diff --git a/src/multitoken_contract/README.md b/src/multitoken_contract/README.md
index 6036d073..1a8385cf 100644
--- a/src/multitoken_contract/README.md
+++ b/src/multitoken_contract/README.md
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ All addresses are `AztecAddress`; `id` is a `Field`, `amount` is a `u128`, and `
 - `initialize_transfer_commitment(to, completer) -> Field` — Creates a partial note (privacy entrance) to be completed by later transfers/mints. Id-agnostic: the completer binds `id` and `amount`. See [Commitment trust model](#commitment-trust-model) before using a commitment as a payment guarantee.
 - `mint_to_private(to, id, amount)` — Minter mints `id` into a private balance. Fully private.
 - `burn_private(from, id, amount, nonce)` — Burns `id` from a private balance. Fully private.
+- `cancel_authwit(inner_hash)` — Cancels a private authwit the caller previously granted, by emitting its `(msg_sender, inner_hash)` nullifier so it can no longer be consumed.
 
 ### Public Functions
 
diff --git a/src/multitoken_contract/src/main.nr b/src/multitoken_contract/src/main.nr
index 72554317..2567c663 100644
--- a/src/multitoken_contract/src/main.nr
+++ b/src/multitoken_contract/src/main.nr
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use aztec::macros::aztec;
 pub contract MultiToken {
     // aztec library
     use aztec::{
+        authwit::auth::compute_authwit_nullifier,
         macros::{
             events::event,
             functions::{authorize_once, external, initializer, internal, only_self, view},
@@ -450,6 +451,17 @@ pub contract MultiToken {
         self.emit(TransferSingle { from, to: AztecAddress::zero(), id, amount });
     }
 
+    /// @notice Cancels a private authentication witness the caller previously granted
+    /// @dev Emits the authwit nullifier for `(msg_sender, inner_hash)`, so an authwit that has been
+    ///      granted but not yet consumed can no longer be used. Matches the upstream token contracts.
+    /// @param inner_hash The inner hash of the authwit to cancel
+    #[external("private")]
+    fn cancel_authwit(inner_hash: Field) {
+        let on_behalf_of = self.msg_sender();
+        let nullifier = compute_authwit_nullifier(on_behalf_of, inner_hash);
+        self.context.push_nullifier_unsafe(nullifier);
+    }
+
     /** ==========================================================
      * ================= TOKEN LIBRARIES =========================
      * ======================================================== */
diff --git a/src/multitoken_contract/src/test.nr b/src/multitoken_contract/src/test.nr
index db99ce37..0c5313cb 100644
--- a/src/multitoken_contract/src/test.nr
+++ b/src/multitoken_contract/src/test.nr
@@ -13,4 +13,5 @@ mod burn_public;
 mod authorization;
 mod balance_of;
 mod initialize_transfer_commitment;
+mod cancel_authwit;
 pub mod utils;
diff --git a/src/multitoken_contract/src/test/cancel_authwit.nr b/src/multitoken_contract/src/test/cancel_authwit.nr
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..374a579a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/multitoken_contract/src/test/cancel_authwit.nr
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+use crate::MultiToken;
+use crate::test::utils;
+use aztec::authwit::auth::compute_inner_authwit_hash;
+use aztec::hash::hash_args;
+use aztec::protocol::traits::ToField;
+use aztec::test::helpers::authwit as authwit_cheatcodes;
+use generic_proxy::GenericProxy;
+
+// Proves that once `owner` cancels a private authwit, a caller holding it can no longer consume it:
+// the cancellation pre-emits the authwit nullifier, so the later authwit-gated transfer fails when
+// it tries to emit the same nullifier again.
+#[test(should_fail_with = "duplicate nullifiers")]
+unconstrained fn cancelled_authwit_cannot_be_consumed() {
+    let id: Field = 1;
+    let (mut env, multitoken_contract_address, owner, recipient, _minter, proxy) =
+        utils::setup_and_mint_to_private_with_proxy(id);
+
+    let transfer_amount = (1_000 as u128);
+    let transfer_call = MultiToken::at(multitoken_contract_address).transfer_private_to_private(
+        owner,
+        recipient,
+        id,
+        transfer_amount,
+        1,
+    );
+
+    authwit_cheatcodes::add_private_authwit_from_call(env, owner, proxy, transfer_call);
+
+    let inner_hash = compute_inner_authwit_hash([
+        proxy.to_field(),
+        transfer_call.selector.to_field(),
+        hash_args(transfer_call.args),
+    ]);
+    env.call_private(owner, MultiToken::at(multitoken_contract_address).cancel_authwit(inner_hash));
+
+    env.call_private(
+        owner,
+        GenericProxy::at(proxy).forward_private_5(
+            transfer_call.target_contract,
+            transfer_call.selector,
+            transfer_call.args,
+        ),
+    );
+}
+
+// Positive control: the same flow WITHOUT the cancel succeeds, attributing the failure above to the
+// cancellation.
