Create mitre1.py #6
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| return render(request, 'mitre/mitre_lab_17.html') | ||
|
|
||
| def command_out(command): | ||
| process = subprocess.Popen(command, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Found 'subprocess' function 'Popen' with 'shell=True'. This is dangerous because this call will spawn the command using a shell process. Doing so propagates current shell settings and variables, which makes it much easier for a malicious actor to execute commands. Use 'shell=False' instead.
To resolve this comment:
💡 Follow autofix suggestion
| process = subprocess.Popen(command, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) | |
| process = subprocess.Popen(command, shell=False, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) |
💬 Ignore this finding
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You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| 'exp': datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(seconds=300), | ||
| 'iat': datetime.datetime.utcnow() | ||
| } | ||
| cookie = jwt.encode(payload, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithm='HS256') |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Hardcoded JWT secret or private key is used. This is a Insufficiently Protected Credentials weakness: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/522.html Consider using an appropriate security mechanism to protect the credentials (e.g. keeping secrets in environment variables)
To resolve this comment:
🔧 No guidance has been designated for this issue. Fix according to your organization's approved methods.
💬 Ignore this finding
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/fp <comment>for false positive/ar <comment>for acceptable risk/other <comment>for all other reasons
Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by jwt-python-hardcoded-secret.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| def csrf_transfer_monei_api(request,recipent,amount): | ||
| if request.method == "GET": | ||
| cookie = request.COOKIES['auth_cookiee'] | ||
| payload = jwt.decode(cookie, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithms=['HS256']) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
A secret is hard-coded in the application. Secrets stored in source code, such as credentials, identifiers, and other types of sensitive data, can be leaked and used by internal or external malicious actors. Use environment variables to securely provide credentials and other secrets or retrieve them from a secure vault or Hardware Security Module (HSM).
To resolve this comment:
✨ Commit Assistant fix suggestion
| payload = jwt.decode(cookie, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithms=['HS256']) | |
| import os | |
| payload = jwt.decode(cookie, os.environ.get('JWT_SECRET'), algorithms=['HS256']) |
View step-by-step instructions
- Remove the hardcoded JWT secret
'csrf_vulneribility'from alljwt.encodeandjwt.decodecalls. - Store your secret key outside of your source code, such as in an environment variable. For example, add
JWT_SECRETto your server's environment configuration. - In your code, import the
osmodule if it's not already present:import os - Retrieve the secret using
os.environ.get('JWT_SECRET')in bothjwt.encodeandjwt.decode:- Replace
jwt.encode(payload, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithm='HS256')withjwt.encode(payload, os.environ.get('JWT_SECRET'), algorithm='HS256') - Replace
jwt.decode(cookie, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithms=['HS256'])withjwt.decode(cookie, os.environ.get('JWT_SECRET'), algorithms=['HS256'])
- Replace
- Make sure the
JWT_SECRETenvironment variable is set in your deployment (e.g., in your.envfile or deployment config).
Using environment variables helps prevent accidental leaks of sensitive keys in source code repositories.
💬 Ignore this finding
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You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| if request.method == 'GET': | ||
| try: | ||
| cookie = request.COOKIES['auth_cookiee'] | ||
| payload = jwt.decode(cookie, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithms=['HS256']) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
A secret is hard-coded in the application. Secrets stored in source code, such as credentials, identifiers, and other types of sensitive data, can be leaked and used by internal or external malicious actors. Use environment variables to securely provide credentials and other secrets or retrieve them from a secure vault or Hardware Security Module (HSM).
To resolve this comment:
✨ Commit Assistant fix suggestion
| payload = jwt.decode(cookie, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithms=['HS256']) | |
| import os | |
| JWT_SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('JWT_SECRET_KEY') | |
| payload = jwt.decode(cookie, JWT_SECRET_KEY, algorithms=['HS256']) |
View step-by-step instructions
- Remove the hardcoded secret
'csrf_vulneribility'from alljwt.encodeandjwt.decodecalls. - Store the secret securely in an environment variable, for example,
JWT_SECRET_KEY. - At the top of your file, import
osif it isn't already imported:import os - Retrieve the secret from the environment by adding
JWT_SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('JWT_SECRET_KEY'). - Replace all usages of the hardcoded string
'csrf_vulneribility'withJWT_SECRET_KEYin bothjwt.encodeandjwt.decodecalls:
Example:jwt.decode(cookie, JWT_SECRET_KEY, algorithms=['HS256']) - Set the environment variable
JWT_SECRET_KEYsecurely in your deployment environment, not in the source code.
