@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ that silently does not happen.
 | 21 | **`readonly` strip bypassed — INSERT** | objectql | Same, on create — one gate over BOTH create-side passes since the 2026-09-03 ruling moved the static-`readonly` strip in beside the runtime-owned one and deleted the DataProtocol ingress copy. `isSystem` is the **only** exemption on this path: `preserveAudit` is deliberately not read on create, so a non-system historical import is still stripped. A second read in the same symbol gates the pass that withholds those caller values from `beforeInsert` before the strip, the same exemption, so a system caller's hook still sees what it sent | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#insert` |
 | 21b | **`readonly` strip bypassed — the write PREVIEW (`ObjectQL.validate`)** | objectql | Same as 19–21, in the preview: it runs the write's caller-write strips under the write's own gate, so a system preview reports no `readonly` drop and judges the value a system write would store. The `computed` strip of a `formula` value is NOT gated here or on either write verb — no driver has a column for it, so it runs for every caller | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#validate` |
 | 22 | Strict-drop refusal never fires | objectql | Lose: a caller that opted into loud refusal gets **silence** — strict refuses exactly what the strip would have taken, and the strip took nothing. Two exceptions, both judged in every context: a `formula` value, which the `computed` strip takes from every caller, and a value for a stored field that declares `expression` when it differs from the value the engine computes in its place (`stored_expression`), so strict still refuses both | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#insert`, `packages/objectql/src/readonly-strict-errors.ts#READONLY_CLASS_REASONS` |
-| 23 | **Referential-integrity check skipped** | objectql | Get: writes proceed against unreachable/unresolvable targets. Lose: an `isSystem` caller can write a **dangling reference** | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#assertReferencesResolve` |
+| 23 | **Referential-integrity check skipped** | objectql | Get: writes proceed against unreachable/unresolvable targets. Lose: an `isSystem` caller can write a **dangling reference** | `packages/objectql/src/engine-referential-integrity.ts#assertReferencesResolve` |
 | 23b | **Position-catalog check skipped** — a `sys_user_position` write whose `position` names no position in the security catalog is not refused | plugin-security | Get: a system writer can store an assignment naming no position — the seed loader writes `stack.data` from `AppPlugin.start()` under a system context, as invitation acceptance and the platform's own bootstraps do. Lose: such a row grants nothing and nothing says so. A non-system insert, or a non-system update that changes `position`, is refused `400 VALIDATION_FAILED` / `reference_not_found` instead when the security catalog holds no position of that name: the environment registry (ADR-0131 D3), one per deployment, which takes no organization, so a name only a `sys_position` row carries — any organization's — is refused like one nobody carries. It is the same stand-down as the engine's referential-integrity check for a lookup column | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/position-catalog-refusal.ts#assertPositionNamesCatalogRow` |
 | 23c | **Grant-name catalog check skipped** — a `sys_user_permission_set` write whose `permission_set` names no permission set in the security catalog is not refused | plugin-security | Get: a system writer can store a grant naming a set not yet registered — seed replay and boot provisioning may write the grant before the definition it names is registered. Lose: such a row grants nothing and nothing says so. A non-system insert, or a non-system update that changes `permission_set`, is refused `400 VALIDATION_FAILED` / `reference_not_found` instead when the security catalog holds no set by that name; a grant that names no set at all is refused `required` for every caller. The grant names its set by name alone, and nothing derives the name from `permission_set_id` (ADR-0131 D4, D10) | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-permission-set-name.ts#onInsert`, `#onUpdate` |
 | 23d | **Grant-holder membership check skipped** — a `sys_user_position` or `sys_user_permission_set` write naming a user with no `sys_member` row in the row's organization is not refused | plugin-security | Get: a system writer can store such a grant — invitation acceptance writes the membership and its placement together, and seed replay, the organization-admin reconcile and the platform bootstraps write grants as the system. Lose: such a row takes effect once its user is admitted to the organization. A non-system insert, or a non-system update that moves `user_id` or `organization_id`, is refused `400 VALIDATION_FAILED` / `reference_not_found` at `user_id` instead, for every caller, a platform administrator included; the membership is read as `{ isSystem: true, tenantId }` with `tenantId` the row's own organization, never another one. A row stored with no organization is not judged. Under `single`, 18.0 stamps a new grant with the Default Organization, so such a row is one an earlier release wrote | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-holder-membership-refusal.ts#onInsert`, `#onUpdate` |
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ that silently does not happen.
