diff --git a/packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/status-mirror-cascade.integration.test.ts b/packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/status-mirror-cascade.integration.test.ts
index ec0ffc53528..cc4d10ec9fb 100644
--- a/packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/status-mirror-cascade.integration.test.ts
+++ b/packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/status-mirror-cascade.integration.test.ts
@@ -63,17 +63,27 @@ const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
  * ONLY read refusals whose log frames may be withheld here.
  *
  * `beforeEach` boots a kernel with no datasource and attaches sqlite late, then
- * syncs exactly four objects. Every approval decision below therefore probes
- * the six authz tables `resolveUserAuthzGrants` reads plus
- * `sys_approval_delegation`, which `ApprovalService.lookupActiveDelegation`
- * reads best-effort on each decision. All are fail-soft, so the reads are
- * EXPECTED — but the driver and the engine each log the fault on the way out.
+ * syncs its objects. Every approval decision below probes `sys_organization`
+ * (`ObjectQL.probeInstallOrganizations`) and `sys_approval_delegation`, which
+ * `ApprovalService.lookupActiveDelegation` reads best-effort on each decision.
+ * Both are fail-soft, so the reads are EXPECTED — but the driver and the engine
+ * each log the fault on the way out.
  *
- * ⛔ MEASURED, not copied from the probers' source: a run of this file at
- * `logger: { level: 'info' }` emitted 25 `refused a read on '<t>'` driver lines
- * and 25 matching `ERROR Find operation failed` engine frames — sys_user 5 /
- * sys_member 4 / sys_position 4 / sys_user_position 4 /
- * sys_user_permission_set 4 / sys_organization 2 / sys_approval_delegation 2.
+ * ⚠️ [#17985] The five authz tables `resolveUserAuthzGrants` reads USED TO BE on
+ * this list. They are not any more, because this fixture now provisions them
+ * (see `authzResolverObjects` below) — which is the outcome this channel's own
+ * contract names: "a table that started resolving means the fixture now
+ * provisions it". Being fail-soft, their refusal was not just noise: `tryFind`
+ * answers `[]` for a missing table, so every approval decision here resolved
+ * its grants from reads that never happened. ⛔ The count fell because the
+ * reads SUCCEED, not because anything was quietened.
+ *
+ * ⛔ MEASURED, not copied from the probers' source. At `225197cdb`-era HEAD,
+ * before this fixture provisioned anything, a run emitted 25 `refused a read on
+ * '<t>'` driver lines and 25 matching engine frames — sys_user 5 / sys_member 4
+ * / sys_position 4 / sys_user_position 4 / sys_user_permission_set 4 /
+ * sys_organization 2 / sys_approval_delegation 2. The 21 authz ones are gone;
+ * the remaining two channels are the ones declared below.
  *
  * ## Why a capture instead of the blanket `silent` this replaces
  *
@@ -87,15 +97,102 @@ const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
  * happen. A capture nobody asserts is a mute.
  */
 const EXPECTED_ABSENT_PROBE_TABLES = [
-  'sys_user',
-  'sys_member',
-  'sys_user_position',
-  'sys_user_permission_set',
-  'sys_position',
   'sys_organization',
   'sys_approval_delegation',
 ] as const;
 
+/**
+ * ⚠️ [#17985] The authz objects a real approval decision makes core's
+ * `resolveUserAuthzGrants` read. They belong to `@objectstack/plugin-auth` and
+ * `@objectstack/plugin-security`; they are spelled LOCALLY here, with only the
+ * columns that resolver reads, so this fixture adds no dependency edge onto
+ * either package (the `find-envelope-limb-removal.test.ts` /
+ * `signup-existing-address-refusal.test.ts` precedent, applied by PR #17982 to
+ * the two `plugin-auth` fixtures that carried the same defect).
