and following space.

These limits follow the same practical shape as cURL's response to CVE-2022-32205. Both bound cookies accepted from one response, cookies added to one request, and generated header size. Guzzle's 8,190-byte incoming field limit is more generous than cURL's current 5,000-byte cookie-line limit. Neither approach adds a global jar quota or an eviction policy. The 8,190-byte incoming boundary is inclusive. Invalid, unrelated, identical, oversized, and deletion fields do not consume the 50-cookie limit. For outgoing requests, Guzzle preserves its existing matching and iteration order. It stops after 150 pairs or before the first matching cookie that would exceed the line limit. The output limits also apply to directly imported cookie state, but that state is not limited when it is added to the jar. Explicit caller-supplied Cookie headers and third-party jar implementations remain the caller's responsibility. Versions before 7.15.1 are affected.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not enable a shared built-in cookie jar for requests to untrusted origins. Use separate jars per host or trust boundary, disable cookie handling for untrusted requests, and discard or clear a jar after receiving an untrusted response before it is reused. Applications that must accept cookies from untrusted peers can provide a custom CookieJarInterface implementation that enforces suitable limits.

Guzzle does not use libcurl's cookie engine for cookies stored in a CookieJar. The cURL handler sends the Cookie header that Guzzle's cookie middleware has already built, so libcurl's cookie limits do not apply. Upgrading libcurl therefore does not fix this issue.

References

• https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32205.html
• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10025.html#section-5.7
• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10025.html#section-5.8.3
• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10025.html#section-6.1

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-f283-ghqc-fg79
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3901
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/7b68220d6543f6f80fe62e633361fc9d4ead14d4
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.15.1
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67353
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/guzzlehttp-guzzle-before-unbounded-cookie-denial-of-service
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f283-ghqc-fg79

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Guzzle: URI fragments disclosed in redirect Referer headers

CVE-2026-67354 / GHSA-h95v-h523-3mw8

More information

Details

Impact

When the optional referer redirect setting is enabled, affected versions of RedirectMiddleware can copy the fragment from the referring request URI into a generated Referer header. A URI fragment is the part after #. It is handled locally by the client and is not part of the HTTP request target, so the server handling the original request does not receive it. A generated Referer tells the redirect destination which URI led to the request. Guzzle correctly removes user information from that value, but retains the fragment when it follows a redirect to the same scheme, such as HTTPS to HTTPS. For example, an initial URI ending in #secret is sent without the fragment, but the redirect destination can receive a Referer ending in #secret. This behavior affects both the cURL and stream handlers.

An attacker who controls the redirect destination can read the fragment from the incoming header, including through request logs or application code. If the fragment contains a one-time login secret, access token, state value, or other private client data, it is disclosed to a server that was never meant to receive it. Exploitation requires the application to enable allow_redirects.referer, make a request to a URI with a sensitive fragment, and follow a same-scheme redirect to a less-trusted destination.

The referer setting is disabled by default. Applications that leave it disabled, do not put sensitive data in URI fragments, do not follow redirects, or only redirect within the same trust boundary are not affected. Guzzle already omits the generated header when the scheme changes. This issue is limited to the fragment's inclusion. Reducing the path and query on cross-origin redirects is a separate privacy policy question.

Patches

The issue is patched in 7.15.1 and later. Starting in that release, Guzzle removes both user information and the fragment before generating a redirect Referer value. Other redirect behavior does not change. Guzzle retains the referring path and query, and continues to omit the header when the scheme changes. Versions before 7.15.1 are affected when the optional referer setting is enabled.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, leave automatic Referer generation disabled. It is off by default. If redirect options are configured explicitly, ensure that referer is false:

$client->request('GET', $uri, [
    'allow_redirects' => ['referer' => false],
]);

Alternatively, disable automatic redirects and follow trusted destinations manually, or remove the fragment from the request URI before sending a request that may redirect. Do not rely on the fact that fragments are absent from the initial HTTP request target, because the affected middleware can reintroduce them in the generated header.