This approach keeps sensitive secrets out of your codebase and helps prevent accidental leaks.
💬 Ignore this finding
Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.
/fp <comment>for false positive/ar <comment>for acceptable risk/other <comment>for all other reasons
Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by python-pyjwt-hardcoded-secret.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| 'exp': datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(seconds=300), | ||
| 'iat': datetime.datetime.utcnow() | ||
| } | ||
| cookie = jwt.encode(payload, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithm='HS256') |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
A secret is hard-coded in the application. Secrets stored in source code, such as credentials, identifiers, and other types of sensitive data, can be leaked and used by internal or external malicious actors. Use environment variables to securely provide credentials and other secrets or retrieve them from a secure vault or Hardware Security Module (HSM).
To resolve this comment:
✨ Commit Assistant fix suggestion
| cookie = jwt.encode(payload, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithm='HS256') | |
| import os # Make sure this is at the top of your file | |
| cookie = jwt.encode(payload, os.environ["JWT_SECRET_KEY"], algorithm='HS256') |
View step-by-step instructions
- Remove the hardcoded secret key
'csrf_vulneribility'from all uses ofjwt.encodeandjwt.decode. - Store your JWT secret key in an environment variable. For example, add
JWT_SECRET_KEYto your system or.envfile. - At the top of your file, import the
osmodule if it is not already imported:import os - Replace
'csrf_vulneribility'in bothjwt.encode(...)andjwt.decode(...)withos.environ["JWT_SECRET_KEY"]:- Example:
cookie = jwt.encode(payload, os.environ["JWT_SECRET_KEY"], algorithm='HS256') - And:
payload = jwt.decode(cookie, os.environ["JWT_SECRET_KEY"], algorithms=['HS256'])
- Example:
- Ensure your deployment environment sets the
JWT_SECRET_KEYenvironment variable with a strong, random value.
Storing secrets in environment variables instead of source code reduces the risk of credential leaks.
💬 Ignore this finding
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/fp <comment>for false positive/ar <comment>for acceptable risk/other <comment>for all other reasons
Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by python-pyjwt-hardcoded-secret.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| @csrf_exempt | ||
| def mitre_lab_17_api(request): | ||
| if request.method == "POST": | ||
| ip = request.POST.get('ip') | ||
| command = "nmap " + ip | ||
| res, err = command_out(command) | ||
| res = res.decode() | ||
| err = err.decode() | ||
| pattern = "STATE SERVICE.*\\n\\n" | ||
| ports = re.findall(pattern, res,re.DOTALL)[0][14:-2].split('\n') | ||
| return JsonResponse({'raw_res': str(res), 'raw_err': str(err), 'ports': ports}) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Detected usage of @csrf_exempt, which indicates that there is no CSRF token set for this route. This could lead to an attacker manipulating the user's account and exfiltration of private data. Instead, create a function without this decorator.
To resolve this comment:
✨ Commit Assistant fix suggestion
| @csrf_exempt | |
| def mitre_lab_17_api(request): | |
| if request.method == "POST": | |
| ip = request.POST.get('ip') | |
| command = "nmap " + ip | |
| res, err = command_out(command) | |
| res = res.decode() | |
| err = err.decode() | |
| pattern = "STATE SERVICE.*\\n\\n" | |
| ports = re.findall(pattern, res,re.DOTALL)[0][14:-2].split('\n') | |
| return JsonResponse({'raw_res': str(res), 'raw_err': str(err), 'ports': ports}) | |
| def mitre_lab_17_api(request): | |
| if request.method == "POST": | |
| ip = request.POST.get('ip') | |
| command = "nmap " + ip | |
| res, err = command_out(command) | |
| res = res.decode() | |
| err = err.decode() | |
| pattern = "STATE SERVICE.*\\n\\n" | |
| ports = re.findall(pattern, res,re.DOTALL)[0][14:-2].split('\n') | |
| return JsonResponse({'raw_res': str(res), 'raw_err': str(err), 'ports': ports}) |
View step-by-step instructions
- Remove the
@csrf_exemptdecorator from themitre_lab_17_apifunction. - If you need to exempt some views from CSRF checks for valid reasons (such as for APIs intended for third-party access), make sure you use appropriate authentication and add CSRF protection elsewhere or use tokens like JWT.