+ *
+ * Columns, and why each one is here — every other column of the real objects is
+ * deliberately absent, because no read on this path touches it:
+ *   `sys_user`                 id (filter), email (the RLS owner-email fallback)
+ *   `sys_member`               user_id / organization_id (filters), role
+ *   `sys_user_position`        user_id (filter), position, organization_id
+ *   `sys_user_permission_set`  user_id (filter), permission_set_id, organization_id
+ *   `sys_position`             name (filter), id, active (`isRowActive`),
+ *                              organization_id (the driver's tenant scope)
+ *
+ * ⛔ `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_permission_set` are NOT here: the
+ * resolver reaches them only once a `sys_position` row resolves and a
+ * permission-set id is collected, and these cases seed neither — registering
+ * them would add fixture surface no read in this file touches. The ADR-0091
+ * validity columns are absent for the reason `sys_member` lacks them today:
+ * `isGrantActive` reads an absent bound as unbounded, so declaring them would
+ * change no verdict here.
+ */
+const authzResolverObjects = [
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-auth',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user',
+      label: 'User',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        email: { name: 'email', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-auth',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_member',
+      label: 'Member',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        role: { name: 'role', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user_position',
+      label: 'User Position',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        position: { name: 'position', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user_permission_set',
+      label: 'User Permission Set',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        permission_set_id: { name: 'permission_set_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_position',
+      label: 'Position',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        name: { name: 'name', type: 'text' as const },
+        active: { name: 'active', type: 'boolean' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+] as const;
+
 /** [#11081] Shared by both kernels this file boots; asserted once in `afterAll`. */
 const noise = captureExpectedReadRefusals([...EXPECTED_ABSENT_PROBE_TABLES]);
 
@@ -207,6 +304,12 @@ describe('an approval decision cascades as the deciding user (#3783)', () => {
     for (const def of [opportunity, SysApprovalRequest, SysApprovalAction, SysApprovalApprover]) {
       objectql.registry.registerObject(def as any, 'approvals-test', 'approvals-test');
     }
+    // [#17985] The authz resolver's own reads, so a decision resolves its
+    // grants from reads that HAPPEN rather than from `tryFind`'s empty answer
+    // for a missing table.
+    for (const o of authzResolverObjects) {
+      objectql.registry.registerObject(o.def as any, o.owner);
+    }
     // Real DDL for all four objects — including the three sys_approval_* tables
     // the ApprovalService writes through.
     await objectql.syncSchemas();
diff --git a/packages/services/service-automation/src/paused-run-visibility.test.ts b/packages/services/service-automation/src/paused-run-visibility.test.ts
index 63d0b1252f6..c5870b58869 100644
--- a/packages/services/service-automation/src/paused-run-visibility.test.ts
+++ b/packages/services/service-automation/src/paused-run-visibility.test.ts
@@ -417,6 +417,103 @@ describe('#8050 merging a third source: no duplicates, and a stated precedence',
  * `where: { status: 'paused' }` scan the DB-backed store actually issues. That
  * is where "works against a Map, empty against a table" would hide.
  */
+/**
+ * ⚠️ [#17985] The authz objects a write here makes core's
+ * `resolveUserAuthzGrants` read. They belong to `@objectstack/plugin-auth` and
+ * `@objectstack/plugin-security`; they are spelled LOCALLY, with only the
+ * columns that resolver reads, so this fixture adds no dependency edge onto
+ * either package (the `find-envelope-limb-removal.test.ts` precedent, applied
+ * by PR #17982 to the two `plugin-auth` fixtures with the same defect).
+ *
+ * Without them the driver REFUSED every one of those reads — measured at
+ * `2f1a6f696`: 5 `refused a read on` driver lines, one per table.
+ * `tryFind` classifies a missing table as "not provisioned" and answers `[]`,
+ * so nothing went red: the assertions below passed over grant reads that never
+ * happened. ⛔ Registering the tables is what makes those reads SUCCEED; the
+ * fix is not to quieten the line.