References

• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110.html#section-10.1.3
• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986.html#section-3.5
• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700.html#section-4.2.3

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-h95v-h523-3mw8
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3901
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/7b68220d6543f6f80fe62e633361fc9d4ead14d4
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.15.1
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67354
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/guzzlehttp-guzzle-before-uri-fragment-disclosure-via-referer
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h95v-h523-3mw8

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Guzzle: Noncanonical cookie domain keeps subdomain scope

CVE-2026-69245 / GHSA-f7vp-7xgx-4w4r

More information

Details

Impact

SetCookie::matchesDomain() gives every subdomain of a cookie Domain that cookie unless it recognizes the Domain as an IP literal or a numeric host, and it decides that from the domain's own text, so two spellings a transport reads as an address keep subdomain scope. On 7.15, hexadecimal and mixed-base forms such as 0x7f000001 and 0177.0.0.0x1 go unrecognized while libcurl 8.21.0 reads both as 127.0.0.1, so closing them completes the rule GHSA-g446-98w2-8p5w (CVE-2026-59883) set out to establish, which cited the WHATWG IPv4 parser and so already admitted a 0x part. A percent-escaped Domain keeps that scope on both branches for a different reason: percent-decoding sits above numeric parsing, so 192.168.0.%31 and 127.0.0.1%2e are registered names in the URI grammar rather than address literals, and no numeric rule in any base classifies them, while libcurl decodes the host before it resolves and reads them as 192.168.0.1 and 127.0.0.1. The escape must fall in the rightmost label on 8.0.0, which already catches a decimal, octal or 0x part there, but not on 7.15, where %31%32%37.0.0.0x1 also reads as 127.0.0.1; 8.0.0 is affected in the percent spelling alone.

Both directions of the defect are reproduced over a real socket. A cookie stored for Domain=0x7f000001 is placed in the Cookie header of a request to evil.0x7f000001, disclosing a session identifier or token to a host that is not that address, and a response from evil.0x7f000001 setting Domain=0x7f000001 is accepted into the jar and replayed to the address, so a server answering for the look-alike name can fix a session or set application state.

Exploitation requires the application to enable cookie support, address an origin by one of these spellings, and contact a host whose name ends in it. No public DNS delegation provides such a name, so the exposure is to private, split-horizon and container zones. Applications that do not use Guzzle's cookies, that keep a separate jar for each host or trust boundary, or that address origins only by ordinary names are not affected.

Patches

This is a summary; the patches are the authority. The issue is fixed in 7.15.2 and 8.0.1, which hold a cookie Domain containing a % byte to an exact match against the request host. 7.15.2 additionally holds to an exact match a Domain whose every dot-separated part is decimal, octal or hexadecimal, a rule wide enough that 0x100000000, a name to libcurl, loses subdomain matching too; 8.0.0 already recognizes a 0x-prefixed rightmost label. One class stays open: an IDN-capable transport reads a fullwidth-digit Domain such as 127.0.0.１ as 127.0.0.1 while Guzzle matches it by suffix, and these patches do not close that. Versions before 7.15.2 and version 8.0.0 are affected, 8.0.0 in the percent spelling alone.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade, do not share one CookieJar between an origin addressed by a numeric or percent-escaped spelling and any other host ending in that spelling. Use a separate jar for each host or trust boundary, or address such an origin by its canonical dotted-decimal form, writing 127.0.0.1, which released versions already hold to an exact match, rather than 0x7f000001 or 127.0.0.%31. Rejecting a request URI host that contains a percent escape, before you hand the URI to Guzzle and on every redirect hop, closes that spelling, and rejecting a non-ASCII byte closes the fullwidth one, but nothing outside the jar closes the hexadecimal one.