+#[test]
+unconstrained fn uncancelled_authwit_is_consumed() {
+    let id: Field = 1;
+    let (mut env, multitoken_contract_address, owner, recipient, _minter, proxy) =
+        utils::setup_and_mint_to_private_with_proxy(id);
+
+    let transfer_amount = (1_000 as u128);
+    let transfer_call = MultiToken::at(multitoken_contract_address).transfer_private_to_private(
+        owner,
+        recipient,
+        id,
+        transfer_amount,
+        1,
+    );
+
+    authwit_cheatcodes::add_private_authwit_from_call(env, owner, proxy, transfer_call);
+
+    env.call_private(
+        owner,
+        GenericProxy::at(proxy).forward_private_5(
+            transfer_call.target_contract,
+            transfer_call.selector,
+            transfer_call.args,
+        ),
+    );
+
+    utils::check_private_balance(
+        env,
+        multitoken_contract_address,
+        recipient,
+        id,
+        transfer_amount,
+    );
+}
+
+// Caller isolation: a foreign account cancelling with the owner's exact inner hash does NOT revoke
+// the owner's authwit — the nullifier is bound to `msg_sender`.
+#[test]
+unconstrained fn foreign_cancel_does_not_revoke_owner_authwit() {
+    let id: Field = 1;
+    let (mut env, multitoken_contract_address, owner, recipient, _minter, proxy) =
+        utils::setup_and_mint_to_private_with_proxy(id);
+
+    let transfer_amount = (1_000 as u128);
+    let transfer_call = MultiToken::at(multitoken_contract_address).transfer_private_to_private(
+        owner,
+        recipient,
+        id,
+        transfer_amount,
+        1,
+    );
+    authwit_cheatcodes::add_private_authwit_from_call(env, owner, proxy, transfer_call);
+
+    let inner_hash = compute_inner_authwit_hash([
+        proxy.to_field(),
+        transfer_call.selector.to_field(),
+        hash_args(transfer_call.args),
+    ]);
+    // `recipient` (not the granter) attempts to cancel the owner's authwit
+    env.call_private(
+        recipient,
+        MultiToken::at(multitoken_contract_address).cancel_authwit(inner_hash),
+    );
+
+    env.call_private(
+        owner,
+        GenericProxy::at(proxy).forward_private_5(
+            transfer_call.target_contract,
+            transfer_call.selector,
+            transfer_call.args,
+        ),
+    );
+    utils::check_private_balance(
+        env,
+        multitoken_contract_address,
+        recipient,
+        id,
+        transfer_amount,
+    );
+}
diff --git a/src/nft_contract/README.md b/src/nft_contract/README.md
index b6613871..97b43a96 100644
--- a/src/nft_contract/README.md
+++ b/src/nft_contract/README.md
@@ -169,6 +169,16 @@ fn mint_to_private(to: AztecAddress, token_id: Field) { /* ... */ }
 fn burn_private(from: AztecAddress, token_id: Field, _nonce: Field) { /* ... */ }
 ```
 
+### cancel_authwit
+```rust
+/// @notice Cancels a private authentication witness the caller previously granted
+/// @dev Emits the authwit nullifier for `(msg_sender, inner_hash)`, so an authwit that has been
+///      granted but not yet consumed can no longer be used
+/// @param inner_hash The inner hash of the authwit to cancel
+#[private]
+fn cancel_authwit(inner_hash: Field) { /* ... */ }
+```
+
 ## Public Functions
 
 ### transfer_public_to_public
diff --git a/src/nft_contract/src/main.nr b/src/nft_contract/src/main.nr
index 9a8db51a..12320e55 100644
--- a/src/nft_contract/src/main.nr
+++ b/src/nft_contract/src/main.nr
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use aztec::macros::aztec;
 pub contract NFT {
     // aztec library
     use aztec::{
+        authwit::auth::compute_authwit_nullifier,
         macros::{
             events::event,
             functions::{authorize_once, external, initializer, internal, only_self, view},
@@ -408,6 +409,17 @@ pub contract NFT {
         self.emit(Transfer { from, to: AztecAddress::zero(), token_id });
     }
 
+    /// @notice Cancels a private authentication witness the caller previously granted
+    /// @dev Emits the authwit nullifier for `(msg_sender, inner_hash)`, so an authwit that has been
+    ///      granted but not yet consumed can no longer be used. Matches the upstream NFT contract.