+ *
+ * Columns, and why each is here — every other column of the real objects is
+ * deliberately absent, because no read on this path touches it:
+ *   `sys_user`                 id (filter), email (the RLS owner-email fallback)
+ *   `sys_member`               user_id / organization_id (filters), role
+ *   `sys_user_position`        user_id (filter), position, organization_id
+ *   `sys_user_permission_set`  user_id (filter), permission_set_id, organization_id
+ *   `sys_position`             name (filter), id, active (`isRowActive`),
+ *                              organization_id (the driver's tenant scope)
+ *
+ * ⛔ `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_permission_set` are NOT here: the
+ * resolver reaches them only once a `sys_position` row resolves and a
+ * permission-set id is collected, and nothing here seeds either. The ADR-0091
+ * validity columns are absent for the reason `sys_member` lacks them today:
+ * `isGrantActive` reads an absent bound as unbounded, so declaring them would
+ * change no verdict here.
+ */
+const authzResolverObjects = [
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-auth',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user',
+      label: 'User',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        email: { name: 'email', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-auth',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_member',
+      label: 'Member',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        role: { name: 'role', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user_position',
+      label: 'User Position',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        position: { name: 'position', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user_permission_set',
+      label: 'User Permission Set',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        permission_set_id: { name: 'permission_set_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_position',
+      label: 'Position',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        name: { name: 'name', type: 'text' as const },
+        active: { name: 'active', type: 'boolean' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+] as const;
+
 describe('#8050 cold boot over the same sqlite file (full stack)', () => {
     let dir: string | undefined;
     const kernels: ObjectKernel[] = [];
@@ -444,6 +541,11 @@ describe('#8050 cold boot over the same sqlite file (full stack)', () => {
         });
         await driver.connect();
         ql.registerDriver(driver, true);
+        // [#17985] The authz resolver's own reads, registered before the sync so
+        // they are provisioned rather than refused.
+        for (const o of authzResolverObjects) {
+            (ql as any).registry.registerObject(o.def as never, o.owner);
+        }
         await ql.syncSchemas();
 
         const automation = kernel.getService<AutomationEngine>('automation');
diff --git a/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/before-update-flow-payload-reach.test.ts b/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/before-update-flow-payload-reach.test.ts
index 4ff6ae259eb..5ed41383c3e 100644
--- a/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/before-update-flow-payload-reach.test.ts
+++ b/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/before-update-flow-payload-reach.test.ts
@@ -214,6 +214,104 @@ function makeDriver(): any {
  * top-level key. That is the falsification candidate, and it cannot be tried
  * on a payload of scalars.
  */
+/**
+ * ⚠️ [#17985] The authz objects a write here makes core's
+ * `resolveUserAuthzGrants` read. They belong to `@objectstack/plugin-auth` and
+ * `@objectstack/plugin-security`; they are spelled LOCALLY, with only the
+ * columns that resolver reads, so this fixture adds no dependency edge onto
+ * either package (the `find-envelope-limb-removal.test.ts` precedent, applied
+ * by PR #17982 to the two `plugin-auth` fixtures with the same defect).
+ *
+ * Without them the driver REFUSED every one of those reads — measured at
+ * `2f1a6f696`: 10 `refused a read on` driver lines, two per table across this
+ * file's one real-sqlite case.
+ * `tryFind` classifies a missing table as "not provisioned" and answers `[]`,
+ * so nothing went red: the assertions below passed over grant reads that never
+ * happened. ⛔ Registering the tables is what makes those reads SUCCEED; the
+ * fix is not to quieten the line.
