diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index f6a50c03..872f348a 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/).
 - **`scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh`:** the database DSN detector now fires on `user:password@host` (the old pattern ended at `@`, which `git-secrets`' word-match scan rejected before a hostname), and also covers `postgresql`, `mariadb`, driver-suffixed schemes and empty usernames (#125).
 - **`provider`:** `ProviderConfig` is renamed to `Config` (#39). `ProviderConfig` stays as a deprecated type alias, so existing consumers keep compiling; migrate to `provider.Config`. The provider modules move over once their pinned `pkg` version includes the rename.
 - **`provider`:** `ProviderConfig` is renamed to `Config` (#39). `ProviderConfig` stays as a type alias, so existing consumers keep compiling; migrate to `provider.Config`. The provider modules move over once their pinned `pkg` version includes the rename.
+- **`httpclient`:** dials to the RFC 8215 local-use NAT64 prefix `64:ff9b:1::/48` are refused when any RFC 6052 layout (/48, /56, /64, /96) embeds a metadata IPv4 address; Teredo `2001::/32` stays allowed (#238).
 - **`common.HoursPerMonth`:** exported 730-hour average month (`HoursPerYear / 12`) next to `HoursPerYear`; the remaining bare 730 and 8760 literals in the aws and gcp providers use the shared constants (#109).
 - **`gcp`:** region-lookup permission errors are now classified by type only (googleapi 403 or gRPC `PermissionDenied`) through the shared `IsPermissionError`. gRPC `PermissionDenied` is now skipped with a warning like a 403, and an untyped error whose text merely contains "403" and "permission" now propagates instead of being skipped (#6).
 - **BREAKING `gcp`: stored contexts removed (#6).** `computeengine.NewClient`
diff --git a/pkg/httpclient/embedded_test.go b/pkg/httpclient/embedded_test.go
index eba2d89b..a5922885 100644
--- a/pkg/httpclient/embedded_test.go
+++ b/pkg/httpclient/embedded_test.go
@@ -66,6 +66,80 @@ func TestBlockMetadata_EmbeddedAndUnspecified(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// nat64Local returns an address in 64:ff9b:1::/48 whose RFC 6052 layout
+// (index into rfc6052Layouts) carries v4.
+func nat64Local(t *testing.T, layout int, v4 string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	b := netip.MustParseAddr("64:ff9b:1::").As16()
+	o := netip.MustParseAddr(v4).As4()
+	for i, off := range rfc6052Layouts[layout] {
+		b[off] = o[i]
+	}
+	return "[" + netip.AddrFrom16(b).String() + "]:80"
+}
+
+// A local-use NAT64 prefix (RFC 8215) may embed any IPv4 under any RFC 6052
+// layout (/48, /56, /64, /96), so each layout carrying a metadata address must
+// be refused, and a global one must not.
+func TestBlockMetadata_LocalNAT64AllLayouts(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	for layout := range rfc6052Layouts {
+		for _, v4 := range []string{
+			"169.254.169.254", // IMDS
+			"169.254.170.2",   // ECS credentials
+			"168.63.129.16",   // Azure WireServer
+			"100.100.100.200", // Alibaba IMDS
+		} {
+			addr := nat64Local(t, layout, v4)
+			t.Run(addr, func(t *testing.T) {
+				t.Parallel()
+				if err := blockMetadata("tcp", addr, nil); err == nil {
+					t.Fatalf("%s (layout %d, %s) must be blocked", addr, layout, v4)
+				}
+			})
+		}
+		addr := nat64Local(t, layout, "8.8.8.8")
+		t.Run(addr, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			if err := blockMetadata("tcp", addr, nil); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("%s must stay allowed: %v", addr, err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+	for _, addr := range []string{
+		"[64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe]:80", // /96 literal from the issue
+		"[64:ff9b:1::169.254.169.254]:80",
+		"[64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe%eth0]:80",
+	} {
+		t.Run(addr, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			if err := blockMetadata("tcp", addr, nil); err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("%s must be blocked", addr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+	if err := blockMetadata("tcp", "[64:ff9b:2::a9fe:a9fe]:80", nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("address outside the /48 must stay allowed: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// Teredo is intentionally not decoded (see the Teredo comment in
+// httpclient.go).