- If the route is intended for use within your own web application (e.g., called via AJAX from templates you control), rely on Django's default CSRF protection. Ensure that your frontend sends the CSRF token with AJAX requests by including the token in your request headers.
- Test submitting a POST request to this endpoint from your frontend to make sure the CSRF token is being sent and the request succeeds as expected.
Django provides CSRF protection by default to help prevent cross-site request forgery attacks, so only remove these decorators unless you absolutely require it for legitimate API design purposes.
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Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by no-csrf-exempt.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| return render(request, 'mitre/mitre_lab_17.html') | ||
|
|
||
| def command_out(command): | ||
| process = subprocess.Popen(command, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Detected subprocess function 'mitre_lab_17_api' with user controlled data. A malicious actor could leverage this to perform command injection. You may consider using 'shlex.escape()'.
Dataflow graph
flowchart LR
classDef invis fill:white, stroke: none
classDef default fill:#e7f5ff, color:#1c7fd6, stroke: none
subgraph File0["<b>mitre1.py</b>"]
direction LR
%% Source
subgraph Source
direction LR
v0["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L240 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 240] request.POST.get('ip')</a>"]
end
%% Intermediate
subgraph Traces0[Traces]
direction TB
v2["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L240 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 240] ip</a>"]
v3["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L241 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 241] command</a>"]
v4["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L242 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 242] command_out</a>"]
v5["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L232 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 232] command</a>"]
end
v2 --> v3
v3 --> v4
v4 --> v5
%% Sink
subgraph Sink
direction LR
v1["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L233 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 233] command</a>"]
end
end
%% Class Assignment
Source:::invis
Sink:::invis
Traces0:::invis
File0:::invis
%% Connections
Source --> Traces0
Traces0 --> Sink
To resolve this comment:
🔧 No guidance has been designated for this issue. Fix according to your organization's approved methods.
💬 Ignore this finding
Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.
/fp <comment>for false positive/ar <comment>for acceptable risk/other <comment>for all other reasons
Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by dangerous-subprocess-use.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| return render(request, 'mitre/mitre_lab_17.html') | ||
|
|
||
| def command_out(command): | ||
| process = subprocess.Popen(command, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Detected user input entering a subprocess call unsafely. This could result in a command injection vulnerability. An attacker could use this vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands on the host, which allows them to download malware, scan sensitive data, or run any command they wish on the server. Do not let users choose the command to run. In general, prefer to use Python API versions of system commands. If you must use subprocess, use a dictionary to allowlist a set of commands.
Dataflow graph
flowchart LR
classDef invis fill:white, stroke: none
classDef default fill:#e7f5ff, color:#1c7fd6, stroke: none
subgraph File0["<b>mitre1.py</b>"]
direction LR
%% Source
subgraph Source
direction LR
v0["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L238 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 238] request</a>"]
end
%% Intermediate
subgraph Traces0[Traces]
direction TB
v2["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L238 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 238] request</a>"]
v3["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L240 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 240] ip</a>"]
v4["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L241 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 241] command</a>"]
v5["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L242 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 242] command_out</a>"]
v6["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L232 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 232] command</a>"]
end
v2 --> v3
v3 --> v4
v4 --> v5
v5 --> v6
%% Sink
subgraph Sink
direction LR
v1["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L233 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 233] subprocess.Popen(command, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)</a>"]
end
end
%% Class Assignment
Source:::invis
Sink:::invis
Traces0:::invis
File0:::invis
%% Connections
Source --> Traces0
Traces0 --> Sink
To resolve this comment:
🔧 No guidance has been designated for this issue. Fix according to your organization's approved methods.
💬 Ignore this finding
Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.
/fp <comment>for false positive/ar <comment>for acceptable risk/other <comment>for all other reasons
Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by subprocess-injection.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| @authentication_decorator | ||
| @csrf_exempt | ||
| def csrf_transfer_monei(request): | ||
| if request.method == 'GET': | ||
| try: | ||
| cookie = request.COOKIES['auth_cookiee'] | ||
| payload = jwt.decode(cookie, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithms=['HS256']) | ||
| username = payload['username'] | ||
| User = CSRF_user_tbl.objects.filter(username=username) | ||
| if not User: | ||
| redirect('/mitre/9/lab/login') | ||
| return render(request, 'mitre/csrf_dashboard.html', {'balance': User[0].balance}) | ||
| except: | ||
| return redirect('/mitre/9/lab/login') |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Detected usage of @csrf_exempt, which indicates that there is no CSRF token set for this route. This could lead to an attacker manipulating the user's account and exfiltration of private data. Instead, create a function without this decorator.
To resolve this comment:
✨ Commit Assistant fix suggestion
| @authentication_decorator | |
| @csrf_exempt | |
| def csrf_transfer_monei(request): | |
| if request.method == 'GET': | |
| try: | |
| cookie = request.COOKIES['auth_cookiee'] | |
| payload = jwt.decode(cookie, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithms=['HS256']) | |
| username = payload['username'] | |
| User = CSRF_user_tbl.objects.filter(username=username) | |
| if not User: | |
| redirect('/mitre/9/lab/login') | |
| return render(request, 'mitre/csrf_dashboard.html', {'balance': User[0].balance}) | |
| except: | |
| return redirect('/mitre/9/lab/login') | |
| @authentication_decorator | |
| def csrf_transfer_monei(request): | |
| if request.method == 'GET': | |
| try: | |
| cookie = request.COOKIES['auth_cookiee'] | |
| payload = jwt.decode(cookie, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithms=['HS256']) | |
| username = payload['username'] | |
| User = CSRF_user_tbl.objects.filter(username=username) | |
| if not User: | |
| redirect('/mitre/9/lab/login') | |
| return render(request, 'mitre/csrf_dashboard.html', {'balance': User[0].balance}) | |
| except: | |
| return redirect('/mitre/9/lab/login') |
View step-by-step instructions
- Remove the
@csrf_exemptdecorator from thecsrf_transfer_moneifunction definition. - Make sure that your frontend forms which POST to this route include the CSRF token, typically by using Django’s
{% csrf_token %}template tag within forms. - Confirm that any AJAX requests to this endpoint include the CSRF token in the request headers, as per Django's CSRF protection guidelines.
Removing @csrf_exempt ensures that Django's default CSRF protection is enabled for this route, reducing the risk of cross-site request forgery attacks.
💬 Ignore this finding
Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.
/fp <comment>for false positive/ar <comment>for acceptable risk/other <comment>for all other reasons
Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by no-csrf-exempt.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| elif request.method == 'POST': | ||
| password = request.POST.get('password') | ||
| username = request.POST.get('username') | ||
| password = md5(password.encode()).hexdigest() |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
It looks like MD5 is used as a password hash. MD5 is not considered a secure password hash because it can be cracked by an attacker in a short amount of time. Use a suitable password hashing function such as scrypt. You can use hashlib.scrypt.
Dataflow graph
flowchart LR
classDef invis fill:white, stroke: none
classDef default fill:#e7f5ff, color:#1c7fd6, stroke: none
subgraph File0["<b>mitre1.py</b>"]
direction LR
%% Source
subgraph Source
direction LR
v0["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L161 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 161] md5</a>"]
end
%% Intermediate
%% Sink
subgraph Sink
direction LR
v1["<a href=https://github.com/ArmorCode-Public-Test/pygoat/blob/74b51fb13244b885e9cc6ce142fea8f875eaf939/mitre1.py#L161 target=_blank style='text-decoration:none; color:#1c7fd6'>[Line: 161] md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()</a>"]
end
end
%% Class Assignment
Source:::invis
Sink:::invis
File0:::invis
%% Connections
Source --> Sink
To resolve this comment:
✨ Commit Assistant fix suggestion
| password = md5(password.encode()).hexdigest() | |
| import os | |
| import hashlib | |
| # To use scrypt securely, you must store each user's salt alongside their password hash. | |
| # Here we use a static salt for illustration, but in production generate/store per-user salts. | |
| STATIC_SALT = b'some_static_salt' # Replace with per-user salt in production | |
| # If you have access to user's salt from the database, retrieve it here. | |
| # Example: user_obj = CSRF_user_tbl.objects.filter(username=username).first() | |
| # salt = user_obj.salt if user_obj else STATIC_SALT | |
| salt = STATIC_SALT # Replace this line to get the actual per-user salt as above. | |
| password = hashlib.scrypt(password.encode(), salt=salt, n=16384, r=8, p=1).hex() |
View step-by-step instructions
- Replace the usage of
md5for password hashing with a secure password hash function, such ashashlib.scrypt. - Change the line
password = md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()to use scrypt as follows:
password = hashlib.scrypt(password.encode(), salt=b'some_unique_salt', n=16384, r=8, p=1).hex()
Replaceb'some_unique_salt'with a unique, securely generated salt for each user if possible. - If you store password hashes in the database, make sure to store both the salt and the hashed password.
- Update the login and user creation logic to use the same password hashing method so passwords can be verified correctly.
Using scrypt instead of md5 makes it much harder for attackers to crack user passwords, since scrypt is designed to be slow and computationally expensive.
💬 Ignore this finding
Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.
/fp <comment>for false positive/ar <comment>for acceptable risk/other <comment>for all other reasons
Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by md5-used-as-password.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| def mitre_lab_25_api(request): | ||
| if request.method == "POST": | ||
| expression = request.POST.get('expression') | ||
| result = eval(expression) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Detected the use of eval(). eval() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources.
To resolve this comment:
✨ Commit Assistant fix suggestion
| result = eval(expression) | |
| import ast | |
| # ... [previous code unchanged] ... | |
| @csrf_exempt | |
| def mitre_lab_25_api(request): | |
| if request.method == "POST": | |
| expression = request.POST.get('expression') | |
| try: | |
| # Safely evaluate only Python literals (numbers, strings, tuples, lists, dicts, booleans, and None) | |
| result = ast.literal_eval(expression) | |
| except (ValueError, SyntaxError): | |
| result = "Invalid input" | |
| return JsonResponse({'result': result}) | |
| else: | |
| return redirect('/mitre/25/lab/') | |
| # ... [following code unchanged] ... |
View step-by-step instructions
- Remove the line that calls
eval(expression). - Replace it with code that safely handles only the operations you need. If the allowed expressions are limited (e.g., only math calculations), use the
ast.literal_evalfunction:import astthenresult = ast.literal_eval(expression). - If that’s still too permissive, validate and parse the input more strictly—such as using regular expressions to allow only digits and operators you want to support.
- Raise an error or return an error message if the input does not match expected safe patterns.
For simple math, this would look like:
import re
expression = request.POST.get('expression')
if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9+\-*/ ().]+", expression):
result = eval(expression)
else:
result = "Invalid input"Replace eval(expression) with the safer ast.literal_eval(expression) if only literals (numbers, tuples, lists, etc.) must be supported.
This avoids security risks because eval will execute any code it receives, which can allow attackers to run arbitrary Python commands if input is unchecked.
💬 Ignore this finding
Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.
/fp <comment>for false positive/ar <comment>for acceptable risk/other <comment>for all other reasons
Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by eval-detected.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| } | ||
| cookie = jwt.encode(payload, 'csrf_vulneribility', algorithm='HS256') | ||
| response = redirect("/mitre/9/lab/transaction") | ||
| response.set_cookie('auth_cookiee', cookie) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Django cookies should be handled securely by setting secure=True, httponly=True, and samesite='Lax' in response.set_cookie(...). If your situation calls for different settings, explicitly disable the setting. If you want to send the cookie over http, set secure=False. If you want to let client-side JavaScript read the cookie, set httponly=False. If you want to attach cookies to requests for external sites, set samesite=None.