+ *
+ * Columns, and why each is here — every other column of the real objects is
+ * deliberately absent, because no read on this path touches it:
+ *   `sys_user`                 id (filter), email (the RLS owner-email fallback)
+ *   `sys_member`               user_id / organization_id (filters), role
+ *   `sys_user_position`        user_id (filter), position, organization_id
+ *   `sys_user_permission_set`  user_id (filter), permission_set_id, organization_id
+ *   `sys_position`             name (filter), id, active (`isRowActive`),
+ *                              organization_id (the driver's tenant scope)
+ *
+ * ⛔ `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_permission_set` are NOT here: the
+ * resolver reaches them only once a `sys_position` row resolves and a
+ * permission-set id is collected, and nothing here seeds either. The ADR-0091
+ * validity columns are absent for the reason `sys_member` lacks them today:
+ * `isGrantActive` reads an absent bound as unbounded, so declaring them would
+ * change no verdict here.
+ */
+const authzResolverObjects = [
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-auth',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user',
+      label: 'User',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        email: { name: 'email', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-auth',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_member',
+      label: 'Member',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        role: { name: 'role', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user_position',
+      label: 'User Position',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        position: { name: 'position', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user_permission_set',
+      label: 'User Permission Set',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        permission_set_id: { name: 'permission_set_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_position',
+      label: 'Position',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        name: { name: 'name', type: 'text' as const },
+        active: { name: 'active', type: 'boolean' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+] as const;
+
 function registerObjects(registry: TestObjectRegistry, object: string): void {
   registry.registerObject({
     name: object, label: object,
@@ -793,6 +891,11 @@ describe('[#15356/#14744] S5 on the real SQL driver — the mutation reaches no
     await driver.connect();
     objectql.registerDriver(driver, true);
     registerObjects(objectql.registry as unknown as TestObjectRegistry, 'sq');
+    // [#17985] The authz resolver's own reads, registered before the sync so
+    // they are provisioned rather than refused.
+    for (const o of authzResolverObjects) {
+      (objectql.registry as unknown as TestObjectRegistry).registerObject(o.def as never, o.owner);
+    }
     await objectql.syncSchemas();
 
     objectql.registerFunction('sq_mutate_nested', async (args: any) => {
diff --git a/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/record-change-integration.test.ts b/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/record-change-integration.test.ts
index 22e8413a8ca..7d0efb716f0 100644
--- a/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/record-change-integration.test.ts
+++ b/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/record-change-integration.test.ts
@@ -69,18 +69,28 @@ const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
  * the ONLY read refusals whose log frames may be withheld here.
  *
  * Every `it` below boots a kernel with no datasource, attaches sqlite late, and
- * registers exactly its own test object. The authz resolver
- * (`core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts`) and
- * `ObjectQL.probeInstallOrganizations` then probe these six on every write.
- * Both probes are fail-soft by construction, so the reads are EXPECTED — but
- * the driver and the engine each log the fault on the way out.
+ * registers its own test object. `ObjectQL.probeInstallOrganizations` then
+ * probes `sys_organization` on every write. That probe is fail-soft by
+ * construction, so the read is EXPECTED — but the driver and the engine each
+ * log the fault on the way out.
  *
- * ⛔ This list is MEASURED, not copied from the probers' source: a run of this
- * file at `logger: { level: 'info' }` emitted 84 `refused a read on '<t>'`
- * driver lines and 84 matching `ERROR Find operation failed` engine frames,
- * split sys_user 15 / sys_member 15 / sys_user_position 15 /
- * sys_user_permission_set 15 / sys_position 15 / sys_organization 9. A read
- * this file stops provoking therefore shows up as a CHANGED SET (red
+ * ⚠️ [#17985] The five authz tables the resolver
+ * (`core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts`) reads USED TO BE on this list.
+ * They are not any more, because `attachSqlite` now provisions them (see
+ * `authzResolverObjects` below) — the outcome this channel's own contract
+ * names: "a table that started resolving means the fixture now provisions it".
+ * Their refusal was never only noise: `tryFind` answers `[]` for a missing
+ * table, so every write below resolved its grants from reads that never
+ * happened. ⛔ The count fell because the reads SUCCEED, not because anything
+ * was quietened.