Do not use filter_var() with FILTER_VALIDATE_IP to decide whether a domain is an address: it rejects 0x7f000001 and 127.0.0.%31, which a transport reads as 127.0.0.1.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-f7vp-7xgx-4w4r
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3907
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3908
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/3aeea0406aab88cbbd86531313d7cebf8ae149a4
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/744101956d78b7c1384d0cbf379db13e859167bf
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.15.2
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/8.0.1
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f7vp-7xgx-4w4r

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Guzzle: Noncanonical host can bypass host-based checks

CVE-2026-69246 / GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33

More information

Details

Impact

In affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the Host header separately. The cURL handlers set CURLOPT_URL to the URI exactly as written and push that Host into CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER; StreamHandler does the same through fopen(). libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy CONNECT, while the supplied Host suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In http://127.0.0.%31/ the URI host is one filter_var() rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to 127.0.0.1 and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives Host: 127.0.0.%31.

An attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: no_proxy selects proxy routing from the literal host, and RedirectMiddleware decides from it whether to strip Authorization and Cookie. The cookie middleware extracts Set-Cookie against the URI Guzzle produced, not the authority contacted, so for a raw divergent URI the cookie is stored under the URI host as written. Where Guzzle rewrote that URI but left a divergent Host, or where the caller supplied one, the cookie is stored under the canonical name and replayed by ordinary later requests to it. With a third-party UriInterface, a host of blocked.example.com@127.0.0.1 reaches 127.0.0.1 through all three handlers and generates Authorization: Basic from userinfo the application never wrote.

Exploitation requires the application to build a request URI from untrusted input and to make a host decision before handing it to Guzzle. Applications that only fetch URIs they construct themselves are not affected, and an exact allowlist of canonical names ordinarily fails closed; the exposure is to denylists, private-range and IP-literal checks, and any check that treats an unresolvable name as safe. The raw Unicode class needs an IDNA transformation somewhere: either a libcurl built with IDN support or Guzzle's own idn_conversion, off by default on both branches, which rewrites the URI in Client::buildUri() before a handler sees it and leaves a prebuilt request's explicit Host as written, while a request the client builds derives that header from the rewritten URI and produces no divergence. Noncanonical numeric spellings such as 127.1, 2130706433, 0x7f000001 and 0177.0.0.1 remain accepted after the patch and reach whatever the transport reads them as, loopback or a routable public host, and the cURL and stream handlers can differ, so a check comparing a host against an address as text stays bypassable. Guzzle does not offer SSRF protection, and neither cache poisoning nor cross-tenant compromise was established.

Patches

This is a summary; the patches are the authority. The issue is fixed in 7.15.2 and 8.0.1, which validate the request host in all three built-in handlers before any network I/O. A URI host is rejected for a byte outside 0x21 to 0x7E, a percent escape, a URI authority delimiter, unbalanced brackets, or numeric-looking parts followed by a trailing dot. That last rule is deliberately conservative and also refuses out-of-range forms libcurl keeps as names, such as 256.0.0.1.. An explicit Host header must be printable ASCII, and on 7.15.2 free of percent escapes. The client also regenerates a derived Host when it rewrites the request URI. Versions before 7.15.2 and version 8.0.0 are affected.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade, constrain the host yourself before handing a URI to Guzzle, and constrain any explicit Host header separately, on every redirect hop. The URI rule assumes $uri is a validated GuzzleHttp\Psr7\Uri, so re-parse a third-party UriInterface with new Uri((string) $uri) first.

