LLM05: add Markdown auto-render exfiltration to output handling guidance#9
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ottosulin wants to merge 1 commit intoGenAI-Security-Project:mainfrom
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This was referenced Apr 29, 2026
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Adds prevention coverage for the Markdown image / link preview exfiltration pattern that has affected ChatGPT, Bing, Google Bard, NotebookLM, Writer.com, Amazon Q, GitHub Copilot Chat, Gemini, and Cursor.
CSP (current item 6) can mitigate this in browser-based UIs when
img-srcis properly used, but many LLM clients are not browsers (IDEs, native apps, terminal clients, email clients) and need application-layer controls at the renderer.Adds: