diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/README.md b/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/README.md
index 6e9b3a06547..0929162f25f 100644
--- a/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/README.md
+++ b/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/README.md
@@ -1644,6 +1644,35 @@ function handleResponse() {
 </script>
 ```
 
+### PostMessage-origin script loaders (opener-gated)
+
+If a page **stores `event.origin` from a `postMessage` and later concatenates it into a script URL**, the sender controls the **origin** of the loaded JS:
+
+```javascript
+window.addEventListener('message', (event) => {
+  if (event.data.msg_type === 'IWL_BOOTSTRAP') {
+    localStorage.setItem('CFG', {host: event.origin, pixelID: event.data.pixel_id});
+    startIWL(); // later loads `${host}/sdk/${pixelID}/iwl.js`
+  }
+});
+```
+
+Exploitation recipe (from CAPIG):
+
+- **Gates**: fires only when `window.opener` exists and `pixel_id` is allowlisted; **origin is never checked**.
+- **Use CSP-allowed origin**: pivot to a domain already permitted by the victim CSP (e.g., logged-out help pages allowing analytics like `*.THIRD-PARTY.com`) and host `/sdk/<pixel_id>/iwl.js` there via takeover/XSS/upload.
+- **Restore `opener`**: in Android WebView, `window.name='x'; window.open(target,'x')` makes the page its own opener; send the malicious `postMessage` from a hijacked iframe.
+- **Trigger**: the iframe posts `{msg_type:'IWL_BOOTSTRAP', pixel_id:<allowed>}`; the parent then loads attacker `iwl.js` from the CSP-allowed origin and runs it.
+
+This turns origin-less `postMessage` validation into a **remote script loader primitive** that survives CSP if you can land on any origin already allowed by the policy.
+
+### Supply-chain stored XSS via backend JS concatenation
+
+When a backend **builds a shared SDK by concatenating JS strings with user-controlled values**, any quote/structure breaker can inject script that is served to every consumer:
+
+- Example pattern (Meta CAPIG): server appends `cbq.config.set("<pixel>","IWLParameters",{params: <user JSON>});` directly into `capig-events.js`.
+- Injecting `'` or `"]}` closes the literal/object and adds attacker JS, creating **stored XSS** in the distributed SDK for every site that loads it (first-party and third-party).
+
 ### Abusing Service Workers
 
 
@@ -2006,5 +2035,6 @@ other-js-tricks.md
 - [HackerOne Report #2902856 - Nextcloud Mail List-Unsubscribe SSRF](https://hackerone.com/reports/2902856)
 - [From "Low-Impact" RXSS to Credential Stealer: A JS-in-JS Walkthrough](https://r3verii.github.io/bugbounty/2025/08/25/rxss-credential-stealer.html)
 - [MDN eval()](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/eval)
+- [CAPIG XSS: postMessage origin trust becomes a script loader + backend JS concatenation enables supply-chain stored XSS](https://ysamm.com/uncategorized/2026/01/13/capig-xss.html)
 
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