$host = $uri->getHost();

if (
    preg_match('/\A[\x21-\x7E]*\z/D', $host) !== 1
    || strpbrk($host, '%@/?#\\') !== false
    || substr($host, -1) === '.'
) {
    throw new RuntimeException('Refusing to fetch this URI host.');
}

if (
    preg_match('/\A[\x21-\x7E]*\z/D', $hostHeader) !== 1
    || strpos($hostHeader, '%') !== false
) {
    throw new RuntimeException('Refusing to send this Host header.');
}

It differs from the patch in both directions: it refuses example.com., which the patch accepts, and it does not canonicalize 127.1 or 0x7f000001. Reparsing the URI separates a valid port from the host and rejects malformed bracket forms, so the snippet checks the host component alone. idn_conversion => true is not an access control, since IDNA maps １２７。０。０。１ onto 127.0.0.1 and direct handler use bypasses it, and Uri::getHost() is not an SSRF boundary: it is the host as written, not the host a transport connects to. Where the destination matters, resolve the host and check the addresses, and use a separate cookie jar for untrusted origins.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.2 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3907
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3908
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/3aeea0406aab88cbbd86531313d7cebf8ae149a4
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/744101956d78b7c1384d0cbf379db13e859167bf
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.15.2
• https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/8.0.1
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

guzzle/guzzle (guzzlehttp/guzzle)

v7.15.2

Compare Source

Security

• Reject non-printable-ASCII and percent-escaped URI hosts and Host headers (GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33)
• Reject request URI hosts that contain a URI authority delimiter (GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33)
• Reject numeric-looking URI hosts with trailing dots, read as IPv4 addresses (GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33)
• Treat numeric-in-any-base and percent-escaped cookie domains as exact-match-only (GHSA-f7vp-7xgx-4w4r)
• Regenerate a derived Host header after client URI rewrites (GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33)

Fixed

• Preserve RequestException when the stream handler rejects a request before opening a stream

v7.15.1

Compare Source

Security

• Preserve host-only cookie scope and require explicit persistence markers (GHSA-wm3w-8rrp-j577)
• Bound response cookie admission and generated Cookie headers (GHSA-f283-ghqc-fg79)
• Exclude URI fragments from Referer headers generated for redirects (GHSA-h95v-h523-3mw8)

v7.15.0

Compare Source

Added

• Added Multiplexing::NONE support as a client, cURL multi handler, and conditional request option

Changed

• Adjusted guzzlehttp/psr7 version constraint to ^2.13
• Use locale-independent ASCII folding for all case normalization and comparison
• Bound cURL upload reads to the declared Content-Length
• Sanitize the cURL error text exposed through exception handler context
• Fail closed when a named cURL multi connection cap cannot be applied
• Reject the request-level CURLOPT_SHARE cURL option when named connection caps are configured
• Strengthen old-libcurl SOCKS isolation for raw CURLOPT_PRE_PROXY and opaque share handles
• Isolate HTTP proxy tunnels from opaque shared connection caches
• Trigger runtime deprecations for previously deprecated functionality in 7.1.0

Deprecated

• Deprecated Utils::jsonDecode() and Utils::jsonEncode() in favor of native JSON functions
• Deprecated passing CURLMOPT_PIPELINING in the cURL multi handler options array
• Deprecated passing CURLOPT_PROXYHEADER without cURL proxy header separation support

Fixed

• Defer cURL requests created from multi callbacks until native execution unwinds
• Fail synchronous waits from native cURL callbacks promptly instead of self-deadlocking
• Guard cURL multi handle removal against progress callbacks re-entering the handler
• Scope promise waits on the cURL multi handler to the awaited transfer
• Strip Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding when redirects discard the request body
• Stop re-applying the delay request option to followed redirects

v7.14.2

Compare Source

Security

• Prevent first-class and proxy URL credentials from reaching origins (GHSA-94pj-82f3-465w)