To resolve this comment:
✨ Commit Assistant fix suggestion
| response.set_cookie('auth_cookiee', cookie) | |
| response.set_cookie('auth_cookiee', cookie, secure=True, httponly=True, samesite='Lax') |
View step-by-step instructions
- Add these arguments to the
response.set_cookiecall:secure=True, httponly=True, samesite='Lax'. - The full line should look like:
response.set_cookie('auth_cookiee', cookie, secure=True, httponly=True, samesite='Lax') - If you intentionally need different settings (for example, if cookies must be read by JavaScript or sent cross-site), explicitly set
httponly=Falseorsamesite=Noneas needed.
This change ensures the cookie is only sent over HTTPS, cannot be accessed by JavaScript, and is not sent with cross-site requests, making it less likely to be exposed to attackers.
💬 Ignore this finding
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/fp <comment>for false positive/ar <comment>for acceptable risk/other <comment>for all other reasons
Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by django-secure-set-cookie.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
| @csrf_exempt | ||
| def mitre_lab_25_api(request): | ||
| if request.method == "POST": | ||
| expression = request.POST.get('expression') | ||
| result = eval(expression) | ||
| return JsonResponse({'result': result}) | ||
| else: | ||
| return redirect('/mitre/25/lab/') |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Detected usage of @csrf_exempt, which indicates that there is no CSRF token set for this route. This could lead to an attacker manipulating the user's account and exfiltration of private data. Instead, create a function without this decorator.
To resolve this comment:
✨ Commit Assistant fix suggestion
| @csrf_exempt | |
| def mitre_lab_25_api(request): | |
| if request.method == "POST": | |
| expression = request.POST.get('expression') | |
| result = eval(expression) | |
| return JsonResponse({'result': result}) | |
| else: | |
| return redirect('/mitre/25/lab/') | |
| def mitre_lab_25_api(request): | |
| if request.method == "POST": | |
| expression = request.POST.get('expression') | |
| result = eval(expression) | |
| return JsonResponse({'result': result}) | |
| else: | |
| return redirect('/mitre/25/lab/') |
View step-by-step instructions
- Remove the
@csrf_exemptdecorator from themitre_lab_25_apifunction. - Make sure that your frontend sends the CSRF token in POST requests to this view, typically by including the
X-CSRFTokenheader. - If you are using Django's default template system, ensure that your form includes
{% csrf_token %}inside the<form>tag.
This will ensure that Django's CSRF protection is enforced for this view and reduce the risk of cross-site request forgery.
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| expression = request.POST.get('expression') | ||
| result = eval(expression) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Found user data in a call to 'eval'. This is extremely dangerous because it can enable an attacker to execute arbitrary remote code on the system. Instead, refactor your code to not use 'eval' and instead use a safe library for the specific functionality you need.
To resolve this comment:
✨ Commit Assistant fix suggestion
| expression = request.POST.get('expression') | |
| result = eval(expression) | |
| expression = request.POST.get('expression') | |
| # Use simpleeval to safely evaluate mathematical expressions | |
| from simpleeval import simple_eval | |
| try: | |
| result = simple_eval(expression) | |
| except Exception as e: | |
| # If the expression is invalid, return an error message | |
| result = f"Invalid expression: {str(e)}" |
View step-by-step instructions
- Remove the line that uses
eval(expression). Do not directly evaluate user input witheval. - If you need to allow users to perform mathematical calculations, use the
ast.literal_evalfunction from Python's standard library, which only safely evaluates Python literals (like numbers, strings, lists, etc.), or use a math expression parser likesimpleevalorsympy.
For example, replaceeval(expression)with:import astresult = ast.literal_eval(expression)
- Alternatively, if you need to support full calculator-style math expressions (e.g.
2+2,3*5), install and use a library likesimpleeval:$ pip install simpleevalfrom simpleeval import simple_evalresult = simple_eval(expression)
- Validate or sanitize the input as much as possible to prevent unsafe expressions from being processed.
The eval function can execute arbitrary code, which lets attackers take control of your server. Libraries like ast.literal_eval or simpleeval only allow safe expressions and are designed for this use case.
💬 Ignore this finding
Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.
/fp <comment>for false positive/ar <comment>for acceptable risk/other <comment>for all other reasons
Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by user-eval.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
|
This is for testing