+    /// @param inner_hash The inner hash of the authwit to cancel
+    #[external("private")]
+    fn cancel_authwit(inner_hash: Field) {
+        let on_behalf_of = self.msg_sender();
+        let nullifier = compute_authwit_nullifier(on_behalf_of, inner_hash);
+        self.context.push_nullifier_unsafe(nullifier);
+    }
+
     /** ==========================================================
      * ================= TOKEN LIBRARIES =========================
      * ======================================================== */
diff --git a/src/nft_contract/src/test.nr b/src/nft_contract/src/test.nr
index 6528cd53..b4b8d0b9 100644
--- a/src/nft_contract/src/test.nr
+++ b/src/nft_contract/src/test.nr
@@ -10,5 +10,6 @@ mod transfer_private_to_public_with_commitment;
 mod transfer_private_to_public;
 mod transfer_public_to_private;
 mod transfer_public_to_public;
+mod cancel_authwit;
 pub mod utils;
 mod view;
diff --git a/src/nft_contract/src/test/cancel_authwit.nr b/src/nft_contract/src/test/cancel_authwit.nr
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..17a35660
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/nft_contract/src/test/cancel_authwit.nr
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+use crate::NFT;
+use crate::test::utils;
+use aztec::authwit::auth::compute_inner_authwit_hash;
+use aztec::hash::hash_args;
+use aztec::protocol::traits::ToField;
+use aztec::test::helpers::authwit as authwit_cheatcodes;
+use generic_proxy::GenericProxy;
+
+// Proves that once `owner` cancels a private authwit, a caller holding it can no longer consume it:
+// the cancellation pre-emits the authwit nullifier, so the later authwit-gated transfer fails when
+// it tries to emit the same nullifier again.
+#[test(should_fail_with = "duplicate nullifiers")]
+unconstrained fn cancelled_authwit_cannot_be_consumed() {
+    let token_id = 1;
+    let (mut env, nft_contract_address, owner, _minter, recipient, proxy) =
+        utils::setup_and_mint_to_private_with_proxy(token_id);
+
+    let transfer_call =
+        NFT::at(nft_contract_address).transfer_private_to_private(owner, recipient, token_id, 1);
+
+    authwit_cheatcodes::add_private_authwit_from_call(env, owner, proxy, transfer_call);
+
+    let inner_hash = compute_inner_authwit_hash([
+        proxy.to_field(),
+        transfer_call.selector.to_field(),
+        hash_args(transfer_call.args),
+    ]);
+    env.call_private(owner, NFT::at(nft_contract_address).cancel_authwit(inner_hash));
+
+    env.call_private(
+        owner,
+        GenericProxy::at(proxy).forward_private_4(
+            transfer_call.target_contract,
+            transfer_call.selector,
+            transfer_call.args,
+        ),
+    );
+}
+
+// Positive control: the same flow WITHOUT the cancel succeeds, attributing the failure above to the
+// cancellation.
+#[test]
+unconstrained fn uncancelled_authwit_is_consumed() {
+    let token_id = 1;
+    let (mut env, nft_contract_address, owner, _minter, recipient, proxy) =
+        utils::setup_and_mint_to_private_with_proxy(token_id);
+
+    let transfer_call =
+        NFT::at(nft_contract_address).transfer_private_to_private(owner, recipient, token_id, 1);
+
+    authwit_cheatcodes::add_private_authwit_from_call(env, owner, proxy, transfer_call);
+
+    env.call_private(
+        owner,
+        GenericProxy::at(proxy).forward_private_4(
+            transfer_call.target_contract,
+            transfer_call.selector,
+            transfer_call.args,
+        ),
+    );
+
+    utils::assert_owns_private_nft(env, nft_contract_address, recipient, token_id);
+}
+
+// Caller isolation: a foreign account cancelling with the owner's exact inner hash does NOT revoke
+// the owner's authwit — the nullifier is bound to `msg_sender`.