v7.14.1

Compare Source

Changed

• Adjusted guzzlehttp/psr7 version constraint to ^2.12.5

Fixed

• Fail closed when a proxy tunnel isolation cURL option cannot be applied
• Normalize Stringable proxy credential values before computing connection-reuse section signatures
• Restore conservative credential redaction for unparseable proxies with multiple @ separators
• Redact request URI credentials from the stream handler connection error message
• Reject enabled response streaming (stream => true) on cap-configured stream handlers
• Distinguish CurlMultiHandler and StreamHandler outcomes in connection-cap custom-handler guidance
• Reject raw cURL options that conflict with explicit multiplexing guarantees
• Stop explicit multiplexing conflict checks faulting on non-array cURL multi options values
• Reject required multiplexing when the final CURLOPT_HTTPAUTH mask permits NTLM
• Require an integer CURLMOPT_PIPELINING when combined with explicit multiplexing
• Check the required multiplexing cleartext proxy rule against the final cURL configuration
• Bound cURL multi handler blocking selects by the earliest pending request delay
• Stop synchronous cURL multi handler waits blocking on other transfers once the target has settled
• Stop cURL multi completion processing double-settling promises canceled from completion callbacks
• Run ready promise queue tasks before sleeping for delayed cURL multi requests
• Avoid integer overflow in cURL multi delay timing on 32-bit platforms
• Roll back failed cURL multi handle attachment instead of leaving requests pending
• Release the cURL easy handle when the on_stats callback throws
• Normalize response trailer field names to lowercase with values in wire order
• Retain response trailers only when an on_trailers callback is configured
• Validate the on_trailers callback before starting a cURL transfer
• Reject the on_trailers request option on the stream handler, which cannot observe trailers
• Match cookies, proxy schemes, auth types, and header names with locale-independent ASCII folding
• Reject proxy option values that Guzzle cannot classify identically to ext-curl

v7.14.0

Compare Source

Added

• Added the on_trailers request option to expose parsed HTTP response trailers
• Added the multiplex request option with Multiplexing::* modes to control or require HTTP/2 multiplexing
• Added rejection of explicit multiplex requests when CURLMOPT_PIPELINING disables multiplexing
• Added the max_host_connections and max_total_connections client and cURL multi handler options

Changed

• Redirects that discard the request body no longer require it to be rewindable
• Synchronous cURL multi handler requests no longer wait for other queued transfers
• Section SOCKS proxy connections by credentials on libcurl before 7.69.0
• Reject request-level CURLOPT_SHARE when combined with authenticated SOCKS proxy configuration
• Redact proxy userinfo containing raw control bytes in cURL errors
• Check linked curl/libcurl NTLM support before applying NTLM auth
• Clarify that NTLM is deprecated by both Guzzle and curl/libcurl
• Remove deprecation for the raw cURL CURLOPT_CERTINFO option
• Warn when a cURL multi option cannot be applied

Deprecated

• Deprecate the raw CURLOPT_PIPEWAIT cURL option in favour of the multiplex request option
• Deprecate unknown handler constructor options
• Deprecate invalid select_timeout cURL multi handler option values
• Deprecate raw cURL multi connection cap options in favour of the named options

v7.13.3

Compare Source

Changed

• Adjusted guzzlehttp/promises version constraint to ^2.5.1
• Adjusted guzzlehttp/psr7 version constraint to ^2.12.4
• Pass explicit trim characters ahead of the PHP 8.6 trim default change

Fixed

• Stop matching cookie domains against hosts with a trailing newline
• Reject HTTP status codes and certificate type extensions with a trailing newline
• Treat PCRE engine failures as invalid cookie names during cookie validation
• Report PCRE engine failures when formatting log messages
• Report PCRE engine failures when splitting no_proxy values

v7.13.2

Compare Source

Fixed

• Stop the cURL multi handler busy-waiting on request delays shorter than one second
• Stop cURL HEAD requests with request bodies hanging on responses that declare a content length
• The cURL handler no longer transmits request bodies on HEAD requests
• Preserve response headers when a response includes HTTP trailers
• Harden cURL response header block detection when HTTP trailers are received
• Corrected the PSR-7 class names in the Pool iterator exception
• Redirect body rewind failures no longer leak a bare RuntimeException

[v7.13.1](https://redirect.github.com/guzzle/guzzle/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md

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Code Review

This pull request updates the guzzlehttp/guzzle dependency version from ~7.10.0 to ~7.12.1 in iap/composer.json. There are no review comments, and I have no feedback to provide.