 | 28 | Dependent-count disclosure on a blocked delete | objectql | Get: the count of blocking children. Nothing was elevated past the caller, so nothing is withheld | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#dependentCountIsDisclosable` |
 | 29 | Reference-cleanup log attributes the write to `'system'` | objectql | Get: an honest actor label instead of `anonymous` when the context carries neither `userId` nor `actor` | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#recordReferenceCheckElevation` |
 | 29b | A traversing validation rule's related read skips the **caller's bounds** | objectql | Get: no row bound from the caller's own read on a related object no organization wall scopes, no read door on a header the rule reads through a `master_detail` field, and a related read even with no organization under a walled posture (a `tenantId` on the context still scopes it). Every caller that is not system is held to all three: a header its read door does not return is unavailable to the rule exactly as a header that exists nowhere is, whatever it holds, and a header it can read is judged on its stored values. A plain `lookup` to an object an organization wall scopes asks no read door, system caller or not | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#resolveOneHopRelated` |
-| 29c | A detail write's master-detail header read asks **no read door** | objectql | Get: the write binds the header a parent-scoped `requiredWhen` / `readonlyWhen` reads as `parent` from the header's stored row whoever can read it, as before. Every caller that is not system meets its own read door first: a header that read does not return answers as a header that exists nowhere — an unbound `parent`, and `reference_not_found` on the reference check (which a system caller's write skips altogether) | `packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#masterDetailHeadersCallerReads` |
+| 29c | A detail write's master-detail header read asks **no read door** | objectql | Get: the write binds the header a parent-scoped `requiredWhen` / `readonlyWhen` reads as `parent` from the header's stored row whoever can read it, as before. Every caller that is not system meets its own read door first: a header that read does not return answers as a header that exists nowhere — an unbound `parent`, and `reference_not_found` on the reference check (which a system caller's write skips altogether) | `packages/objectql/src/engine-referential-integrity.ts#masterDetailHeadersCallerReads` |
 | 30 | **Bulk data event `organizationId` OMITTED** — the batch is published "not asserted" | plugin-security | Get: nothing — the `data.records.*` event still publishes. Lose: the per-organization attribution: this exit is taken before the security middleware composes any tenant wall, so it records no Layer 0 verdict on the operation (`OperationContext.tenantLayer0Verdict`, #15813), and the engine's bulk producer — which reads that recorded verdict and nothing else — omits the key rather than filling it from the caller's `tenantId`; a tenant-scoped consumer then does not deliver the event inside an organization wall (#15225) | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-authz-middleware.ts#registerAuthzMiddleware` |
 | 30b | **The import doors admit a control opt-out** — `runAutomations: false` and `treatAsHistorical: true` on `POST /data/:object/import` and `/import/jobs` | rest | Get: an import whose rows are written with `skipAutomations` (no metadata-bound hook, no record-change trigger: an app's approvals and record freezes among them) or with `skipStateMachine` and `preserveAudit`. Every other caller, every signed-in user and administrator included, is refused `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` before the body is parsed, so nothing is written and no job is created. Inbound HTTP never carries the flag, so this is an in-process caller's door. Note: the flag still suppresses none of those controls by itself (see below); it only admits the opt-outs that do | `packages/rest/src/import-prepare.ts#importControlOptOutRefusal` |
 | 30c | **The import undo keeps the control skips** — `POST /data/import/jobs/:jobId/undo` | rest | Get: an undo whose deletes and restores are written with `skipAutomations` and `skipStateMachine`, so no metadata-bound hook, record-change trigger or `state_machine` rule refuses a reversal. Every other caller, every signed-in user and administrator included, undoes under those controls: a reversal one of them refuses is reported per row in the undo answer's `failures` and kept in the job's undo log, and the job is stamped reverted only once every row is. A historical job's `preserveAudit` belongs to the job, not the caller, and rides every undo. Inbound HTTP never carries the flag, so this is an in-process caller's door | `packages/rest/src/data-action-routes.ts#importUndoWriteContext` |
 
@@ -138,7 +138,6 @@ const CALLERS: Record<string, Classification> = {
     read: "the expansion sub-read (`ObjectQL.expandRelatedRecords`), for the data door's `$expand`",
     decidedIn: 'packages/metadata-protocol/src/protocol-query-validation.ts',
     also:
-      'the write-path reference-existence probe (`referenceExists`: whether a stored id resolves, no field) and ' +
       'the validation-predicate reads (`resolvePredicateRelated`: a pass/fail verdict, the value never served). ' +
       "The engine's privileged callers (a flow's `config.expand`, a hook's read) never pass the door, by design.",
   },
@@ -210,6 +209,14 @@ const CALLERS: Record<string, Classification> = {
     kind: 'not-a-served-read',
     reason: "resolves a seed's references at install, under the system identity; serves nothing to a caller",
   },
+  // [#25522 cut 10] The write-path reference check, moved out of engine.ts.
+  'packages/objectql/src/engine-referential-integrity.ts': {
+    kind: 'not-a-served-read',
+    reason:
+      'the write-path reference-existence check (`assertReferencesResolve`): it asks whether a caller-supplied id ' +
+      "resolves on the target (the engine's `referenceExists` probe) and answers `reference_not_found` or nothing, " +
+      'never a field of the target',
+  },
   'packages/objectql/src/integrity/dangling-reference-audit.ts': {
     kind: 'not-a-served-read',
     reason: 'an integrity audit: it probes whether a stored id resolves and reports ids, never a field of the target',