+func TestBlockMetadata_TeredoStaysAllowed(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	for _, addr := range []string{
+		"[2001:0:4136:e378:8000:63bf:5601:5601]:80", // client field de-obfuscates to 169.254.169.254
+		"[2001::a9fe:a9fe]:80",
+	} {
+		t.Run(addr, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			if err := blockMetadata("tcp", addr, nil); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("%s must stay allowed: %v", addr, err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 // The guard runs for every dial, so a redirect to an embedded form or an
 // unspecified address is refused as well.
 func TestNew_BlocksEmbeddedFormsViaRedirect(t *testing.T) {
diff --git a/pkg/httpclient/httpclient.go b/pkg/httpclient/httpclient.go
index ba54b02c..2c0a4d98 100644
--- a/pkg/httpclient/httpclient.go
+++ b/pkg/httpclient/httpclient.go
@@ -64,6 +64,46 @@ var embeddedIPv4Prefixes = []struct {
 	{netip.MustParsePrefix("::/96"), 12},
 }
 
+// localNAT64 is the RFC 8215 local-use NAT64 prefix. Unlike the well-known
+// 64:ff9b::/96 (which RFC 6052 section 3.1 forbids from carrying non-global
+// IPv4), a network-specific prefix may embed any IPv4 address, including
+// metadata ones, and the operator chooses the prefix length (/48 to /96). The
+// IPv4 address is therefore decoded under every RFC 6052 layout and the dial is
+// refused if any decoding is blocked (#238).
+var localNAT64 = netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b:1::/48")
+
+// rfc6052Layouts lists, per NAT64 prefix length (/48, /56, /64, /96), the byte
+// offsets of the four IPv4 octets in the 16-byte form. Byte 8 is the reserved
+// "u" octet and is skipped by RFC 6052.
+var rfc6052Layouts = [][4]int{
+	{6, 7, 9, 10},
+	{7, 9, 10, 11},
+	{9, 10, 11, 12},
+	{12, 13, 14, 15},
+}
+
+// localNAT64Embedded returns the IPv4 address ip would translate to under each
+// RFC 6052 layout, or nil when ip is outside localNAT64.
+func localNAT64Embedded(ip netip.Addr) []netip.Addr {
+	if !localNAT64.Contains(ip) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	b := ip.As16()
+	out := make([]netip.Addr, 0, len(rfc6052Layouts))
+	for _, l := range rfc6052Layouts {
+		out = append(out, netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{b[l[0]], b[l[1]], b[l[2]], b[l[3]]}))
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// Teredo (2001::/32, deprecated) is deliberately NOT decoded (#238; pinned by
+// TestBlockMetadata_TeredoStaysAllowed). An address carries the relay's IPv4
+// and the client's obfuscated IPv4 (XOR 0xffff). The obfuscated client IPv4 is
+// where a relay sends the tunneled packets, as IPv6 inside UDP; it is not
+// reachable as a metadata endpoint, because nothing here opens a TCP
+// connection to it. A field that decodes to a metadata address is therefore
+// not a path to that endpoint.
+
 // embeddedIPv4 returns the IPv4 address ip carries, if any.
 func embeddedIPv4(ip netip.Addr) (netip.Addr, bool) {
 	b := ip.As16()
@@ -105,6 +145,11 @@ func blockMetadata(_, address string, _ syscall.RawConn) error {
 	if v4, ok := embeddedIPv4(ip); ok && isMetadata(v4) {
 		return fmt.Errorf("connection to metadata endpoint %s (embedded in %s) is blocked", v4, ip)
 	}
+	for _, v4 := range localNAT64Embedded(ip) {
+		if isMetadata(v4) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("connection to metadata endpoint %s (embedded in %s) is blocked", v4, ip)
+		}
+	}
 	return nil
 }