+ *
+ * ⛔ This list is MEASURED, not copied from the probers' source: before this
+ * file provisioned anything, a run at `logger: { level: 'info' }` emitted 84
+ * `refused a read on '<t>'` driver lines and 84 matching `ERROR Find operation
+ * failed` engine frames, split sys_user 15 / sys_member 15 / sys_user_position
+ * 15 / sys_user_permission_set 15 / sys_position 15 / sys_organization 9. The
+ * 75 authz ones are gone; the one channel left is the one declared below. A
+ * read this file stops provoking still shows up as a CHANGED SET (red
  * `silentChannels()`), not as a silence.
  *
  * ## Why a capture instead of the blanket `silent` this replaces
@@ -94,13 +104,96 @@ const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
  * real console, and COUNTS what it withheld so `afterAll` can assert the
  * expected reads still happen. A capture nobody asserts is a mute.
  */
-const EXPECTED_ABSENT_PROBE_TABLES = [
-  'sys_user',
-  'sys_member',
-  'sys_user_position',
-  'sys_user_permission_set',
-  'sys_position',
-  'sys_organization',
+const EXPECTED_ABSENT_PROBE_TABLES = ['sys_organization'] as const;
+
+/**
+ * ⚠️ [#17985] The authz objects a write here makes core's
+ * `resolveUserAuthzGrants` read. They belong to `@objectstack/plugin-auth` and
+ * `@objectstack/plugin-security`; they are spelled LOCALLY, with only the
+ * columns that resolver reads, so this fixture adds no dependency edge onto
+ * either package (the `find-envelope-limb-removal.test.ts` precedent, applied
+ * by PR #17982 to the two `plugin-auth` fixtures with the same defect).
+ *
+ * Columns, and why each is here — every other column of the real objects is
+ * deliberately absent, because no read on this path touches it:
+ *   `sys_user`                 id (filter), email (the RLS owner-email fallback)
+ *   `sys_member`               user_id / organization_id (filters), role
+ *   `sys_user_position`        user_id (filter), position, organization_id
+ *   `sys_user_permission_set`  user_id (filter), permission_set_id, organization_id
+ *   `sys_position`             name (filter), id, active (`isRowActive`),
+ *                              organization_id (the driver's tenant scope)
+ *
+ * ⛔ `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_permission_set` are NOT here: the
+ * resolver reaches them only once a `sys_position` row resolves and a
+ * permission-set id is collected, and nothing here seeds either. The ADR-0091
+ * validity columns are absent for the reason `sys_member` lacks them today:
+ * `isGrantActive` reads an absent bound as unbounded, so declaring them would
+ * change no verdict here.
+ */
+const authzResolverObjects = [
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-auth',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user',
+      label: 'User',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        email: { name: 'email', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-auth',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_member',
+      label: 'Member',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        role: { name: 'role', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user_position',
+      label: 'User Position',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        position: { name: 'position', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user_permission_set',
+      label: 'User Permission Set',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        permission_set_id: { name: 'permission_set_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_position',
+      label: 'Position',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        name: { name: 'name', type: 'text' as const },
+        active: { name: 'active', type: 'boolean' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
 ] as const;
 
 /** [#11081] Shared by every kernel this file boots; asserted once in `afterAll`. */
@@ -161,6 +254,13 @@ async function attachSqlite(objectql: any): Promise<any> {
   // The engine exists only after `kernel.bootstrap()`, which every caller has
   // already run; the probed reads all happen later, per write.
   noise.captureEngine(objectql);
+  // [#17985] Registered on the ONE seam every boot site in this file goes
+  // through, before any caller's `syncSchemas()`, so each write below resolves
+  // its grants from reads that HAPPEN rather than from `tryFind`'s empty answer
+  // for a missing table.