+#[test]
+unconstrained fn foreign_cancel_does_not_revoke_owner_authwit() {
+    let token_id = 1;
+    let (mut env, nft_contract_address, owner, _minter, recipient, proxy) =
+        utils::setup_and_mint_to_private_with_proxy(token_id);
+
+    let transfer_call =
+        NFT::at(nft_contract_address).transfer_private_to_private(owner, recipient, token_id, 1);
+    authwit_cheatcodes::add_private_authwit_from_call(env, owner, proxy, transfer_call);
+
+    let inner_hash = compute_inner_authwit_hash([
+        proxy.to_field(),
+        transfer_call.selector.to_field(),
+        hash_args(transfer_call.args),
+    ]);
+    // `recipient` (not the granter) attempts to cancel the owner's authwit
+    env.call_private(recipient, NFT::at(nft_contract_address).cancel_authwit(inner_hash));
+
+    env.call_private(
+        owner,
+        GenericProxy::at(proxy).forward_private_4(
+            transfer_call.target_contract,
+            transfer_call.selector,
+            transfer_call.args,
+        ),
+    );
+    utils::assert_owns_private_nft(env, nft_contract_address, recipient, token_id);
+}
diff --git a/src/token_contract/README.md b/src/token_contract/README.md
index 2cf938f1..3ea4c8ca 100644
--- a/src/token_contract/README.md
+++ b/src/token_contract/README.md
@@ -357,6 +357,16 @@ fn mint_to_private(to: AztecAddress, amount: u128) { /* ... */ }
 fn burn_private(from: AztecAddress, amount: u128, nonce: Field) { /* ... */ }
 ```
 
+### cancel_authwit
+```rust
+/// @notice Cancels a private authentication witness the caller previously granted
+/// @dev Emits the authwit nullifier for `(msg_sender, inner_hash)`, so an authwit that has been
+///      granted but not yet consumed can no longer be used
+/// @param inner_hash The inner hash of the authwit to cancel
+#[private]
+fn cancel_authwit(inner_hash: Field) { /* ... */ }
+```
+
 ## ARC-403 Authorization Hook
 
 The authorization contract address is set at construction via the `auth_contract` parameter on both constructors and stored as an immutable field. A zero address disables the hook. When set, each hooked function calls either `authorize_private(from, amount, selector)` or `authorize_public(from, amount, selector)` on the authorization contract after authwit validation and before any balance mutation. The token operation reverts if the authorization call reverts. The hook variant matches the calling function's context — private functions call `authorize_private`, public functions call `authorize_public` — and the `selector` passed is the calling function's own selector.
diff --git a/src/token_contract/src/main.nr b/src/token_contract/src/main.nr
index 3201ef61..fd57d2ae 100644
--- a/src/token_contract/src/main.nr
+++ b/src/token_contract/src/main.nr
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use aztec::macros::aztec;
 pub contract Token {
     // aztec library
     use aztec::{
+        authwit::auth::compute_authwit_nullifier,
         macros::{
             events::event,
             functions::{authorize_once, external, initializer, internal, only_self, view},
@@ -491,6 +492,17 @@ pub contract Token {
         self.internal._burn_public(from, amount);
     }
 
+    /// @notice Cancels a private authentication witness the caller previously granted
+    /// @dev Emits the authwit nullifier for `(msg_sender, inner_hash)`, so an authwit that has been
+    ///      granted but not yet consumed can no longer be used. Matches the upstream Token contract.
+    /// @param inner_hash The inner hash of the authwit to cancel
+    #[external("private")]
+    fn cancel_authwit(inner_hash: Field) {
+        let on_behalf_of = self.msg_sender();
+        let nullifier = compute_authwit_nullifier(on_behalf_of, inner_hash);
+        self.context.push_nullifier_unsafe(nullifier);
+    }
+
     /// @notice Decreases the total supply by `amount`
     /// @param amount The amount of tokens to decrease the total supply by
     #[external("public")]
diff --git a/src/token_contract/src/test.nr b/src/token_contract/src/test.nr
index e6a695d3..a4f256f3 100644
--- a/src/token_contract/src/test.nr
+++ b/src/token_contract/src/test.nr
@@ -12,5 +12,6 @@ mod transfer_public_to_public;
 mod transfer_public_to_commitment;
 mod transfer_public_to_private;
 mod authorization;
+mod cancel_authwit;
 mod view;
 pub mod utils;
diff --git a/src/token_contract/src/test/cancel_authwit.nr b/src/token_contract/src/test/cancel_authwit.nr
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9ddb0d5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/token_contract/src/test/cancel_authwit.nr
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+use crate::test::utils;
+use crate::Token;
+use aztec::authwit::auth::compute_inner_authwit_hash;
+use aztec::hash::hash_args;
+use aztec::protocol::traits::ToField;
+use aztec::test::helpers::authwit as authwit_cheatcodes;
+use generic_proxy::GenericProxy;
+
+// Proves that once `owner` cancels a private authwit, a caller holding that authwit can no longer
+// consume it: the cancellation pre-emits the authwit nullifier, so the later authwit-gated transfer
+// fails when it tries to emit the same nullifier again.
