diff --git a/data/agentic-controls.json b/data/agentic-controls.json index 1c2eb87..cdf7945 100644 --- a/data/agentic-controls.json +++ b/data/agentic-controls.json @@ -73,7 +73,13 @@ "name": "Model action privilege minimization", "url": "https://www.opencre.org/cre/220-442" } - ] + ], + "spec": { + "status": "public", + "name": "cA2A", + "topic": "capability attenuation", + "url": "https://ca2a.agentrust-io.com/docs/spec/delegation-chain/#ca2a-delegation-verification" + } }, { "id": "AT-04", @@ -95,7 +101,13 @@ "name": "AI user transparency", "url": "https://www.opencre.org/cre/810-884" } - ] + ], + "spec": { + "status": "public", + "name": "Agent Manifest", + "topic": "declared intent", + "url": "https://manifest.agentrust-io.com/spec/agent-manifest-v0.2/#am-declared-intent" + } }, { "id": "AT-05", @@ -158,7 +170,13 @@ "name": "Audit & accountability", "url": "https://www.opencre.org/cre/217-168" } - ] + ], + "spec": { + "status": "public", + "name": "TRACE", + "topic": "evidence record format", + "url": "https://trace.agentrust-io.com/docs/schema/#trace-schema" + } }, { "id": "AT-08", @@ -408,7 +426,13 @@ "name": "Sanitization and sandboxing", "url": "https://www.opencre.org/cre/764-765" } - ] + ], + "spec": { + "status": "public", + "name": "cMCP", + "topic": "tool authorization", + "url": "https://cmcp.agentrust-io.com/spec/cedar-policy/#cmcp-policy-evaluation" + } }, { "id": "AT-18", @@ -614,7 +638,13 @@ "name": "Runtime model integrity controls", "url": "https://www.opencre.org/cre/276-748" } - ] + ], + "spec": { + "status": "public", + "name": "TRACE", + "topic": "hardware evidence", + "url": "https://trace.agentrust-io.com/docs/trust-levels/#trace-l1" + } }, { "id": "AT-27", @@ -631,7 +661,13 @@ "name": "Log integrity", "url": "https://www.opencre.org/cre/148-420" } - ] + ], + "spec": { + "status": "public", + "name": "TRACE", + "topic": "transparency anchoring", + "url": "https://trace.agentrust-io.com/docs/trust-levels/#trace-l2" + } }, { "id": "AT-28", @@ -653,7 +689,13 @@ "name": "Mutually authenticate application components", "url": "https://www.opencre.org/cre/530-671" } - ] + ], + "spec": { + "status": "public", + "name": "cA2A", + "topic": "channel attestation and key custody", + "url": "https://ca2a.agentrust-io.com/docs/spec/sealed-channel/#ca2a-channel-key-custody" + } }, { "id": "AT-29", @@ -688,7 +730,7 @@ "slug": "model-weight-custody", "name": "Model weight custody against the hosting operator", "enforcement_points": [], - "requirement": "Model weights released into infrastructure the model owner does not control remain under the owner's custody, including against the infrastructure operator.", + "requirement": "Model weights are released only to a runtime that satisfies the signed release policy. Custody claims state the required platform protections and residual operator trust; physical ownership of the hardware is outside the base custody guarantee.", "permalink": "https://agentrust-io.com/go/model-weight-custody/", "opencre": [ { @@ -709,9 +751,9 @@ ], "spec": { "status": "public", - "topic": "model weight custody", "name": "Weight Custody Manifest", - "url": "https://wcm.agentrust-io.com/" + "topic": "model weight custody", + "url": "https://github.com/agentrust-io/weight-custody-manifest/blob/main/SPEC.md#wcm-guarantee-scope" } } ] diff --git a/go/index.html b/go/index.html index c69c797..dc75228 100644 --- a/go/index.html +++ b/go/index.html @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@
A grant passed to a sub-agent is a subset of the grant it derives from. Delegation depth is bounded and no hop may widen scope.
+ @@ -146,6 +147,7 @@The agent declares its purpose and the boundary of its task in a form a policy engine can read, not only a form a person can read.
+ @@ -172,6 +174,7 @@The action record is signed so that a party who does not trust the operator of the log can still verify who acted and what was decided.
+ @@ -256,6 +259,7 @@Every tool call is an authorization decision made outside the model against the agent's granted scope, not a decision the model makes about itself.
+ @@ -332,6 +336,7 @@Evidence of what is actually executing is produced by the platform at startup and appraised by a relying party that does not control that platform.
+ @@ -340,6 +345,7 @@Evidence records are anchored in an append-only log so a record cannot be rewritten after the fact without detection.
+ @@ -348,6 +354,7 @@An agent-to-agent channel establishes what the peer is, not only that the channel is encrypted, before scope is passed across it.
+ @@ -362,9 +369,9 @@Model weights released into infrastructure the model owner does not control remain under the owner's custody, including against the infrastructure operator.
+Model weights are released only to a runtime that satisfies the signed release policy. Custody claims state the required platform protections and residual operator trust; physical ownership of the hardware is outside the base custody guarantee.
- +