+  for (const o of authzResolverObjects) {
+    objectql.registry.registerObject(o.def as any, o.owner);
+  }
   openDrivers.push(driver);
   return driver;
 }
diff --git a/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/reentrant-start-condition.test.ts b/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/reentrant-start-condition.test.ts
index a120a2772aa..48a4baa8420 100644
--- a/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/reentrant-start-condition.test.ts
+++ b/packages/triggers/trigger-record-change/src/reentrant-start-condition.test.ts
@@ -83,6 +83,104 @@ type EngineWithLogger = { logger: { warn(message: string, meta?: unknown): void
 
 const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
 
+/**
+ * ⚠️ [#17985] The authz objects a write here makes core's
+ * `resolveUserAuthzGrants` read. They belong to `@objectstack/plugin-auth` and
+ * `@objectstack/plugin-security`; they are spelled LOCALLY, with only the
+ * columns that resolver reads, so this fixture adds no dependency edge onto
+ * either package (the `find-envelope-limb-removal.test.ts` precedent, applied
+ * by PR #17982 to the two `plugin-auth` fixtures with the same defect).
+ *
+ * Without them the driver REFUSED every one of those reads — measured at
+ * `2f1a6f696`: 10 `refused a read on` driver lines, two per table across this
+ * file's two writes.
+ * `tryFind` classifies a missing table as "not provisioned" and answers `[]`,
+ * so nothing went red: the assertions below passed over grant reads that never
+ * happened. ⛔ Registering the tables is what makes those reads SUCCEED; the
+ * fix is not to quieten the line.
+ *
+ * Columns, and why each is here — every other column of the real objects is
+ * deliberately absent, because no read on this path touches it:
+ *   `sys_user`                 id (filter), email (the RLS owner-email fallback)
+ *   `sys_member`               user_id / organization_id (filters), role
+ *   `sys_user_position`        user_id (filter), position, organization_id
+ *   `sys_user_permission_set`  user_id (filter), permission_set_id, organization_id
+ *   `sys_position`             name (filter), id, active (`isRowActive`),
+ *                              organization_id (the driver's tenant scope)
+ *
+ * ⛔ `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_permission_set` are NOT here: the
+ * resolver reaches them only once a `sys_position` row resolves and a
+ * permission-set id is collected, and nothing here seeds either. The ADR-0091
+ * validity columns are absent for the reason `sys_member` lacks them today:
+ * `isGrantActive` reads an absent bound as unbounded, so declaring them would
+ * change no verdict here.
+ */
+const authzResolverObjects = [
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-auth',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user',
+      label: 'User',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        email: { name: 'email', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-auth',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_member',
+      label: 'Member',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        role: { name: 'role', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user_position',
+      label: 'User Position',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        position: { name: 'position', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_user_permission_set',
+      label: 'User Permission Set',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        user_id: { name: 'user_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        permission_set_id: { name: 'permission_set_id', type: 'text' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    owner: '@objectstack/plugin-security',
+    def: {
+      name: 'sys_position',
+      label: 'Position',
+      fields: {
+        id: { name: 'id', type: 'text' as const, primaryKey: true },
+        name: { name: 'name', type: 'text' as const },
+        active: { name: 'active', type: 'boolean' as const },
+        organization_id: { name: 'organization_id', type: 'text' as const },
+      },
+    },
+  },
+] as const;
+
 function makeSqliteDriver(): SqlDriver {
   return new SqlDriver({
     client: 'better-sqlite3',
@@ -167,6 +265,11 @@ describe("a record-change flow's start condition is evaluated on its own write-b
     openDrivers.push(driver);
 
     objectql.registry.registerObject(caseObjectDef('esc_case'), 'test', 'test');
+    // [#17985] The authz resolver's own reads, registered before the sync so
+    // they are provisioned rather than refused.
+    for (const o of authzResolverObjects) {
+      objectql.registry.registerObject(o.def as never, o.owner);
+    }
     await objectql.syncSchemas();
     automation.registerFlow('esc_escalation', escalationFlow('esc_escalation', 'esc_case') as never);