+#[test(should_fail_with = "duplicate nullifiers")]
+unconstrained fn cancelled_authwit_cannot_be_consumed() {
+    let (mut env, token_contract_address, owner, recipient, proxy) =
+        utils::setup_and_mint_to_private_with_proxy();
+
+    let transfer_amount = (1000 as u128);
+    let transfer_call = Token::at(token_contract_address).transfer_private_to_private(
+        owner,
+        recipient,
+        transfer_amount,
+        1,
+    );
+
+    // owner grants the authwit to the proxy
+    authwit_cheatcodes::add_private_authwit_from_call(env, owner, proxy, transfer_call);
+
+    // owner cancels it, using the same inner hash the authwit machinery derives
+    let inner_hash = compute_inner_authwit_hash([
+        proxy.to_field(),
+        transfer_call.selector.to_field(),
+        hash_args(transfer_call.args),
+    ]);
+    env.call_private(owner, Token::at(token_contract_address).cancel_authwit(inner_hash));
+
+    // proxy now attempts the transfer with the cancelled authwit — must fail
+    env.call_private(
+        owner,
+        GenericProxy::at(proxy).forward_private_4(
+            transfer_call.target_contract,
+            transfer_call.selector,
+            transfer_call.args,
+        ),
+    );
+}
+
+// Sanity: the SAME flow WITHOUT the cancel succeeds, so the failure above is attributable to the
+// cancellation and not to some unrelated setup problem.
+#[test]
+unconstrained fn uncancelled_authwit_is_consumed() {
+    let (mut env, token_contract_address, owner, recipient, proxy) =
+        utils::setup_and_mint_to_private_with_proxy();
+
+    let transfer_amount = (1000 as u128);
+    let transfer_call = Token::at(token_contract_address).transfer_private_to_private(
+        owner,
+        recipient,
+        transfer_amount,
+        1,
+    );
+
+    authwit_cheatcodes::add_private_authwit_from_call(env, owner, proxy, transfer_call);
+
+    env.call_private(
+        owner,
+        GenericProxy::at(proxy).forward_private_4(
+            transfer_call.target_contract,
+            transfer_call.selector,
+            transfer_call.args,
+        ),
+    );
+
+    utils::check_private_balance(env, token_contract_address, recipient, transfer_amount);
+}
+
+// Caller isolation: a foreign account cancelling with the owner's exact inner hash does NOT revoke
+// the owner's authwit — the nullifier is bound to `msg_sender`, so the foreign cancel nullifies a
+// different (attacker-bound) value and the owner's grant to the proxy still consumes successfully.
+#[test]
+unconstrained fn foreign_cancel_does_not_revoke_owner_authwit() {
+    let (mut env, token_contract_address, owner, recipient, proxy) =
+        utils::setup_and_mint_to_private_with_proxy();
+
+    let transfer_amount = (1000 as u128);
+    let transfer_call = Token::at(token_contract_address).transfer_private_to_private(
+        owner,
+        recipient,
+        transfer_amount,
+        1,
+    );
+    authwit_cheatcodes::add_private_authwit_from_call(env, owner, proxy, transfer_call);
+
+    let inner_hash = compute_inner_authwit_hash([
+        proxy.to_field(),
+        transfer_call.selector.to_field(),
+        hash_args(transfer_call.args),
+    ]);
+    // `recipient` (not the granter) attempts to cancel the owner's authwit
+    env.call_private(recipient, Token::at(token_contract_address).cancel_authwit(inner_hash));
+
+    // The owner's authwit is unaffected: the proxy transfer still succeeds
+    env.call_private(
+        owner,
+        GenericProxy::at(proxy).forward_private_4(
+            transfer_call.target_contract,
+            transfer_call.selector,
+            transfer_call.args,
+        ),
+    );
+    utils::check_private_balance(env, token_contract_address, recipient, transfer_amount);
+}